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ABSTRACT
The absence of a comprehensive, universal and legally binding definition of terrorism has
characterized the international terrorism discourse for decades. Scholarship on the
interplay between states, discourse, and power in shaping this dilemma has been largely
absent. This project attempts to sociologically examine this theoretical relationship by
primarily looking at the role of the state in producing, framing, and otherwise manipulating
the definition of terrorism, and consequently, the global terrorism discourse within the
United Nations. Applying the sociological concepts of states, discourse, and power, while
drawing on the theoretical lens of Bob Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach to
examining states, this study assesses the strategic political processes engaged in by UN
member-states over the last two decades to define and frame the discourse of terrorism.
At the very core of the political impasse to define terrorism is a confluence of three tightly
linked factors: 1) varying political interests carried out through ‘state projects’; 2) the
relative strength of geopolitical alliances or networks of states through which state projects
flow and operate; and 3) the need for states to attain political clout in transnational social
life by shaping and framing discourse as a weapon of power. By viewing the state as a
product of social and political relations within a larger global state system, this study sheds
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light on how states shape, manipulate, or otherwise use a constructed body of meaning,
i.e. the terrorism discourse, to influence decision-making processes and norms in
international security affairs.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
“The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. [The claim
that] it is unnecessary and well nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long
established itself as the “politically correct” one. [Yet]… an effective struggle against terrorism requires such
a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.”
- Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism

Overview of the Study: The Research Question
Why is there no comprehensive, universal and legally binding definition of
terrorism? This question has been asked numerous times by political, security, and social
science theorists and policy analysts, who have in turn offered extensive and critical
explanations for this lack of conceptual consensus. With no conclusive answer to this
puzzle, this definitional question is usually no longer posed in empirical or policy work on
terrorism; rather, scholars of the phenomenon simply assume a particular definition of
terrorism as a formality or truism, with each analyst operationalizing the concept to suit
the purpose of his or her work (Weinberg, Pedhazur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004). As Perry
(2010: 249) aptly points out, a definitional consensus on terrorism has been at least as
elusive as the Holy Grail. Despite the existence of copious theoretical work on terrorism
and what it means, as well as multiple United Nations (UN) conventions dealing with
“terrorist acts” (covering, inter alia, offences on aircrafts, threats to civil aviation, nuclear
terrorism, terrorist bombings, and the financing of terrorism), the world is far from
addressing the terrorist threat through the use of a common, objective definition of the
phenomenon. Arguably, this ambiguity in the academic and legal discourse – tied with the

1

inexhaustible debate characterizing the political discourse within the international state
system – has resulted in arbitrary national-level interpretation of the aforementioned
conventions in accordance with the post-9/11 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(A/RES/60/288). It is thus fair to argue that without a standardized, legal definition of
terrorism at the inter-state level, the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies agreed
upon by UN member-states becomes not only indiscriminate but, more importantly,
vulnerable to political conflicts and human rights abuses.
Given the thorny discourse surrounding the global definition of terrorism, this
study aims to find the sociological answers to why the international community
consistently fails to come to a formal agreement on what terrorism means and entails. The
study is guided by the following overarching research question: Why have United Nations
(UN) member-states been unable to come to a consensus on how to define terrorism
as a form of political violence? In particular, the study will ask: What are the social and
political conditions that affect the global discourse on terrorism, particularly the
construction of the definition of terrorism at the UN level? Who or what entities has/have
shaped the global discourse on terrorism, and by what means? How do power relations
and networks between states shape the discourse surrounding counterterrorism efforts?
In exploring these questions, this study aims to examine the social and political
conditions that affect the global discourse on terrorism, particularly with regard to the
construction of the definition of terrorism in reference to the proposed United Nations
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (UNCCIT), which has been on the
table for almost two decades. The study also seeks to identify entities or institutions that
have shaped the global discourse on terrorism, and by what means they have done so.
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Finally, this dissertation aims to explain how power relations and networks between states
affect the discussions of the international community in its efforts to reach a
comprehensive definition of terrorism.
Applying the sociological concepts of discourse and power, and drawing on the
theoretical lens of Bob Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach to examining states,
this dissertation will assess the strategic political processes engaged in by UN memberstates to define and frame terrorism pursuant to the organization’s mandate to address
challenges to global security. The present aim here is to understand how these processes
relate to the development of a discourse and regime around terrorism and counterterrorism that not merely seeks to address the threat, but more significantly, becomes
another mechanism to consistently ensure and reify state power.
Given the constant political power struggle that characterizes the international state
system, I hypothesize that first, defining terrorism and shaping its discourse has been a
function of each member state engaging in what Bob Jessop (1990) calls a ‘state project’
- a tool for state formation, cohesion, and hegemony. When states undertake such a
project in relation to the terrorism discourse, the result is the conceptual opacity of
terrorism itself; second, specific political and ideological interests of states, articulated and
advocated through state blocs, significantly contribute to the general definitional debate
on terrorism at the international level, and particularly to the deadlock in the UNCCIT
negotiations; and third, with the definitional debate being a struggle for state power - and
states being unwilling to yield to other states’ acquisition of relatively more power in the
state system - a consensus on a highly political concept becomes virtually impossible to
achieve.
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Using content and discourse analysis, and applying social network theory on
archival data from official records and transcripts of terrorism-related negotiations at the
UN (with a focus on the UNCCIT), statements from member-states, and supplementary
interviews with UN officials and member-state representatives to the United Nations, this
dissertation intends to address the above questions and explore the posited hypotheses.
The study will provide an analysis of the power relations, political conditions, and
institutions affecting the international discourse on terrorism that have simultaneously
resulted from and continue to shape the process towards a common global definition of
the phenomenon. The ultimate hope is that with this analysis, possible areas of
compromise can be identified that could perhaps lead to a practical compromise - if not
consensus - on what terrorism means, and how it can be effectively prosecuted on the
basis of a universal definition.

Significance of the Study
The practical and operational significance of having a universal definition of
terrorism has been discussed in numerous venues by scholars and policymakers alike. In
one of the official reports of the Ad Hoc Committee for the proposed international
convention, the Coordinator of the committee, Carlos Fernando Díaz-Paniagua of Costa
Rica, could not have stated the significance of a consensus on a definition - and a
comprehensive treaty - any better: The UNCCIT does not only have symbolic value in
terms of universal condemnation of terrorism; more importantly, the negotiating process
itself can produce a proposed definition that has the ability to transform international law
on terrorism:

4

“[The] negotiation process had managed to elaborate, in draft article 2 of an
instrument that would be legally binding, the inclusionary elements of a legal
definition of international terrorism. Once adopted, it would be the first time that
States would have, in a universal counter-terrorism instrument, a definition that
would serve as the basis for taking counter-terrorism measures.” (A/66/37, Annex
2, sec. A, para. 2).
As an instrument of international law and counter-terrorism efforts, the UNCCIT was
intended to “complete the international, police and judicial cooperation, legal regime
against terrorism (Díaz-Paniagua 2008: 515). The convention would be able to address
other forms of terrorist activity previously not contemplated in existing treaties on terrorist
acts and would serve as the conceptual and operational catch-all instrument to
ideologically and politically support an effective counter-terrorism strategy (Ibid).1
Our primary task here, however, is not to simply add to that discussion but rather
to unpack the sociological significance of the absence of a definitional consensus on
terrorism; that is, to provide an analysis that goes beyond identifying the challenges to
implementing a counter-terrorism strategy on the ground and delve into why such
challenges exist in the first place.2 The problem posed by the failure to address the core
of the concept in the global discourse - and one which this study recognizes - speaks to
the lack of a conceptual and theoretical understanding of the links between states,

1

This view was corroborated by a UN Legal Affairs official in an interview conducted by the
author on April 15, 2015 in New York.
2 It is also important to note at this juncture that a comparative analysis between the
discussions surrounding an international convention on terrorism (and consequently, its
definition) on the one hand, and the debates surrounding conventions on other international
crimes such as genocide or torture might provide insight into the fundamental difference(s) of
terrorism relative to other atrocities under international law. A separate study on such intrinsic
conceptual or practical differences could be instructive, and might complement this project
well.
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discourse, and power that might have practical ramifications on the international
definitional debate on terrorism.
The value of unpacking the role of the state in discourse production
Sociological literature on the link between discourse and power has been abundant
(see Foucault 1978; Hall 1985; Bernstein 1971-75; Mueller 1973; Schatzman and Strauss
1972; Van Dijk 1989). In such scholarly discussions, the power to produce and manipulate
discourses has been attributed to various individuals or groups in society that possess
“symbolic capital” (e.g., journalists, academics, writers, directors, to name a few; see
Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Symbolic capital, according to
Bourdieu (1989, 17; see also Bourdieu 1986) is a form of capital (along with economic,
social and cultural capital) that is also “perceived and recognized as legitimate.” It refers
to an acquired reputation for competence by virtue of accumulated prestige, celebrity or
honor… founded on a dialectic of knowledge (connaissance) and recognition
(reconnaissance)” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 7). Following Bourdieu’s approach, the
accumulation of capital - economic, social, cultural, and symbolic - determines power
relationships within a field; a field that can be understood as “a space of forces within
which contending agents struggle for power” (Bourdieu 2002 cited in Poblacion, Castro
and Palazon 2016). These sets of capital as accumulated resources reproduce the social
status of the agents accumulating them, as well as the social structure as a whole
(Bourdieu 2000; Bourdieu and Wacquant 2013; also cited in Poblacion, Castro and
Palazon 2016).
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The concept of symbolic capital might also be analytically applied to states when
recognized as agents in an international system. In such a context, states are engaged in
a constant process of building and protecting their reputation in a global political arena
characterized by a perennial struggle for power. Yet little has been explored in sociological
literature about the role of the state as an agent in producing, framing, and otherwise
manipulating discourse – and consequently, perceptions – as a mechanism to consistently
ensure and reify its sovereign power and clout in the international system.
This dissertation is an attempt to assess and dissect that theoretical and conceptual
relationship. By doing so, it aims to not only understand the practical and political factors
that affect the definitional debate on terrorism, but more significantly, contribute a
sociological examination of the role of the state in producing and shaping meaning in
transnational social life.
The importance of a sociological analysis
Seeking to understand the processes of exchange that shape the construction of
the global counter-terrorism regime at the UN-level (one that theoretically aims to take the
causes and consequences of terrorism into account) will greatly benefit from a sociological
analysis that focuses on the power connections and interactions within the network of
global negotiations. Such a study will not only allow us to view the practical reasons for
the definitional debate, but will more importantly provide general theoretical insights into
how state power shapes international discourse, by what means, and toward what ends.
The analysis might also provide empirical arguments that could aid in efforts to move

7

beyond the definitional debate at the United Nations, and into substantive discussions
about legal and political mechanisms to respond to the long-standing crisis.
While this study does not examine the behavior of particular terrorist groups or
social conditions that cause violent behavior per se, this project provides an analysis of
social and political conditions within states that may serve to create climates conducive
(or not) to terrorism, particularly in relation to 1) how states actually view terrorism
ideologically, legally, or politically; and 2) what they think the best methods are to combat
the threat within their nuanced national milieus. Examining how states construct and
understand terrorism in relation to their historical and cultural contexts vis-à-vis their
political and/or foreign policy interests, might provide sharper insight into various
conditions that allow certain forms of terrorism to exist and perpetuate in particular
national settings. How a country defines terrorism reflects the various social, cultural,
historical and political factors that can determine how it chooses to address the social
problem. This unique framing of terrorism is what UN member-states take with them into
the negotiations on treaties regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies; and
these highly nuanced and context-specific conceptions of terrorism have clearly led to
a deadlock on efforts to define and prosecute it using uniform global standards. Without
trying to understand the push and pull that goes on within the halls of the UN surrounding
the discourse on terrorism, we might lose the opportunity to find areas for compromise
and collaboration that can move us toward clearer and more effective international
counter-terrorism measures.
This dissertation is an attempt to engage in such an endeavor as it aims to
sociologically analyze an important decision-making process in relation to a large-scale
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societal response to terrorism. The objective is for the findings of this project to be useful
to security policymakers and practitioners as they seek to formulate effective and
standardized counter-terrorism policies and strategies at the inter-state level. Being able
to get past defining ‘terrorism,’ into figuring out how it can be addressed – and even
prosecuted – at the international level might lead to better methods of prevention and
more useful ways of addressing its consequences when it does happen.
The present aim here is thus twofold: On a theoretical level, this dissertation seeks
to gain a deeper understanding of the state as a product of social and political relations,
vis-à-vis discourse and power within the larger global state system. Through an
examination of the development of the discourse and regime around terrorism and
counter-terrorism within the foremost global institution and association of states, i.e. the
United Nations, this study seeks to understand the links between discourse, power, and
states, and how the latter use a constructed body of meaning to influence decision-making
in the UN.
On a practical level, by analyzing the mechanisms and processes of how states
produce and frame the terrorism discourse at the UN, the study ultimately seeks to
understand how the network of relations of states – and even the agents of these states –
navigate the discourse on terrorism over time in order to wield political power. The hope
is that with such an analysis, possible areas of compromise can be identified that could
perhaps lead to a consensus on what terrorism means, and how it can be effectively
prosecuted on the basis of a binding, universal, and legal definition.
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Background of the Study: Terrorism as a Social Problem
We are all faced with the threat of terrorism on a daily basis, whether we reside in
a quiet suburban neighborhood, a densely populated urban area, or a war-torn city. In
recent years, terrorist attacks - as a form of political violence - have occurred almost daily
in different parts of the world. From 2014 to 2015 alone, data from the Global Terrorism
Database reveal that there were more than 25,000 terrorism-related incidents recorded
worldwide, from individual assaults on private citizens, property, and businesses, to
attacks by extremist groups on government installations, public spaces, utilities, and other
social institutions3. The data for 2015 to 2016 show 28,340 incidents. For 2016 alone,
crowdsourced data culled from open-source reports show at least 1,487 terrorist attacks
have occurred with 14,801 fatalities; in 2017 there were 1,332 attacks with 8,319 fatalities4.

3

Terrorism-related “incidents” refer to all acts of violence that fall within at least one of the
three criteria set up by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Criterion I: The act must be aimed
at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; Criterion II: There must be evidence
of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or
audiences) than the immediate victims; Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of
legitimate warfare activities. This total number is based on a broad, advanced search by the
author of all recorded incidents that meet any of those criteria and were reported through open
source media. The data show that there were 25, 867 incidents of terrorism reported across all
geo-political regions: North America; Central America & Caribbean; South America; East Asia;
Southeast Asia; South Asia; Central Asia; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle East &
North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Australasia & Oceania. (Accessed January 23, 2017). Data
for 2016 are still not available from the GTD at the time of writing.
4

These numbers were gathered by PeaceTech Labs - an independent non-profit organization
focused on addressing peace and conflict issues - based on crowdsourced data from
Wikipedia. PeaceTech Labs notes: “As with any crowdsourced data, the map may display
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The types of terrorist attacks have also evolved from those that use highly intricate bombs
to destroy infrastructure to the use of non-traditional devices such as tucks to ram into
civilians in public spaces.5
These numbers and incidents suggest that terrorism indeed has a quotidian logic
to it, which reifies our fears that violent attacks from extremists can occur anywhere and
anytime; and that our own communities, no matter how sheltered, are not immune to the
consequences of extremist political violence. In the United States, this fear is palpable
with 83% of Americans recently expressing worry about a "major" terrorist attack
happening in the country6 after the Paris and San Bernardino attacks in 2015; and by the
end of that year, terrorism ranked first among the issues of national concern for ordinary
citizens7.

spurious or objectionable data, for which Esri and PeaceTech Lab hold no responsibility.
Similarly, the definition of terrorism is inherently subjective, and in the case of this map is
determined by the contributing community.” Thus, unlike the data from the GTD, these
numbers are not based on strict operationalized criteria to identify terrorist attacks. That said,
these numbers are verifiable through open source media reports on significant attacks.
5

Such attacks using trucks include the Nice attack on Bastille Day in 2016, the Berlin
Christmas Market attack in 2016, the London Westminster Bridge attack on March 22, 2017,
the Stockholm department store attack on April 7, 2017, and the London Bridge attack on
June 3, 2017.
6

Washington Post-ABC News Poll, November 16-19, 2015.

7

Gallup Poll, December 2-5, 2015. Available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187655/americans-name-terrorism-no-problem.aspx. This is also
corroborated by an NBC-News/Wall Street Journal Survey conducted on December 6-9, 2015.
Available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/A_Politics/FORPOST15564%20NBCWSJ%2
0December%20Poll%20(PM%2012-14-15%20Release)%20(3).pdf.
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This trend is not unique to the United States. In a 2016 global survey conducted by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, two thirds of respondents thought that
violent extremism is a “major” problem in their country, with citizens from Turkey,
Indonesia and France overwhelmingly expressing this as their top concern8. Since the
atrocities of September 11, 2001 (9/11), surveys on fears about violent extremism
repeatedly suggest that the concern about terrorism and the threat of violent attacks
continues to grow rather than abate.
One would thus presume that with the terrorist threat plaguing our everyday lives,
the international community would have already come together to categorically identify
and define the phenomenon in order to systematically quell it. Yet despite the gamechanging events of 9/11, the development of extremist transnational groups like the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
or ISIS), and the remarkable number of terrorist attacks and fatalities since 9/11, there
remains an absence of a comprehensive, universal, and legally binding definition of
terrorism to guide the international state system in its counter-terrorism efforts.
For decades - since the “golden age” of terrorism of the 1970s (Bergen 2015)9 political, security, and social science theorists have offered extensive and critical
explanations for this lack of a conceptual consensus around the term. With no conclusive

8

From “Views from around the Globe: Countering Violent Extremism." Online survey
conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies from August 12-29, 2016 by
the National Research Group (NRG). Available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/surveyfindings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism.
9

From the article “The golden age of terrorism.” Available at
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/28/opinions/bergen-1970s-terrorism/. Accessed January 24,
2017.
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answer to this puzzle, and hence no single definition of ‘terrorism,’ scholars of the
phenomenon have often simply assumed and operationalized the concept to suit the
purpose of their work (Weinberg, Pedhazur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004).
On the policy front, a similar puzzle for analysts exists. There are currently 19
international legal instruments to prevent “terrorists acts” covering, inter alia, offences on
aircrafts, threats to civil aviation, nuclear terrorism, terrorist bombings, and the financing
of terrorism, with the very first international legal instrument conceived in 1963.10
Nevertheless, despite the existence of copious theoretical work on terrorism and what it
means, as well as multiple United Nations (UN) conventions dealing with “terrorist acts”
on an operational and practical level, the world is far from addressing terrorism through
the use of a common, objective definition of the phenomenon.
This is not to say that there have been no attempts to define terrorism in
international discourse. Efforts to achieve a comprehensive and binding international
treaty to suppress and prosecute terrorism have existed for years. The most far-reaching
one has been the proposal launched by the UN Ad Hoc Committee established by
Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 on Terrorism. The proposal was for the
international organization to adopt a United Nations Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism (hereafter UNCCIT) that would clearly define terrorism and set
standards on how to address international terrorism. However, due to issues surrounding

10

The first instrument was presented in 1963 as the Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft. These instruments are open to all member-states for
signature and ratification, and were conceptualized under the auspices of the United Nations
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Available at
http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/legal-instruments.shtml.
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the definition11 of the very act it aims to suppress, the negotiations among UN memberstates on this proposed accord – one that would ultimately criminalize all forms of
international terrorism and deny perpetrators of terrorist acts and their associates access
to funds, arms and safe havens – are currently deadlocked. Ever since the talks on the
proposed convention gained traction in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks, the debate has
perennially boiled down to a fundamental disagreement not necessarily on what act
qualifies as terrorism, but rather on who can commit terrorism and on what grounds. The
question revolves around whether terrorism should be understood as political violence
“from below” by non-state actors, or whether such violence can also be committed “from
above,” by states against their citizens or citizens of another state pursuant to particular
national interests. This controversy over who or what entities can commit terrorism,
against whom it is committed, and for what ends, has largely characterized the UN
discourse on the matter. More significantly, it has also served as a major roadblock to the

11

The definition of the crime of terrorism which has been on the negotiating table of the UN
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism reads as follows:
"1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any
means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment;
or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this
article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."
(United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General
Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Sixth session (28 January-1 February 2002),
Annex II, art. 2.1)

14

implementation of meaningful global prosecution of those who commit acts of
international terror based on a single, legally binding definition.
Arguably, this definitional ambiguity in the international discourse on terrorism
within the UN has resulted in varying national-level interpretations of existing conventions
to suppress terrorist acts. The current UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
(A/RES/60/288) adopted by consensus in September 2006 serves as a guide for states
but does not set strict operational counter-terrorism standards for national implementation
to which each state must adhere. While this strategy is characterized by the UN CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force as a “unique global instrument to enhance national,
regional and international efforts to counter terrorism”12 it still fails to address the
fundamental dilemma in the terrorism/counter-terrorism discourse as it presents no
categorical definition of terrorism itself. The document simply couches the operational plan
of action on a condemnation of “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed
by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security” (A/RES/60/288, Annex: Plan of Action).
While the international community is currently engaged with on-the-ground
operations to quell the terrorist threat on the national level context, with each UN memberstate recognizing the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and enacting its own national
laws against terrorism, it seems that the urgency to develop and enact an international
convention that plainly defines terrorism for normative, conceptual and operational

12

UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Available at
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy. Accessed
on February 2, 2017.
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purposes has abated. More importantly, the deadlock on the UNCCIT negotiations shows
no sign of being resolved anytime soon. Given these circumstances - coupled with the
constant yet ever-changing threat of terrorism - I believe that it remains important to
understand the ramifications of not being able to identify what exactly it is we are up
against. Having no standardized, legal definition of terrorism at the inter-state level might
lead to the indiscriminate enforcement of treaties on terrorist acts agreed upon by UN
member-states, with the implementation of such counter-terrorism policies subject to
myopic political interests. If such is the case, the enforcement of the global counterterrorism strategy might become vulnerable to political and human rights abuses.
It is within this context that I embark on an examination of the definitional problem
of terrorism within the larger international terrorism discourse. By examining the
negotiations surrounding the proposed UN Convention on International Terrorism, the
discussions at the UN between and among states on security and terrorism after 9/11,
and their state policies in relation to terrorism, I intend to uncover the impact of power
relations and state networks on the international terrorism discourse - and ultimately
provide a sociological analysis of why terrorism has not been categorically and distinctly
defined by the international community despite its constant threat.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework for the Study: An Overview
While dominant rational choice scholars have attempted to answer the main
question of this study by merely focusing on the weighting of foreign policy and national
interests of states, I posit that such explanations do not necessarily provide a complete
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picture of how the power dynamics between and among states (and their representatives)
impact the UN negotiations - and overall discourse - on terrorism and counter-terrorism.
Rational choice analysts assume that actors are always motivated by the wants or goals
that express their 'preferences,' and that they engage in a cost-benefit analysis based on
the information they possess within specific, given constraints (Scott 2000: 127). Yet,
given that we have limited information and intelligence about government interests, I would
argue that game theoretic models and strategies based on cost-benefit analyses of
competing actors in this context will always be limited by the researcher’s interpretations
of meanings and interests.
Analytical dependence on the weighting of recent national interests and foreign
policy also leaves no room for the nuanced influences of culture, ideology, or history in
assessing preferences and interests. Although one can argue that culture, ideology and
historical influences can be packaged as interests in themselves, the malleable nature of
these elements is lost once when they are quantified and boxed into static rational models.
It would be ideal to systematically and quantitatively explain the behavior of states, but
assuming perfect information about interests of highly dynamic and covert entities such
as states will only take us so far in any analysis.
Rather than presenting an analysis based on the quantification of interests and
preferences, I intend to qualitatively apply the sociological concepts of states, discourse
and power, as well as draw on the theoretical lens of Bob Jessop’s (1990) strategicrelational approach to examining states, when assessing the strategic political processes
engaged in by UN member-states to define and frame terrorism.
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Fundamental to Bob Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach to examining
states is his belief that the state is not a fixed, static entity that mediates class interests or
acts on its own; rather, he posits that the state is a result of social struggles and the
balancing of social forces. Highly critical of the limits of the structuralist-instrumentalist
debate between the Marxist theorists Poulantzas and Miliband (1972), which was primarily
about the nature of the state, as well as Skocpol’s (1985) theory of state autonomy, Bob
Jessop (1990) argues for a more general state theory of “societization or society effects.”
His alternative - the ‘strategic-relational approach’ to understanding the nature of the state
- is thus fundamentally a theory that seeks to “integrate a relational view of the state with
the Marxist form-analytic account of capital as a social relation” (Jessop 1990:4). In this
view, the capitalist state must be viewed as a social relation, similar to Marx’s (1849)
conceptualization of capital as “not a thing”; for just as the capital relation is constituted
through value in the spheres of production and circulation, the form of the capitalist state
is also made possible by its “particularization” or institutional separation from the circuit
of capital (Jessop 1990: 206).
In this strategic-relational theory of the state then, state power is considered to be
a form-determined social relation in that it is a function of constant interactions and
struggles between the state and society. As such, an analysis of the state is only complete
if it considers first, the distinctive institutional form(s) of the state and, second, how the
balance of political forces is influenced by factors beyond the state, i.e., by society.
Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach ultimately sees the relationship between
state and society as not simply one-dimensional, but rather highly contingent, with political
and socio-institutional forces always being balanced in the relationship. This interaction
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between state institutions and factors external to the state brings about three certain state
effects: organizational coherence, functional coordination and operational unity within the
state.
Understanding that these state effects are crucial to the development and
maintenance of state power not only in the national context but more so in the international
state system is an important foundation to the analysis at hand. By viewing the state as a
dynamic product of international relations and networks (and not just an isolated actor
operating in a vacuum), we might be able to more effectively and sociologically appreciate
the impact of social and political forces that have shaped and continue to shape the interstate power relations in general, and the international terrorism discourse in particular.

Organization of the Study
This chapter has introduced the sociological issue-of-focus for this study, which is
the absence of a comprehensive, universal and legally binding definition of terrorism in the
international (UN) discourse despite the ever-present threat of extremist political violence.
It has also presented the main research question and hypotheses to be explored, and the
conceptual and theoretical framework that will be applied to the present analysis. The
significance and possible contributions of this study were also highlighted in the current
chapter.
Chapter two elaborates on the links between states, power and discourse,
particularly the terrorism discourse, as presented in sociological literature. Studies that
straddle political science and security studies are included in the review to illustrate the
interdisciplinary nature of the discussion. The chapter provides an examination of the
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terrorism discourse by first unpacking the conceptualization of terrorism (and acts of
terrorism) within the academic discourse, and then within policy circles. It then goes on
to elaborate on the role of states - as actors that struggle for power in the international
state system - in framing the terrorism discourse within the global political arena. It is
important to note that framing and dominating international political discourses can be
a source of state power. Since discourses are expressions of power as a social relation
and a process that can be mobilized to shape and define social realities (Foucault 1980;
1972), their use (or manipulation) as a tool to gain and maintain sovereign power must
necessarily be examined. The chapter closes with a conceptualization of the ‘state
project’ (Jessop 1990) as a tool employed by states to shape the global terrorism
discourse. State projects are historically contingent strategies that endeavor to organize
the activities of the state (e.g., strategies, laws, policies) around a coherent politicaleconomic agenda, which can then be projected onto civil society (Jessop 1990: 9, 346).
The review of this concept provides a solid foundation for the subsequent analysis
of how states use the terrorism discourse to secure and maintain power.
Chapter three discusses the data and methods employed in this study. As a
project that employs a mixed methods approach, the selection and use of content and
discourse analysis, interviews, observations, and social network analysis are all
discussed in turn. Data gathered for the analysis are also identified and discussed.
Chapter four presents the empirical background of the case at hand: how
terrorism has been conceptualized in the international political system. In particular, it
examines the conceptualization and operationalization of the phenomenon within the
United Nations. An overview of the origins of ‘terrorism’ as a concept within the
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international discourse is provided through a historical examination of its application in
global policy-making activities. With the assumption that the discourse on terrorism
gained significant traction after the events of September 11th, 2001 (9/11), the chapter
examines the UN terrorism discourse in two phases: first, as it developed in the context
of counterterrorism efforts before 9/11; and second, how it evolved in the context of a
global counterterrorism strategy after 9/11. The chapter ends with the introduction of the
United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (UNCCIT) and an
explanation of the definitional debate that has led to the deadlock in the negotiations on
the proposed convention.
The empirical findings of this study are summarized and discussed through
Chapters five, six, and seven. Analysis of the data reveals three major findings: Firstly,
defining terrorism and shaping its discourse is a function of ‘state projects’ engaged in
by states to secure and maintain power in the international system; secondly, networks
and alliances of states serve as significant avenues through which these state projects
– as well as political and ideological interests – are propagated, consequently
contributing to the deadlock in the UNCCIT negotiations; and lastly, the definitional
debate on terrorism is a struggle for state power more than a problem of semantics;
framing and manipulating the terrorism discourse is used as a tool to gain and maintain
power in this process.
Chapter five focuses on how states engage in efforts to define terrorism in
international discussions as part of a ‘state project’ - a strategy concerned principally
with the attainment of various non-economic objectives including but not limited to
military success, social reform, political stability, or moral regeneration (Jessop 2014).
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The chapter examines why and how controlling the definition and discourse on terrorism
has become a necessary tool for state formation, cohesion, and hegemony (Jessop
1990) not only nationally but more so globally, and how it has become part of a strategy
to influence decision-making processes at the UN, or otherwise affect the larger global
policy agenda.
Chapter six deals with the definitional deadlock by looking more closely into the
role of politics, ideology and alliances within the United Nations. Here, an analysis of
how networks among states - carried out through political or voting blocs - continually
and significantly influence the discourse and struggle for state power.
The analysis is then completed with an examination of how the definitional debate
has become a function of the struggle for state power. In Chapter seven, that link will be
examined by focusing on how states shape and manipulate discourse as power.
Examining the discursive practices of informal consultations and human rights and
legalistic framing used by states, I shed light on processes by which states are able to
gain positions of political strength relative to others in the definitional debate on
terrorism.
The study concludes in Chapter eight with a discussion of whether or not a
categorical, universal and legally binding definition of terrorism should be a goal of the
international community to begin with. Should having a global consensus be a necessary
objective that we should work towards? If so, are there areas of compromise that might
be gleaned from this analysis that could be useful for negotiations moving forward? If
not, are the current international legal instruments against terrorism enough to quell the
terrorist threat? The final section will seek to respond to these questions with the findings
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of the present analysis in mind. It will also look into possible avenues for future research
concerning the link(s) between states, power, and the terrorism discourse.
Ultimately, the hope is that the findings and analysis of this study could contribute
to a deeper understanding of the global terrorism discourse and how we might - as
members of an international community - more effectively navigate structures and
institutions of (state) power to more effectively counter the transnational terrorist threat.
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW: The Terrorism
Discourse, States and Power

The Origins of the Terrorism Discourse
Terrorism is hardly a new idea. While the long-standing, pedestrian interpretation
of the word refers to a strategy of spreading fear through violent and destructive means
for social, political, or religious ends (Burgess 2003), the term formerly held a positive,
value-laden connotation (Howard and Sawyer 2011: 4). The act was initially seen as a
legitimate state instrument carried out by Maximilien Robespierre in post-Revolutionary
France to protect the new government from subversives. It was a political strategy
supposedly aimed at protecting justice and democracy at a time when the French
Republic was at its infancy. This ultimate goal, however, provided the French state with
the authority and justification to engage in “victimage rituals” of public torture and premodern forms of warfare (Blain 2009:109) as they executed about 40,000 people by
guillotine (Burgess 2003; Howard and Sawyer 2011: 5). As a result, the strategy was
criticized and subsequently demonized by European philosophers of the time who referred
to this period of the revolution as ‘regime de la terreur’ (reign of terror) – the phrase from
which the current negative conception of terrorism has its roots (Burgess 2003: 2; Blain
2007).
Yet while terrorism as a concept emerged from the actions of the state and was
associated with abuse of office and power, the post-revolution discourse on the
phenomenon was founded on an anti-state, anti-monarchical sentiment as a reaction to
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the alienation and exploitative conditions of nineteenth-century capitalism (Howard and
Sawyer 2011: 5). The subsequent rise of nationalist and separatist movements that
engaged in attacks and assassinations of state leaders up until the first World War led the
discourse of terrorism to refer to the phenomenon as violence against governments. This
shift would prove the concept of terrorism to be “tactically polyvalent;” i.e., terrorism
became known as a strategy of political violence that could be employed by the “savages”
or “dangerous classes” of society against state apparatuses (Blain 2007: 109); but
simultaneously, it was also a tactic that could be used by repressive regimes against their
people (Howard and Sawyer 2011:9-10).
Despite this conceptual polyvalence, the focus of policy and scholarly work on
terrorist acts has leaned more toward those acts committed by individuals and groups
outside and against the state. Terrorism evolved into a category that distinguished
between illegitimate political violence carried out by non-state actors on the one hand,
and legitimate violence or use of force committed by the state on the other. As a result,
those who engaged in collective violence against the state could be vilified and
criminalized as terrorists (Blain 2007: 110) with governments largely being excused. Such
discourse that focuses on non-state terrorism is what has shaped and continues to shape
discussions of terrorism and counter-terrorism at the global level, particularly within the
halls of the United Nations.
Thus, notwithstanding the shared international conviction that terrorism is an act to
be condemned, no comprehensive, universal, and legally binding definition of the concept
is in place due to its “essentially contested” nature (Gallie 1969 and Connolly 1993, cited
in Weinberg, Pedhazur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004; Ganor 1998; Williamson 2009; Schmid
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2011). The various forms that terrorism has taken throughout centuries has led to
conceptual problems both legally and academically (Williamson 2009; Schmid 2011) so
much so that when terrorism reemerged as a leading research subject in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, analysts immediately recognized that the achievement of a wide
agreement on a single definition posed a serious challenge to the field (Weinberg, et al.
2004: 777). Lacquer (1977:5, cited in Weinberg et al. 2004: 778) observes that because
terrorism has appeared in “so many different forms and under so many different
circumstances,” arriving at a comprehensive definition is simply “impossible.” Sociologist
Philip Schlesinger (1991, cited in Schmid, 2011: 40) even argues that “no commonly
agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is
itself part of a wider contestation over ideologies and political objectives.”
Indeed, literally hundreds of definitions of terrorism saturate the fields of political
science, law, security studies and – more recently – sociology13 (see Schmid 2011; Record
2003; Schmid and Jongman 1988 for a list of these definitions). Studies on proposed
academic definitions of the term have shown that there are at least 22 definitional elements
to terrorism that exist in the literature (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Weinberg et al. 2004).14
Such attributes of the phenomenon are believed to be sensitive to location, history, power,
moral perceptions, international relations, and military capabilities of states (Vertigans

13

Sociological interest in terrorism saw a rapid spike immediately after the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 (Goodwin 2011; Turk 2004:271). Prior to this, terrorism was largely seen
as a political act, and thus within the scope of political science (Vertigans 2011: 13).
14

In the Schmid and Jongman (1988) study, a survey of 109 definitions of terrorism were made,
while in the Weinberg et al. study (2004), 73 definitions were analyzed from 55 articles
collected from three top terrorism journals.
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2011: 1). This has led some to posit that the term has become politically and emotionally
charged, so much so that it might be the most politicized term in the contemporary political
vocabulary (Hoffman 1998; Schmid 2011: 40). This is not to say, however, that the
discourse on terrorism is wanting of any points of convergence on definitional issues. A
large majority of extant definitions of terrorism recognize that an act of terror intrinsically
involves the use of violence or threats of violence by its perpetrators (prominent examples
are those offered by Schmid 1988; Weinberg et al. 2004; Hoffman 2004; Tilly 2004; and
Goodwin 2006 to name a few; see also Gage 2001, and the surveys conducted by Schmid
and Jogman 1988, and Weinberg et al. 2004). There is, however, a clear lack of consensus
when it comes to defining terrorism in terms of its motivations, its targets, what forms it
may take, and who can qualify as possible perpetrators.
Since terrorism has been widely used as a tactic against government policies or
leaders, experts and policymakers alike have primarily characterized it as an act of political
violence; that is, it contemplates political aims and motives, or is otherwise used for
political effect or propaganda outside the usual means of political struggle (Vertigans
2011:13; Tilly 2004:5; Turk 2004: 273; Weinberg et al. 2004: 778; Hoffman 2004). Yet
researchers have found that political reasons were not the only motivations recognized by
experts (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Weinberg et al. 2004); rather, other “idiosyncratic”
and “criminal” motivations pursued through violence could also characterize an act as
‘terrorism.’ The pursuit of publicity (Weinberg et al. 2004: 782) as well as adherence to
religious motivations (Burgess 2003; Blain 2007), for instance, can also be possible
incentives for a terrorist. But where does one draw the line between a simple violent
criminal act on the one hand, and terrorism as political violence on the other?

27

Some theorists posit that the distinction lies in who or what terrorism targets. The
fact that the phenomenon is largely perceived as politically motivated violence against the
state leads most definitions to assume that acts of terror are those committed to harm
solely the government and its agents. However, some scholars argue that for terrorism to
be labeled as such, it must have consequences that extend beyond the state to the
detriment of innocent citizens (see Ganor 1998; Turk 2002; Carr; 2003; Goodwin 2006;
Schmid 2011). In essence, these scholars agree that an essential attribute of terrorism is
that the direct victims of such violence are not its main targets. Hoffman’s (2006) list of
common characteristics of terrorism does not explicitly declare civilian targets necessary
for an act to qualify as terrorism; but the mention of the fact that terrorism is meant to have
“far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target” speaks
to the necessary condition of having victims who are not associated with the state.
Goodwin (2006: 2028) presents a clearer argument in his “categorical definition” of
terrorism, suggesting that the phenomenon involves the strategic use of violence and
threats of violence by an oppositional political group against civilians or noncombatants,
usually intended to influence several audiences (emphasis mine). Without injury to
innocent civilians, this school of thought maintains that the act cannot categorically be
named terrorism. Such a view also allows for possible distinction between terrorism on
the one hand, and guerilla warfare or other forms of political violence on the other
(Weinberg et al. 2004). This attribute (of having civilian victims) is often – if not always –
present in definitions of terrorism as found in national laws and counter-terrorism policies,
including that of the United States State Department (Ruby 2002) and existing UN counterterrorism conventions.
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However, this victim-target differentiation does not appear to be an overwhelming
characteristic found among academic definitions of terrorism within the past decade.
Weinberg et al. (2004:781) found that only 25% of the 73 scholarly definitions they
surveyed mentioned its importance, with injury to civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, and
outsiders being considered only 22% of the time. The question of victim-target
differentiation is perhaps trumped by a more recent and increasingly polarizing issue in
the academic and legal definitional debate: whether or not terrorism is something that can
be engaged in by states, and not merely by non-state actors.
The general and long-standing discourse on terrorism has largely focused on nonstate terrorism; that is, scholars have focused on acts of terror as committed by extreme
non-state political entities – individuals, cadres, organizations, or networks against states
(Schmid 1992; Hoffman 2006; Tilly 2011; Del Villar and Glasberg 2015), with some arguing
that this is due to the inadequate evidence that states actually sponsor or engage in
terrorism in several historical cases (Adams 1986, cited in Turk 2004), or implying that
‘state terrorism’ is a misnomer or a term that needs to be distinguished from “terrorism
proper” (Goodwin 2006 citing Hoffman 1998; Black 2004; and Bergesen and Lizardo
2004). Yet the exclusion of state terrorism from conceptual and operational definitions of
terrorism – both in scholarship and in the practice of governments – has been largely
criticized (Stampnitzky 2011: 2; see critiques by Herman 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan
1990; Chomsky 2001). Such an understanding of terrorism fails to consider that
competition over economic resources and power, as well as resistance to domination and
repression in the international system, can also increase the incidence of terrorism from
above, i.e., as perpetrated by state actors (Del Villar and Glasberg 2015) and not just from

29

below (Jalata 2010). With each country having its own interpretation of the phenomenon
in its penal code, and the UN having conventions that focus on non-state perpetrators,
what is considered terrorism is thus relative and largely dependent on how a state
constructs or frames the ‘‘act of terror’’ (Del Villar and Glasberg 2015: 5). Terrorism is thus
considered a pejorative term that is essentially politically and emotionally charged
(Hoffman 1998).
Following this premise, sociological analyses of terrorism have therefore
contributed the idea that the phenomenon is a social construction (Ben-Yehuda 1993;
Turk 2002); and contrary to the impression promoted by media and government reports
that terrorism is a “given in the real world,” it is instead an interpretation of events and
their presumed causes (Turk 2004). Turk (2004: 271-2) further argues that these
interpretations “are not unbiased attempts to depict truth but rather conscious efforts to
manipulate perceptions to promote certain interests at the expense of others.” For this
reason, the discourse on terrorism can be understood as a “war of words” between and
among powerful government entities that seek to control global discussions on global
security issues to favor their interests; that is, governments “generally succeed in labeling
their more threatening (i.e., violent) opponents as terrorists, whereas attempts by
opponents to label officially sanctioned violence as “state terrorism” have little chance of
success unless supported by powerful third parties such as the United Nations (Turk 2004:
271-2). Hence, in order to reify state power in the international arena, the global discourse
on terrorism is necessarily a state-constructed and driven one. With this in mind, we now
turn to understand the nature and role of the state vis-a-vis the production of discourse,
particularly with regard to terrorism.
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States, Power, and Framing the Terrorism Discourse
The state is arguably referred to as the dominant institution that shapes social
structures and determines the flow of power within and among different areas of society.
As a political association that claims the monopoly over the legitimate use of force to
compel order (Weber 1978a: 54; Weber 1978b: 78), the state has accordingly been viewed
as the central site of political, military and economic power in society (Pierson 2011). A
state does not exist in isolation however; it necessarily belongs to a wider system of
competing states with each one protecting its sovereignty, or its ultimate power over its
governed territory (Pierson 2011: 10; Giddens 1985: 263-64). Hence, each state seeks
ways to establish and maintain its global power, with the ultimate goal of balancing power
relations among other countries in the international political arena (Waltz 1978).
The respect for the sovereign power of states has been the canon on which
international relations operates. As a result, the affairs between states, as illustrated by
dealings at the United Nations, have been characterized as a constant struggle for power
driven by national interests (Morgenthau 1978: 27, 5). Realist thinkers in fact posit that
states fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests because they are
predisposed towards conflict and competition over power (Keohane 1989; Pierson 2011:
142). The art of government is consequently about maximizing the power of the state
(Foucault 1994 cited in Pierson 2011); and this argument is clearly given credence at the
UN level as seen through the perennial debates over a member-state’s voting power in
the General Assembly and, more significantly, in the Security Council (O’Neill 1996). Thus,
when it comes to addressing what it supposedly an easily identifiable area of common
interest – in the present case, defeating terrorism – the challenge of achieving a universal,
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comprehensive, and legally binding definition of the phenomenon is shaped not only by
the unique set of security and foreign policy interests of states, but more significantly by
each state’s struggle to achieve power and dominance as a sovereign entity in the
international community. And with terrorism being a staple of international security
concerns, controlling the discourse on the topic appears to be imperative for a state to
overcome this struggle.
Theoretically, framing and dominating international political discourses can be a
source of state power. This is because discourses are expressions of power as a social
relation and a process that can be mobilized to shape and define social realities (Foucault
1980; 1972). Foucault (1969) states that discourse is “an entity of sequences, of signs, in
that they are enouncements (énoncés)” – an abstract construct that can assign and
communicate specific, repeatable relations to, between, and among objects, subjects,
and statements. According to Foucault, discourses are knowledge systems that define
norms of behavior and thought, as well as the meanings that are attached to people and
institutions that adopt (or do not adopt) these norms. Power operates through discourses
because those who have the ability to produce these systems of knowledge - and
determine meanings and behavior - are necessarily able to do so because of their social
status. The discourses that are created and manipulated consequently produce and reify
power.
In theories about the link between linguistics, culture, and power, a discourse is
generally understood as the production of knowledge through language and meaning.
Discourse, in its original sense taken up by linguists, refers to stretches of language above
the level of the sentence in conversation or written texts (Young and Ortega 2009: 2). It
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has since taken up an expanded sense to refer to societal meaning-making systems (e.g.
institutional power, social differentiation groups, and cultural beliefs) that create identities
for individuals and determine their positions in social relationships (Young and Ortega
2009:2).
In this sense, discourse as knowledge and meaning production does not solely
involve the construction of words and meanings in a vacuum; rather, discourse is itself
produced by what linguists refer to as “discursive practice” (Hall 1997, 1992). Here,
‘practice’ refers to “the construction and reflection of social realities through actions that
invoke identity, ideology, belief, and power” (2009:1) and is not merely a repetition of a
particular act or practice. Meaning is constructed and negotiated through recurring faceto-face interactions within a particular context; that is, the creation of meaning - and
ultimately a discourse - takes places within the network of physical, spatial, temporal,
social, interactional, institutional, political, and historical circumstances where participants
“do” or perform a practice.
Young and Ortega (2009: 2) thus observe that discursive practice provides four
important insights about discourse as a meaning-making system that determines social
position and relationships: first, social and cultural meanings and realities are
linguistically/discursively constructed; second, discourse is always context-bound; third,
discourse is all about social action; and fourth, meaning is constantly negotiated in
interaction rather than being present “once-and for-all” in whatever we say (Young and
Ortega 2009: 2).
With those insights in mind, we might come to understand discourse as an arena
that participants can use to control or shape not only meaning, but social action and
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conduct. Consequently, we can conclude that all social practices possess a discursive
aspect (Hall 1992: 291). The power in discourses thus lies in how they operate as a set of
rules informing what we think and do (Powell 2013). But more importantly, since the
knowledge produced by the discourse influences social practices, its power lies in it
having real consequences and effects (Hall 1992: 205). Applying these assumptions
beyond the individual level into the inter-state level, it can be argued that discourses are
highly effective tools of wielding social power.
Power involves an element of domination, coercion, oppression, or preemption –
with the latter conducted by politically socializing people into blindly accepting
assumptions, frames and viewpoints – (Airaksinen 1992; Young 1992; Lukes 1974).
Further, power has been defined as a position and a relationship situated in a social setting
(Lukes 1974; Wartenberg 1992). Therefore, control over a particular discourse in
international affairs – that is, the ability to influence thought and practice on a specific
global issue – could very well obtain power in the form of diplomatic, political, economic,
or military clout for a certain state. Hall (1992) fittingly describes this interrelationship
between discourse and power:
“[Discourse] is one of the systems through which power circulates. The
knowledge which a discourse produces constitutes a kind of power, exercised
over those who are “known.” When that knowledge is exercised in practice, those
who are “known” in a particular way will be subject (i.e. subjected) to it. This is
always a power relation (see Foucault 1980:201). Those who produce the
discourse also have the power to make it true—i.e. to enforce its validity, its
scientific status (204-5, emphasis and citations in original).
Applied to state relations at the UN level where diplomatic negotiations on politically and
emotionally charged issues occur on a daily basis, dominating discourses arguably allows
states to command power in the international stage both in theory and practice. Without
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gaining political clout, a state would be unable to influence important decision-making
processes at the UN, or otherwise affect the larger global policy agenda.
When it comes to the discourse on terrorism, it is important to note that the
phenomenon has been clearly operationalized pursuant to various national interpretations,
with some states seeking to dominate the conversation more than others as either colonial,
political, or economic powerhouses (Del Villar and Glasberg 2015: 6). As a case in point,
the ‘‘War on Terror’’ framed, led, and adopted by the United States in line with its national
security strategy after the events of September 11, 2001 has been largely accepted—at
least rhetorically—as the defining characteristic of global counterterrorism efforts, even
within the chambers of the UN (Del Villar and Glasberg 2015: 6-7). This influence on the
terrorism discourse at the UN has arguably made it possible for the conversation between
member-states, and their subsequent decisions and actions, to focus on terrorism
committed by those outside the state.
Controlling the terrorism discourse by defining the concept and operationalizing
the mechanisms to combat the threat can thus be perceived as a hegemonic ‘state project’
(rather than a concerted global endeavor) to establish and maintain power over security
issues in the foreign policy arena. A state project is a strategy (carried out by a state) that
is concerned principally with the attainment of various non-economic objectives including
but not limited to military success, social reform, political stability, or moral regeneration
(Jessop 2014). It is therefore a necessary tool for state formation, cohesion, and hegemony
(Jessop 1990) not only nationally but more so globally. Since each state technically has
the liberty to define terrorism and formulate laws or policies in line with such a definition –
albeit adhering in principle to the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy – the processes

35

by which a state defines and prosecutes terrorism reflects particular political interests, and
ultimately becomes an instrument of state power and hegemony through its
implementation. In order for the analysis in this study to be more robust, it is crucial at
this point to delve deeper into the concept of the state project as theorized by Jessop
(1990), as well as its relevance as a tool in understanding the role of states in shaping the
global terrorism discourse.

Theories of the State and Jessop’s Strategic Relational Approach: Understanding the
‘State Project’ Framework
The state is arguably the single, most ubiquitous socio-political institution in
modern society. Its omnipresence in daily life has unsurprisingly led to the formulation of
a multitude of theories about its nature, functions, structure and, most importantly, the
relations of power on which it thrives.
One school of thought that seeks to explain power relations within the state is
Pluralism. This theory focuses on the interaction of diverse interest groups in politics to
explain the power dynamics of modern democratic states. For pluralists, power is
fragmented across various associations; thus, competition and compromise define
political processes. Scholars who subscribe to this school of thought (see Lipset 1960;
Rose 1967; and Dahl 1987) acknowledge the value of pluralism for democracies. They
assume that participation in political life through various associations is vital to the balance
of power – and ultimately, stability – in a democratic state. The assumption that there is a
relatively equitable distribution of power in a state has been vehemently challenged by
critical state theorists who have generally ascribed to the tenets of Marxian political
thought (see Barrow 2000; Prechel, and Akard 2005 for an overview of these arguments).
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These scholars have in one way or another sought to debunk the theory of equal power
distribution by demonstrating the significant influence of capitalism, as well as the power
of class and business interests, on the operations of the state.
Those who subscribe to Marxist political theory, however, have not always been in
agreement when it comes to the nature of the state. The most prominent debate within
this circle is the exchange between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas (Miliband 1969;
Poulantzas and Miliband 1972 in Blackburn), which was significant because of its
theoretical as well as practical implications at a time when the world was immersed in the
Cold War and the relevance (even legitimacy) of Marxism as a theoretical approach.
Miliband was a proponent of instrumentalism, which is founded on the belief that
the durability of the state can be attributed to it being an instrument of dominant class
interests - one that is meant to be of service to the capitalist class. Miliband wrote:
“The state in these class societies is primarily and inevitably the guardian and
protector of the economic interests which are dominant in them... its ‘real’
purpose is to ensure their continued predominance, not to prevent it (Miliband,
1969: 22).
Poulantzas reviewed Miliband’s work and instead proposed a structuralist view,
arguing that the relation between the bourgeois class and the capitalist state is actually an
“objective relation” (1969:73). This assumes that the state exists – and persists – for a
specific reason in relation to the entire system; that is, it is there to protect and reproduce
the social structure of capitalist societies (Mandel 1978 cited in Barrow 1993) regardless
of class interests. That the interests of the ruling class and the role of the state coincide is
a function of the system itself:
The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation.
This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and
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the interests of the dominant class coincide, it is by reason of the system itself:
the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus is
not the cause but the effect… (Poulantzas, 1969: 73).
Miliband then criticized the structural approach by claiming that the approach left no room
for agency and was too limiting of a view on how the state operates.
The Miliband-Poulantzas debate only sparked more scholarly discussion on the role
of the state in social life. More recently, state-centered theorists have joined the
discussion, arguing that the most effective starting point of any analysis of the state’s role
in daily life is this assumption: The state has “potential autonomy” (Hooks 1993: 39) and
has the ability to structure social and political life independent of the interests of the
dominant class. The reason for this autonomy, state-centered theory proceeds, is that the
state is an actual organization that seeks to control a territory and its people (Skocpol
1979, cited in Barrow 1993). Corollary to that, since the state has the monopoly of the
tools of coercion, its main objective is to maintain military power towards the protection
of its sovereignty and authority over a territory. Ultimately, dominant class interests do not
dictate state behavior.
State-centered theory has its roots in Theda Skocpol’s state autonomy theory,
which posits that states – as organizations or bureaucracies – could have potential for
autonomous operations outside the influence of the demands or interests of social groups,
classes, or society (Skocpol 1985). Skocpol believes this view has largely been ignored by
social scientists, especially Marxist-oriented ones, who have analyzed the relationship
between politics and economics within capitalism through a society-centric lens (i.e.,
viewing the state as inherently shaped by classes or class struggles, and functioning to
preserve modes of production). According to Skocpol, viewing states as independent
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actors, tied together within an international network, is more relevant – and effective –
especially in the post-WWII historical context. Instrumentalism or structural Marxism, for
instance, would not be able to explain why and how states fiscally behaved the way they
did funding military operations during the war, rather than focusing on keeping certain
industries alive. State-centered theory, on the other hand, allows analysts to consider the
effect of political structures and activities, political culture, or collective political action on
society. And since state-centered theory believes in using historical, comparative analyses
of states to understand these effects, Skocpol argues that the theory can move us beyond
the understanding of the state in a national setting (which is the focus of instrumentalism
and structuralism) by telling us about states in transnational contexts (Skocpol 1985) – a
view that further shapes the state as a rational actor in the international state system. State
centric approaches to understanding the state have also been criticized for its failure to
take into account the role of elites, state managers, or institutional variations in the state
system (see Domhoff 1991; Barrow 1993; Hooks 1993).
Of relevance to this study is the critique by Bob Jessop (1990) of the theories of the
state previously discussed in this section. Highly critical of the limits of the structuralistinstrumentalist debate between Poulantzas and Miliband, as well as Skocpol’s theory of
state autonomy, Bob Jessop (1990) argues for a more general state theory of “societization
or society effects.” Fundamental to this view is the belief that the state is not a fixed, static
entity that mediates class interests or acts on its own; rather, the state is a result of social
struggles and the balancing of social forces. He thus presents a ‘strategic-relational
approach’ to the state – a theory that seeks to “integrate a relational view of the state with
the Marxist form-analytic account of capital as a social relation” (Jessop 1990:4).
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According to Jessop, the capitalist state must be viewed as a social relation, similar to
Marx’s (1849) conceptualization of capital as “not a thing”; for just as the capital relation
is constituted through value in the spheres of production and circulation, the form of the
capitalist state is also made possible by its “particularization” or institutional separation
from the circuit of capital (Jessop 1990: 206).
In this strategic-relational theory of the state then, state power is considered to be
a form-determined social relation in that it is a function of constant interactions and
struggles between the state and society. As such, an analysis of the state is only complete
if it considers first, the distinctive institutional form(s) of the state and, second, how the
balance of political forces is influenced by factors beyond the state, i.e., by society.
Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach ultimately sees the relationship between
state and society as not simply one-dimensional, but rather highly contingent, with political
and socio-institutional forces always being balanced in the relationship. This interaction
between state institutions and factors external to the state brings about certain state
effects: organizational coherence, functional coordination and operational unity within the
state.
What makes Jessop’s model distinct from other state theories is that it views these
resulting effects not as inherent to the state, but rather as a result of a relational process
that produces certain effects. Such state effects only emerge through historically
contingent state projects that endeavor to organize the activities of the state (e.g.,
strategies, laws, policies) around a coherent political-economic agenda that can be
projected into civil society (Jessop 1990: 9, 346). The constant struggles within and around
the state system lead Jessop to further posit that the state exercises strategic selectivity
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in determining political strategies that shape the state’s institutional structures and
interventions. As such, the state becomes the “site, generator and product of strategies”
(1990: 260). As a site of strategies, states are not homogeneous in that some state forms
or regimes “will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies
they adopt to gain state power” (Ibid.); as a generator of strategies, it plays a key role in
mobilizing accumulation strategies and developing state projects; and as a product of
strategies, its structures, policies, and programs are shaped by and inherited from
previous political strategies (1990: 261).
In this entire process, the role of state projects is crucial in that it provides state
institutions with the state effects that they need to secure the maintenance of power. State
projects allow for organizational coherence, functional coordination and operational unity
by making sure that the ensemble of state activities is centralized around one goal or
political agenda. By doing so, state projects lead to standardized interventions that not
only regulate the flow of capital, but also the balance of power within civil society – and
even the globalized state system.
While the concept of state projects has been largely applied to analyses of state
activities on the national level, this study attempts to use such a conceptual framework to
examine state projects undertaken within the global system of states. Applied to an
examination of the international discourse on terrorism as it is constructed and
reconstructed at the UN, Jessop’s concept of state projects – and his strategic-relational
approach – seem apropos given that national interpretations of the term have operationally
trumped any of proposed comprehensive definitions that have been tabled by UN
member-states. Moreover, in one analysis of the terrorism discourse among policy

41

experts, Lisa Stampnitzky (2013) observes that terrorism as an act has been constructed
by states as “irrational,” and has been widely “delegitimized” as a political tactic employed
by individuals or groups - external to the state - against governments. In this sense, state
terrorism (or state sponsored terrorism) is immediately excluded in such a
conceptualization, with states effectively legitimizing their monopoly of the use of force.
It is fair to argue that state projects to define and redefine terrorism and counterterrorism have therefore existed for decades, as witnessed through the politically charged
definitional debate on terrorism, and particularly, the stymied negotiations surrounding the
UNCCIT. For the purposes of this study, it will thus be appropriate and beneficial to apply
the strategic-relational approach expounded on above as we seek to understand the
trends, dynamics, and structures of domination affecting the formal political discourse
surrounding terrorism within the walls of the United Nations.
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CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS
This study employs a mixed methods model to examine the research question(s).
Since the dissertation focuses on the development of the discourse on terrorism, data will
be necessarily gathered from available texts (particularly officially published UN
documents, resolutions, or statements) from UN bodies that have dealt with terrorism and
counter-terrorism, along with their special committees tasked to address terrorism: the
General Assembly - particularly the Sixth Committee (Legal Affairs) with its Ad Hoc
Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 on Terrorism and the
special Working Committee on international conventions on terrorism; and Security
Council, particularly its Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) and Counter-Terrorism
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). Notes from the researcher’s interviews will also
be analyzed alongside these documents.
While it will be shown in this study that the terrorism discourse at the UN has existed
and been shaped/reshaped since the inception of the organization, the scope of the
analysis is on the development of the discourse on terrorism from 1996 – the year that the
UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was established – into the current post-9/11 era. It
was in 1996 when the General Assembly began considering a proposed draft convention
to prevent and suppress international terrorism - submitted by India - which has never
been finalized due to continuing disagreement over the conceptual definition of terrorism.
Thus, this particular time frame has been selected given that the definitional debate, which
is the core of this analysis, became more salient with the Ad Hoc Committee discussions
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in the late 1990s, gained traction in 2000-2001 with the introduction of the UNCCIT by
same committee, became prominent after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and
has remained unresolved until today. The period of analysis presents a significant and
comprehensive picture of the development and evolution of the discourse on terrorism
within the context of the more recent definitional debate within the organization.
Content and Discourse Analysis
Discourses constitute the domain in which subjectivities emerge, and create the
conditions for transformations of consciousness and subjectivities (Canning 1994).
Discourse analysis is thus necessary in this instance, given the subjectivities involved in
the construction of a highly polarizing political concept. In this study, the texts on UN
counter-terrorism efforts identified in the previous section may provide insight into the
transformation processes of state subjectivities, and how relevant states have
conceptualized the terrorism discourse over time. Moreover, textual production at the UN
has become a reflection of historical context and meaning. The texts might then provide
the context of the discourse, i.e., the political conditions and power struggles present at
different points in time that have affected the inability to achieve a comprehensive
definition of terrorism.
Alongside discourse analysis, content analysis is also undertaken as the latter
focuses on the frequency of words/word combinations to provide a measure of meaning,
especially when there is a huge amount of texts to be analyzed. As the terrorism discourse
has been shaped and reshaped since the inception of the UN, and the UNCCIT
negotiations have gone on for almost two decades, content analysis is needed to identify

44

and assess contextual evidence specifically related to the social conditions and power
relations which may have shaped the negotiations on the UNCCIT, and consequently
shaped the larger terrorism discourse.
The data collected for this purpose will be from publicly available information or
texts on the UNCCIT negotiations or related counterterrorism efforts led by the UN. Most
of the data on the negotiations will be from the reports of the UN bodies identified above,
but supplemental textual data will also be gathered from available and relevant
government reports, and relevant video/audio clips and footage of UN meetings from the
UN Web TV website when available and appropriate.
Interviews
Interviews are “guided conversations” that scrutinize meaning, provide a
nuanced understanding of the object of study, and elicit specific kinds of information not
present in documentary sources (Blee and Taylor 2002). Interviewing can also be designed
to investigate organizational and institutional processes (not just individual experiences).
Consequently, they can reveal the “relations of ruling” that shape local experiences
(Devault and McCoy 2002). Interviewing in this sense is key to revealing the political
conditions and power relations within the UN as a political institution. While the focus is
on systemic or structural conditions, conducting interviews with specific individuals will
be very helpful in understanding the publicly disclosed orientations and ideologies of
member-states, as well as officers of the UN. For this purpose, interviews were designed
as semi-structured, face-to-face, and informal in order to establish non-hierarchical
relations with the respondents (Taylor and Bogdan 1998).
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As the goal of this study is to examine the discursive trajectory of the debates on
terrorism, particularly with regard to its definition and meaning as shaped by international
state power, this dissertation is primarily informed by textual analysis and archival
research. The interviews I have gathered for the purpose of revealing the nuances of the
politics surrounding the terrorism discourse are thus not meant to be the primary source
of data for this dissertation, and as such do not constitute a representative sample. Rather,
the information provided by the respondents I contacted and who agreed to be
interviewed serve as expert knowledge from resource persons uniquely placed to provide
internal insight into the whys and hows of the discourse creation. They are individuals who
were directly and specifically working on terrorism and counter-terrorism policy as either
state representatives from Permanent Missions to the United Nations, or former or current
staff of United Nations divisions involved with the counter-terrorism discussions and
negotiations. Their responses then form a very particular, albeit limited, narrative that
might be seen as personalized experiences or memories, but those which could
corroborate, contradict, or provide nuance to the written texts being analyzed.
Given that there are literally scores of UN officials and Member-States involved in
terrorism/counter-terrorism discussions, it was not practical – nor feasible – to interview
all of these individuals. Hence, interviewees were invited based on known expertise and
experience. Those who accept the invitation were interviewed at their convenience in
either New York, Connecticut, or via Skype.
For the UN officials, I targeted participants who were/are professional staff
members or officials, with internal grade level of D (Director) or P (Professional). They were
contacted through publicly available information by email or phone. Some of the resource
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persons were recommended to me by my initial respondents, who I then contacted by
email. My expert resource persons served in diverse capacities within multiple UN bodies.
For representatives of Member-States, I interviewed representatives from
Permanent Missions to the UN in New York that were heavily and directly engaged in the
negotiations of the UNCCIT negotiations through time. While I sought to interview state
representatives from every UN regional group (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin
American and the Caribbean, Western Europe and Others15), with priority given to
countries that have a long history and/or experience of terrorist activity16 the response for
my request for interviews was lukewarm. Out of the 12 exploratory and formal invitations
I sent to various Permanent Missions, and numerous follow-up calls, I only received two
positive responses from States willing to sit and provide expert information with me. While
I understand the concern of having only two interviews from the perspective of a state
representative, it is important to note that the interviews in this study are primarily meant
to provide nuance in relation to information in the primary texts and documents being
analyzed, or otherwise be supplements to these documents.
The absence of interviews in this study theoretically would not detract from the
validity of the findings and conclusions I make, but would only serve to make those
findings more robust. Moreover, the state representative narratives come from the two
15

The United States of America is not a member of any regional group, but attends the
meetings of the Western Europe and Other States Group (WEOG) as an observer and is
considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes.
16
These countries include but are not limited to Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Iran, Ireland, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. Based on 2013
data from the Global Terrorism Database from the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the top ten countries with the most terrorist attacks are
(from most to least): Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, Thailand, Nigeria,
Yemen, Syria and Somalia.
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general diverging points of view in the terrorism discourse based on my preliminary data
- one state that is friendly to the US/Israeli bloc, and another state representing the views
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Having resource persons from these two
blocs made it possible to illustrate and highlight the major strands of the discourse and
ensuing debates on the definition of terrorism that are reflected in UN texts and resources.

Social Network Theory/Network Analysis
Social network theory simultaneously explores the structure and the content of
relations to understand social phenomenon by looking at the ties between and among
nodes - individuals, groups, or things - within a network. Scholars who subscribe to this
theory and method of analysis conceptually think of these networks the primary building
blocks of the social world. Hence, instead of taking the individual as the sole unit of
analysis, network analysts are able to collect highly nuanced types of data at the macro
and meso levels (and even at the micro level.) Analyzing the connections and patterns of
connections within the network helps determine how relations are constructed, how they
affect each other, and how they affect the network as a whole.
Scott (1991) observes that the development of social network theory over the 20th
century has been shaped by three major lines of research: a) the sociometric analysis
tradition, which employs graph theory based on mathematical models; b) the interpersonal
relations tradition, which focuses on the formation of cliques among a group of individuals;
and c) an anthropology tradition that explores the structure of community relations in less
developed societies Liu et. al. 2017: 1). By and large, this study leans toward the second
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line of research - the interpersonal relations approach to analyzing networks - and takes
it further by applying that tradition to relations between UN member-states in the
international state system.
For this study, the objective is to apply social network theory to examine the
network of states involved in the shaping of the terrorism discourse and the definition of
terrorism to trace what factors might be impacting the deadlock in UNCCIT negotiations.
In order to do so, I trace general voting behavior of states relative to what I see from the
data as major alliances or political blocs within the discourse. I used data gathered by the
United States State Department from 1996 to 2017 from their annual report on Voting
Practices in the United Nations to look at the patterns of general voting behavior in the
General Assembly and Security Council over time. I also examine official UN documents
and government statements on a state’s participation in treaties related to terrorism and/or
their definition of terrorism. I then attempt to identify the various connections between
states based on this textual evidence, and determine the relative extent of the ‘power’
possessed by each state in shaping the debate.
I had initially planned to apply social network analysis to voting records of states in
relation to treaties on terrorist acts, as well as specific UNCCIT provisions. However,
voting on treaties at the UN has not been done through a straight "yea" or "nay," as might
be found in typical legislative bodies. In reference to taking up international conventions,
“voting” is characterized by different stages or “levels” of approval, i.e., after negotiations,
Member-States can make reservations to the treaty, then choose to sign, ratify, or accede.
This process can take months to years depending on the Member-States’ own interests.
With regard to UNCCIT votes, no data exists on voting behavior for provisions of the
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convention, since the deliberations have not involved explicit voting on the contested parts
of the convention. Thus, the raw data from the UN did not present itself as easily
translatable into network data that would be ripe for sociometric analysis. Through the
course of my data collection process, I realized however, that it would be more analytically
useful to focus on the interpersonal model of network analysis, and examine the cliques or political alliances - and the extent the ties within these subgroups within the UN have
stalled progress on a universal definition of terrorism.
Based on my data from the content analysis, I thus focus on the two major alliances
largely shaping the debate: States aligned with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) on the one hand, and states aligned with the ‘West” - the Western European and
Others Group at the UN including the United States and Israel on the other. While there
are other smaller geopolitical alliances at play, these two blocs (based on my preliminary
data) represent the major divide in efforts to find a commonly accepted definition of
terrorism through an international convention.
Focusing on the states within the two major blocs and examining how discursive
patterns play out within those alliances in mind might contribute more to our
understanding of how political power shapes the current deadlock, instead of presenting
a convoluted web of the voting patterns between and among all 192 Member-States. The
social network chapter will thus be more theoretical in approach, applying social network
theory rather than present sociometric models of voting among all UN member-states.
The analytical goal is to ultimately see the effect of alliances - and their relative power - in
determining the nature of terrorism, whether such states can be influenced to do
otherwise, and in what ways.
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Examining the UN negotiations on the definition of terrorism through social network
theory might provide a better understanding of the specific points where negotiations
break down, how power and political clout affect the connections and patterns of
connections within these negotiations, and what social factors within the international
state system contribute to the constant failure of the negotiations. All this will be done with
a view to theorizing about possible points of compromise or convergence that may lead
member-states to finally come to a consensus on the definition of terrorism, and ultimately
be able to develop universal standards and policies on how terrorism can be thwarted and
prosecuted under international law.
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CHAPTER 4. GLOBALLY DEFINING TERRORISM: Conceptualizing “Terrorism” at
the United Nations

The Roots of “Terrorism” as a Political Concept
The concept of terrorism is far from a nascent political creation. Prior to its
widespread presence in current national and international discussions, as well as its
ubiquity in mainstream public discourse since the tragedy of 9/11, terrorism - as a
recognized strategy of spreading fear through violent and destructive means for a social,
political or religious cause - has existed for thousands of years (Burgess 2005). It is one
of the oldest forms of violence (keeping in mind that not all violence is terrorism).
While some counter-terrorism analysts and experts on the ground have recently
attempted to link terrorism with ideology, particularly with jihadism or militant Islamism
(see Drake 1998; Chertoff 2008; Bolton 2015; and Stewart 2017 for prominent
arguments), Walter Lacquer (2007:2) posits that terrorism is “not a political doctrine,
even though some have attempted to transform it into an ideology.” Lacquer claims that
terrorism is a strategy used by individuals or organizations to bring about or resist
change. He further argues that terrorism as a tactic of violence “probably antedates
regular warfare” for the primary reason that carrying out terrorism is “primitive” in that it
does not require the sophisticated logistics of armies (Lacquer 2008:2). However, given
the militaristic structure and seemingly extensive resources of recent terrorist
organizations such as ISIS/ISIL, such an observation might be contentious.
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Nevertheless, an important point here is that terrorism has existed even prior to 9/11,
and surely predates the terrorist surge of the 1960s to 1970s. The literature might have
called such violent (political) acts by different names, but the use of violence and fear as
an instrument to promote a political, social, or religious agenda, has long established its
place throughout history.
The term ‘terrorism’ as it is commonly used today, however, has its foundations in
the latter part of the French Revolution when the First French Republic was established.
At that time, Maximilien Robespierre - then leading the Committee on Public Safety carried out the ‘reign of terror’ (regime de la terreur or La Terreur )17 from September 5,
1793 to July 27, 1794 as a state instrument used to protect the new French government
from subversives. In order to quell the threats of civil war and counter- revolution during
that period, terrorism was framed as a positive, value-laden, and necessary act by the
state as it supposedly aimed to preserve justice and protect democracy at a time when
the new French Republic was at its infancy.
Leaders of the First French Republic sought to normalize terror as a tool to
protect the state. One member of the National Convention at that time, Bertrand Barère
de Vieuzac, even advocated for making terror “the order of the day” (Shusterman 2015:
175-203).18 Robespierre believed in the necessity of terror in eliminating opponents of
the revolution, stating:
“If the basis of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the basis of popular
government during a revolution is both virtue and terror; virtue, without which
17

“Reign of Terror,” Encyclopedia Brittanica. Updated December 18, 2017. Available at
https://www.britannica.com/event/Reign-of-Terror. Accessed April 5, 2018.
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terror is baneful; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing more
than speedy, severe and inflexible justice; it is thus an emanation of virtue; it is
less a principle in itself, than a consequence of the general principle of
democracy, applied to the most pressing needs of the [homeland]..”(Linton 2006:
23)
This driving principle behind regime de la terreur, which permeated the actions and
policies of the First Republic, allowed the state to justify the execution of about 40,000
people by guillotine (Linton 2006).
Not everyone in Europe saw this state policy as just or necessary. European
philosophers such as Sir Edmund Burke of England criticized and demonized terrorism
as an unjust tool of the state. It was through Burke’s Letters on a Regicide Peace when
the term “terrorist” first entered the English language with a negative connotation, as
part of his reaction to the violence of the French Revolution (Helland 2013). The critique
focused on terror as a state instrument that was used without consent from the people in
a supposed democracy. Burke viewed Robespierre’s policy as a form of government
coercion, and a means of wielding illegitimate power (Helland 2013). Two decades later,
Jeremy Bentham followed suit, also criticizing terrorism as a “perversion of the political
process” as it allowed for the attainment of sovereign power through the use of fear
(Helland 2013). It was through this philosophical discourse that the critical perception of
terrorism was solidified, consequently contributing to the negative notion of terrorism
that permeates the global discourse today.
Since the French Revolution, however, terrorism has evolved from politically
motivated acts and assaults on leaders and states, to wanton violence on civilians. From
a time when terrorism was used by the state as that institution with an assumed
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legitimate monopoly of violence, we now see terrorism employed as a strategy by nonstate actors against the state, or in opposition to other political or social institutions of
power.
In the aftermath of the events of 9/11 - and the use of violence as a strategy to
pursue a higher ideological or political purpose (particularly by jihadists) - it has been
suggested that the goals of contemporary terrorists are no longer limited to
“overthrowing a government or gaining independence.” Engaging in political violence
has steadily become a function of ideological warfare. In specific reference to militant
Islam, Karns and Mingst have argued that the goals of terrorism now “include eliminating
Western, and especially American, presence in Islamic holy lands” (2010: 345).
The intricate nature of terrorism as an act of violence has no doubt framed and
shaped the nebulous nature of terrorism as a political concept. It is this conceptual
complexity that has stymied the United Nations for decades in its attempt to formulate
and implement counter-terrorism agreements founded on a universal definition of the
threat. A deeper understanding of this lack of unanimity thus calls for an intentional look
into the paths of development, as well as the evolutionary process, of the definition of
terrorism and its entire discourse within the premiere global organization of states.

The Terrorism Discourse in Global Policy Making

The Pre-UN Era
Since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) has been involved in efforts
to address terrorism, seeking to find ways to eliminate it, prevent it, and/or punish
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those who engage in terrorist acts. It is important to note however, that concerns about
political violence against a state - with the use of acts of terror as a strategy or tactic have in fact predated the establishment of this global organization.
Since the early 1900s, there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts by the
global community to formally define terrorism as a criminal offense under international
law. It was only in the 1920s to 1930s however that efforts to systematically state the
exact nature of the phenomenon gained significant traction (Saul 2005: 58). This
interest in defining acts of terror, and in preventing and punishing such acts, coincided
with the establishment of the League of Nations (the predecessor of the United
Nations). The League was established in 1920 as a result of Paris Peace Conference to
ensure collective security and continued peace after World War I.
The first formal proposal for an international agreement on terrorism was made
by Romania at the League of Nations in 1926. Romania had requested the League to
consider drafting a ‘convention to render terrorism universally punishable’ but the
petition immediately fell flat.19 It was not until the early 1930s, during the series of
International Conferences for the Unification of Criminal Law (ICUCL)20 that terrorism
was more seriously and methodically considered as part of global efforts to
standardize criminal law. Its debut as a political concept considered within the context
of international treaty law came at the Third ICUCL Conference in Brussels in 1930.
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Cited in Saul (2005) from League of Nations (LoN), Committee of Experts for the Codification
of International Criminal Law, Replies of Governments 1927, LoN Doc. C.196.M.70.1927.V, p.
221.
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These conferences were held in Brussels (1930), Paris (1931), Madrid (1933), and
Copenhagen (1935). Bounthoul (1975) cited in Saul (2005: 59).
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The inclusion of terrorism on the agenda was made in reference to acts of violence
against people or property. The intention at that conference was to address and define
criminal acts that had “the purpose of expressing or executing political or social ideas”
and that were simultaneously capable of producing “common danger” to the public
(Zlataric 1975). In discussing what crimes should be contemplated in relation to the
“intentional use of instruments capable of producing public danger,” a number of
Eastern European countries proposed that terrorism be subsumed under such offences
(Segesser and Gessler 2009: 13) to wit:
‘The intentional use of means capable of producing a common danger that
represents an act of terrorism on the part of anyone making use of crimes against
life, liberty or physical integrity of persons or directed against private or state
property with the purpose of expressing or executing political or social ideas will
be punished.’21
Saul (2005) observed that such a definition framed terrorism as characterized by two
major features: first, the political or social motives behind specified violent acts; and
second, the risk of producing a common danger to the state or the public. Any
reference of the use of terrorism by a State was absent.
The Fourth ICUCL Conference the following year saw two other proposed
definitions of terrorism from two rapporteurs. Despite variations in these proposals, the
element of imposing a political or social doctrine through criminal violence remained at
the core of terrorism as a concept (Saul 2005: 59). At the end of the Fourth
Conference, however, participating States adopted a resolution with a definition of
terrorism that had no reference whatsoever to the political or social causes of such
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Final Commission Proposal, quoted in Zlataric (1975), op. cit. n. 7, at p. 479; also cited in
Saul (2005).
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violence, but instead one that focused on the effects of certain violent acts (Saul 2005:
59). The conference concluded with a recommendation that States should cooperate
towards “universal repression” of terrorist acts. The reference to terrorism in the
resolution reads as follows:
‘Whoever, for the purpose of terrorizing the population, uses against persons
or property bombs, mines, incendiary or explosive devices or products,
firearms or other deadly or deleterious devices, or who provokes or attempts
to provoke, spreads or attempts to spread an epidemy, a contagious disease
or other disaster, or who interrupts or attempts to interrupt a public service or
public utility will be punished …’22
What is compelling about this resolution is that the term ‘terrorism’ per se was not
universally defined despite lengthy discussions that illustrated a common
understanding of the political nature of the phenomenon during the conference
debates; and just as it is occurs today, reference to terrorism at that time devolved into
references to “acts of terror,” or crimes that seek to “terrorize” the state or the public.
This suggests that states in the international system have consistently been prudent
when it comes to associating terrorism with politics or attributing an inherently political
motive to the phenomenon; for what is political (rather than merely criminal) straddles
subjectivity and each state’s exercise of sovereignty.23
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It is also worth noting that the focus of this definition on physical violence predates, and
therefore leaves out, consideration of other forms of terrorism that may occur today, the most
prominent of which are cyberattacks. Now increasingly common in the arsenal of terrorists,
whether transnational individuals, cadres of individuals, or states themselves, cyberattacks are
changing the face of terrorism and may require another layer to considering/reconsidering what
terrorism means politically and legally. Currently, while cyberterrorism is not specifically
mentioned in the proposed convention nor is it a subject of a proposed treaty or legal regime,
the UN - through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force - has begun efforts to
understand how states can address the burgeoning issue.
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In seeking to define or characterize terrorism, States heavily debated on the
merits of categorizing terrorism as a political offense or a criminal offense, with most
countries leaning towards characterizing terrorism as an international criminal act. This
illustrates the reluctance of states at that time to give up their national legal traditions
and jurisdictions to conform to a new internationalist or universalist vision or criminal
law (Lewis 2014: 137). But more significantly, the question of what terrorism is and how
it should or can be prosecuted was complex - and controversial - when we delve into
the political climate and historical context of that period.
The early 1900s saw fascist and authoritarian regimes in Europe such as Italy
and Germany suppressing opposition and criminalizing political violence, while liberal
(or democratically-oriented) states such as Britain fighting for political freedom and
recognizing that acts of violence against the state might be legitimate. The world
witnessed the emergence of ultra-nationalist and separatist movements against the
oppressions of Fascism or Nazism, where violence became a tactic of resistance. In
this light, countries like Britain were concerned that categorizing and prosecuting
(legitimate) political violence as terrorism would stifle free speech or freedom of
association in opposition groups, or crush a state’s right to offer political asylum (Lewis
2014: 136). In the same vein, doing so would also fail to recognize terrorism as a tool
employed by a repressive state.
These fundamental differences in viewing terrorism as illegitimate political
violence versus terrorism as legitimate freedom fighting were at the very core of the
early debates on the concept. This dichotomy between illegitimate and legitimate
political violence, and how such polarity of interpretation shapes the path towards
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finding a universal definition of terrorism, continues to trouble the current terrorism
discourse almost a century after.
As a consequence, from the very nascent stages of the terrorism discourse, the
discussions - and subsequent agreements resulting from those discussions - have
instead relied on the practical and more tangible aspects of terrorism to characterize it:
The particular acts of violence themselves that cause fear in persons, as well as
damage to life and property. By focusing on criminal acts rather than on the motives,
the international community would theoretically still be able to standardize criminal law
and prosecute specified criminal acts of terror by virtue of their detrimental effects on
persons - and ultimately maintain international peace and order - without being
deterred by the sensitive politics (or political motives) attached to such acts.
As the series of International Conferences for the Unification of Criminal Law
(ICUCL) progressed, there was thus more focus on “social” terrorism and decreased
reference to “political” terrorism. At the Fifth Conference in 1934, the adopted
resolution provided for the punishment of any person who engages in “any means
whatsoever to terrorize the population” with the intention of “undermining social order”
cementing terrorism - or at least terrorist acts - as a depoliticized crime, having only a
social element (Zlataric 1975: 480). Terrorism as a concept remained nebulous and
narrow as to its motives and fundamental nature, while the list of acts that fell under it
as a general social crime expanded to include any act that terrorized a population
(such as, but not limited to, provoking an international catastrophe, destroying art
works, and participating in massacres or collective atrocities against civilians). These
acts of terror were viewed as crimina juris gentium or punishable crimes under
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international law (Saul 2005: 60). As Saul notes, in becoming silent about political
terrorism and disregarding earlier references to political aims of those who employed
terrorism, the Fifth Conference consequently “reduced the notion of terrorism to the
crime of anarchy” (2005:60).
At the Sixth Conference in Copenhagen in 1935, States then adopted a draft
model for national legislation to repress terrorism that listed specific acts punishable as
acts of terror. 24 The model defined such acts to be “intentional acts directed against
the life, physical integrity, health or freedom’ of specified protected persons, where the
perpetrator has created ‘a common [or public] danger, or state terror that might incite a
change or raise an obstacle to the functioning of public bodies or a disturbance in
international relations.’ What is fascinatingly distinct about this draft however, is that it
aimed to codify terrorism as a “discrete crime” (Saul 2014: 60) rather than a general or
ordinary crime under international law:
“It is necessary that certain acts should be punished as special offences, apart
from any general criminal character which they may have under the laws of the
State, whenever such acts create a public danger or a state of terror, of a
nature to cause a change in or impediment to the operation of the public
authorities or to disturb international relations, more particularly by
endangering peace …’ [emphasis mine].
This seemingly innocent shift in the Copenhagen conference illustrates the push and
pull between the divergent views on terrorism, with states this time apparently
recognizing the dual nature of terrorism as political and social (Ditrych 2014). That
said, terrorism fundamentally remained depoliticized. The thought that it could be
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League of Nations Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism (CIRT), “Texts
adopted by the 6th International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law” (Copenhagen,
31 Aug3 Sept 1935), Geneva, 7 January 1936, LoN Doc. CRT.17 (‘Copenhagen Draft’).
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exercised by a state was “discursively impossible25”; that is, the ways in which
terrorism is read, understood, described and even prosecuted obscures the existence
of the state as a perpetrator of terrorist acts. Identifying and perceiving states as
something other than victims of terrorism becomes unimaginable and invisible in the
discourse.
Ditrych (2014)26 notes that the driving force in denying the political motive of a
terrorist act was “the perceived need to remove terrorism from the category of crimes
for which a certain protection, namely with respect to possible extradition, existed.”
This depoliticization in the formal discourse did not mean that the political nature of
terrorism was not discussed in marginal discourses (i.e. outside the international
criminal law debates), only that keeping such tropes present in formal discussions
could become roadblocks to progress so much so that silence about it became the
compromise.
Ultimately, terrorism was effectively limited to practices intended to “terrorize a
population” (Ditrych 2014: 124;127, citing Doc A/34/37). At the end of the day, the
common view at this juncture in the development of the discourse was clear (at least
on paper): “Terrorists always corrupted the political; their crimes, however, never were
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I borrow the term for Laura Sjoberg’s (2016) work on women as wartime rapists. In that
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political.” (Ditrych 2014: 124)27 This kept the state simultaneously immune from the
commission of terrorist acts, and free to defend such acts within the context of
impermeable sovereignty.
While the ICUCL featured debates on the nature and definition of terrorism,
these discussions were only a prelude to more focused negotiations on the issue,
given that terrorism was only one of the many crimes being discussed in that
conference series. It was not until the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia
by Croatian and Macedonian separatists in 1934, that the “most significant early
modern attempt to define terrorism as an international crime” (Saul 2014: 61) was
undertaken by the League of Nations from 1934 and 1937.
Since the French Foreign Minister was also killed together with King Alexander,
the French government took the lead on efforts to deal with the terrorist act and turned
to the League to propose the draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism (CPPT). The impetus for the proposal was the fact that France had requested
Italy to extradite the assassin who had then fled to the latter country, but was denied
pursuant to their 1870 extradition treaty excluding political crimes from extradition.
Without any recourse to international law - especially given the debates on what
constitutes terrorism as a criminal or political offence - the League of Nations was
pressured into placing the proposal on the agenda. Two months after France drafted
the proposal, the League stated that the policies in place to repress terrorism at that
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time were indeed not “sufficiently precise” to “guarantee international cooperation” on
the matter.28
On November 16, 1937, the draft convention was finally adopted, but only by
24 out of 6029 Member-States during the Conference for the Repression of Terrorism in
Geneva. The draft convention encouraged States to exclude acts of terror from the
political offence exception to extradition in bilateral treaties.
While the CPPT did not explicitly define terrorism per se, it clearly defined acts
of terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the
general public" (Article 1, CPPT; emphasis mine). It further specified what kinds of antiState actions were to be considered acts of terror. The list of such acts included
willfully causing death or grievous bodily harm to heads of state, public officials, and/or
their family members; willful destruction or damage to public property or facilities with
a public function; and any act intended to harm the public (Article 2, CPPT). Any
attempt to commit such acts or engagement in the manufacture, possession, or supply
of ammunition to commit such acts were also considered acts of terrorism.
Fundamentally, terrorism was defined in the CPPT by three elements: the
intended aim (i.e., a state of terror), the ultimate target (a State), and the prohibited
means used (Saul 2014: 64). Proposals to refer to political or coercive motives, or to
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define terrorism as a means to a political end were shot down (Saul 2014: 64, citing
Givenovitch 1935).30
One salient provision in the CPPT - a provision that can arguably be seen as one
of the early formal contributions to the present notion that terrorism is borderless and
transnational in nature - is that which required signatory states to pass laws making
such acts extraditable offences, in the event that one of their nationals commit such
acts in another territory. This provision, however, was the downfall of the agreement.
With states protective of their sovereignty (and their right to define what is legitimate
political behavior), the ‘exception to extradition’ clause led to the derailment of the
convention, preventing ratification, and resulting in the agreement never coming into
effect. With the onset of World War II, interest in repressing terrorism waned and the
convention was subsequently not revived when the United Nations was founded.
While the CPPT never came into fruition, it was the first formal basis for
subsequent discussions on terrorism within the United Nations. It highlighted two
principles of international law in relation to terrorism, which are first, that every State
has the duty to refrain from encouraging terrorist behavior directed against another
State and has the duty to prevent such acts; and second, that terrorism necessarily
refers to acts “intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of
particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.” (CPPT text) The
inclusion of effects on civilians as a categorical characteristic of international terrorism
is arguably the crux of current disputes regarding terrorism as something that can be
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committed by a member-state against another state, or a member-state against its
people. References to these principles in that early draft are still made today (Ruperez
2015), and the current discourse at the UN continues to echo to strands of thought that
found their way into the CPPT decades ago.
The Terrorism Discourse in the United Nations
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the analysis of this study focuses on the
development of the terrorism discourse in relation to the more recent definitional
debate as it gained traction with the establishment of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on
Terrorism in 1996. It is important to note however, that since the UN’s founding in
1945, preventing and suppressing terrorist acts was already prominently on the radar
of the UN General Assembly (GA). Tracing the development of the discourse as it
moved from the halls of the General Assembly to the Security Council and to
specialized bodies is crucial to understanding the processes by which the discourse
developed and the power relations involved in shaping the discourse as we have it
today.
Javier Ruperez, UN Assistant Secretary General and Executive Director of the
Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee from 2004-2007, noted that the levels
of awareness of terrorism at the UN “has depended on the experience of the
international community as a whole at any given time” (Ruperez 2006:1). This suggests
that while terrorism has been on the radar of security issues at the UN since its
inception, the discourse has seen distinct phases of development depending on the
types and intensity of terrorist occurrences over the years. For our present purposes,

66

using the model of Javier Ruperez (2005) as a guide on distinct periods in the policymaking trajectory on terrorism/counterterrorism, I posit that there are four phases of
the development of the discourse on terrorism at the United Nations: 1) The “Primary
Phase” from 1945-1971; 2) The “Secondary Phase” from 1972-1992; 3) The “Pre-9/11
Phase” from 1993 to 2001; and 4) The “Post 9/11 Phase” from 2001 up to the present
day.
In distinguishing these phases, it will be helpful to keep in mind that the
organizational framework of the UN, particularly the structural dichotomy between the
General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC), has had a significant impact on
the development of the global terrorism discourse (Saul 2005b, 141)31. As the main
agenda-setting and deliberative body of the UN where each state gets an equal vote,
the GA was the natural - and primary - forum within which the terrorism discourse
developed. States have made an (unspoken) distinction between the GA as the body
that deals with “soft power” issues (e.g., poverty alleviation and development, health,
environmental protection, etc.) and the SC that addresses “hard power” issues such as
peace and order, and (military) conflict resolution (Koskenniemi 1995: 325, 336; Saul
2005b: 141). Since early debates of terrorism fell under the auspices of international
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crime that was either socially or politically motivated, terrorism was placed on the GA’s
agenda. It was not until the late 1990s and into the 2000s - particularly after the events
of September 11, 2001 - that terrorism was discursively and practically moved into the
halls of the Security Council and treated as a more significant threat to international
peace and security.
Through these changes, one thing has remained: the lack of consensus on a
universal and legally binding definition of the phenomenon. Tracing the milestones of
the discourse through the four phases I have identified might aid in our present efforts
to understand why.
The Primary Phase of Discourse Development (1945-1972)
When the concept of terrorism entered formal UN discussions on how
international law might be codified to ensure global peace after the Second World War,
the concept took a remarkable turn. Unlike the depoliticized framing of terrorism in the
League, terrorism at this stage did not refer to offences committed by non-state actors
against the state or against civilians. Rather, terrorism was explicitly linked to the
concept of organized aggression by “authorities of the State” in another country,
establishing individual criminal responsibility for such authorities who carry out these
acts of aggression (Saul 2005a: 66, 68).
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In the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind
(Part I) taken up by the UN’s International Law Commission,32 terrorism was
categorized as an offense “against the peace and security of mankind” that involved
“...undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist
activities in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.’
(Article 2(6), emphasis mine)
This reference to terrorism as only committed by States and as acts committed in an
organized manner (by political parties, for instance) deviated from an initial draft33 in
1950 that covered terrorist acts committed by private persons or non-state actors. In
examining the records of the debates, Saul (2005a: 66) notes that proposals to delete
“organized activities” or to include private or non-state terrorism “with international
effects” in what might be criminalized were rejected.34
In deliberations on the 1954 draft, the absence of a definition of ‘terrorist acts’ or
‘terrorist activities’ was broached by the United Kingdom with the fear that such
ambiguity would allow “states of bad faith” to “attack the acts and policies of
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neighboring States.”35 Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur and other ILC members
noted that terrorism already had a fairly precise definition in international law based on
the 1937 draft Convention of the League of Nations. The draft also borrowed from
other conceptualizations of terrorism that existed in extant legal instruments and
principles at that time (such as those from the UN War Crimes Commission, Australian
War Crimes Act, and Chinese Criminal Law). Ultimately, the ILC voted on the draft with
an understanding of terrorism and particular terrorist acts pursuant to the 1937 League
Convention.
The ILC adopted the article on terrorism virtually unanimously with a vote of 100 and three abstentions (Saul 2005: 68). Nevertheless, the General Assembly
postponed taking up the draft and did not adopt it immediately on the grounds that
“aggression” was not clearly defined, and that such a definition was necessary.36 In
1974, twenty years after the ILC vote, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
defining aggression that did not link the concept to terrorism.37 This silence on
terrorism as an act that is considered an act of state aggression once again redirected
the discourse on terrorism - and the subsequent understanding of the phenomenon towards one that again treated terrorism as international political violence by non-state
actors against a state.
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The next two decades would see the UN delving on codifying specific acts of
terror by non-State groups. Concerns about crimes on board an aircraft and the
question of legal jurisdiction to prosecute such crimes led states to take on the issue of
aircraft safety and the legal status of an aircraft in 1950 (Boyle and Pulsifer 1964: 307).
The efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization to address what was then a
growing concern about the international nature of crimes committed on aircraft
resulted in the adoption of what is now considered as the first international treaty
against terrorism: The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft enacted in Tokyo in 1963, and fully adopted in 1969 (O’Donnell
2006:853; Boyle and Pulsifer 1963). Shortly after, two other conventions addressing
seizure of aircrafts (hijackings) and general civil aviation safety were adopted in 1970
and 1971 respectively.
While these first three legal instruments heralded increasing concern for
terrorism, the scope of these conventions was very narrow. It was not until the Lod
airport attack in Tel Aviv followed by the abduction and murder of 11 Israeli athletes
during the Olympic Games at Munich in 1972, that terrorism became the focal agenda
point at the GA. Then Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim requested the GA to make
terrorism front and center of the next session, and discuss “measures to prevent
terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or
jeopardize fundamental freedoms” (A/8791 of 8 September 1972). Member-States
debated on whether to focus on cooperating to prevent terrorism, or formulating
measures to eliminate the root causes of the phenomenon altogether (Ruperez 2005:
15). The latter proved to be controversial because of the disagreements over the nature
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of terrorism itself. This consequently led to discussions on the UN’s role in encouraging
cooperative measures to prevent manifestations (rather than causes) of any terrorist
threat.
The path was thus paved for the formulation of legal instruments geared
towards preventing terrorist acts. The lack of a robust consensus on a definition of the
concept under international law however, resulted in ad hoc conventions to suppress
and prosecute specific criminal offences considered “terrorist activities.” Harking back
to the spirit of the pre-UN terrorism discourse, which focused on practices intended to
terrorize a population, these treaties provide for the punishment of specific acts of
terror under international law without ever referring to a universal definition of terrorism
itself.
Today, there are 1938 such international legal instruments adopted by various
UN member states that address the prevention and suppression of terrorism.
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The 19 legal instruments (conventions and supplements) are:
1) The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
(1963);
2) The Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);
3) The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(1971);
4) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons (1973);
5) The Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979);
6) The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980);
7) The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation (1988);
8) The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);
9) The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988);
10) The Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
(1991);
11) The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997);
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Collectively, these treaties identify and define nearly fifty offenses including crimes
against civil aviation, crimes against shipping or continental platforms, crimes against
persons or property, crimes against the use, possession, or threatened use of bombs
or nuclear materials, and the financing of terrorism (O’Donnell 2006: 855). The
approach that the UN has taken has indeed been to focus on identifying, condemning,
and suppressing terrorist acts as crimes under international law to aid in the immediate
operational efforts to prevent and prosecute terrorism, rather than actively seeking a
universal definition the concept. A 2004 Security Council Resolution (SC Res 1566)
supports this manner of dealing with the terrorist threat, suggesting that the crimes
under all the aforementioned treaties form part of a “code of terrorist offences”
(O’Donnell 2006: 856) even absent a political cause. In that resolution, the Council
states that it:
“[c]ondemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their
motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most
serious threats to peace and security…” (S/RES/1566 (2004), p.2 para. 1,
12) The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (1999);
13) The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005);
14) Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005);
15) Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (2005);
16) Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (2005);
Adapts the changes to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation to the context of fixed platforms located on the continental
shelf (2005)
17) The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil
Aviation (2010);
18) Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft (2010); and
19) Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (2014).
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emphasis mine.)
It is important to note that while there is a broad consensus on the need for
states to come together on counter-terrorism efforts - particularly by incorporating and
criminalizing the terrorist offenses internationally identified in existing treaties into each
state’s national criminal laws - not all States have signed, ratified, or acceded to all of
these legal instruments. Every convention has its set of reservations from different
states, suggesting the very political and highly malleable nature of terrorism a concept
and as a real security issue.

Secondary Phase of Discourse Development (1972-1996)
Frequent incidents of terrorism throughout the 1970s and 1980s prompted the
United Nations to recognize the enduring and ubiquitous character of terrorism as a
security threat. After the attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Sixth Committee of
the GA - the primary forum for taking up general legal questions at the GA - was
assigned to consider terrorism as a general problem under an agenda item titled
“Measures to prevent international terrorism” (Ruperez 2005: 15).39

The GA considered the agenda item at its thirty-first session, biennially from its thirty-second
to forty-eighth sessions and annually thereafter, changing its title from “Measures to prevent
international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes
fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts
of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people
to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes” to
“Measures to eliminate international terrorism” at its forty-sixth session. The relevant resolutions
throughout that period are as follows: 31/102, 32/147, 34/145, 36/109, 38/130, 40/61, 42/159,
44/29, 46/51, 49/60, 50/53, 51/210, 52/164, 52/165, 53/108, 54/109, 54/110, 55/158, 56/88,
57/27, 58/81, 59/46, 59/290, 60/43, 61/40, 62/71, 63/129, 64/118, 65/34, 66/105, 67/99, 68/119,
69/127 and 70/120 and decision 48/411. (General Assembly, Sixth Committee (Legal) - 71st
Session, Agenda Item 108.) Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/int_terrorism.shtml.
39
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The GA then decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on International
Terrorism, consisting of 35 member-states appointed by the Secretary-General based
on geographic representation (Res 3034 (XXVII)). This Ad Hoc Committee met in 1973
but was later obligated to suspend its work.
In September of that year, the US proposed a Draft Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism to the General
Assembly.40 Interestingly, despite the reference to international terrorism in the title, the
acts defined in this proposed treaty were not categorically referred to as ‘terrorist’ acts
but rather as offences of ‘international significance’ (Saul 2005a: 69 citing Murphy, op.
cit. n. 83, at p. 505.) The offenses in the draft included unlawful killing, causing serious
bodily harm, or kidnapping as long as these acts had an “international dimension”
(Saul 2005a: 69; Murphy, op. cit. n. 83, at p. 505) and were committed with the
intention of “damaging interests of or obtaining concession from a State or an
international organization.”41 This broad characterization of terrorism only
contemplated international offences committed by non-state actors against a State,
and more significantly acts committed by a foreign national or against a foreign
national. Through this proposal, the US was hoping to discursively reconstruct
terrorism as a crime with a fundamentally international or transnational nature,
committed by foreign individuals against (enemy) States and their citizens. Any overt or

40 UN
41

Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972).

1972 US Draft Convention, Art. 1(d).
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direct reference to the existence of state terrorism in theory or in practice was made
invisible in the proposal.
That said, a striking provision in the same draft stated that any offense
committed against a military member in peacetime, as well as any prohibited act
committed by a military member in peacetime may amount to terrorism. Saul (2005a:
70) posits that such a provision might be read as “admitting the punishment of ‘State
terrorism’ (subject to state immunities).” To say that a military member - who is
technically an agent of the state - can be made culpable for a terrorist act arguably
acknowledges the possibility of state terrorism as well.
While the US draft significantly contributed to broadening the terrorism
discourse, member-state support for the proposal was weak. The politics of the Cold
War and the ideological divide between developed and developing States with regard
to issues of self-determination stunted progress: China, along with Arab and African
countries, interpreted the US draft to be an “attempt to criminalize self-determination
movements” (Saul 2005a: 71, citing Murphy, op. cit. n. 89, at p. 17; Murphy, op. cit. n.
83, at p. 499) at a time when countries were seeking to untangle themselves from their
colonial pasts. The discussions were also marred by heated exchanges between Arab
and Israeli States in the context of the highly volatile political climate at the heels of the
anti-Israeli Munich attacks. These conditions condemned the negotiations and
ultimately led to the rejection of the treaty.
As the disagreements on the concept of international terrorism continued
among UN Member-States, so did international terrorist attacks. Data from the Global
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Terrorism Database42 show that incidents of terrorism steadily increased from 1970 into
the mid-1980s, with over 25,000 incidents recorded43 (see Fig.1). Despite the existence
of flagrant, large-scale attacks such as the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to
Entebbe, and the 1979 occupation of the US embassy in Tehran - the Security Council
treated all these incidents as violent crimes under international law without categorical
references to them as acts of ‘terrorism.’ Investigations of these incidents were left to
national agencies, and the Security Council took no action on these attacks. The
discussions in relation to terrorism remained within the agenda of the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly.

The Global Terrorism Database is an open-source database managed by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of
Maryland. The database includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970
through 2016 (with additional annual updates planned for the future) culled from open media
sources that are verified and deemed credible by START. The GTD includes systematic data on
domestic as well as transnational and international terrorist incidents that have occurred during
the said time period and now includes more than 170,000 cases. For each GTD incident,
information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of
the target, the number of casualties, and--when identifiable--the group or individual responsible.
42

43From

the GTD, a broad search of worldwide terrorism incidents from 1970 to 1985 shows
25,294 separate incidents of terrorism. These include successful and unsuccessful incidents
(with no injuries or fatalities, to those with more than 150 casualties).
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NUMBER OF INCIDENTS

Figure 1. Terrorism Incidents Over Time, Recoded from OpenSource Data, 1970-1985.

YEAR
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Generated and
retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd, 29 January 2018.

It was not until the first half the 1980s when terrorism reached unprecedented
levels with an outbreak of bombings, aircraft hijackings, and hostage-taking incidents
that the discourse on terrorism spilled over into forums outside the GA.44 The spate of

See Figure 1 for the trend in incidents during this period. The incidents included – but are not
limited to - the 1983 bombing of Gulf Air flight from Karachi, Pakistan to Abu Dhabi, UAE; the
1884 hijacking of a Kuwait Airways flight from Bangkok to Kuwait; a series of incidents in June
1985 (a TWA flight from Athens to Rome; a Royal Jordanian aircraft sitting on the tarmac at
Beirut International Airport); the seizure of 25 Finnish UN soldiers by the South Lebanon Army
in June 1985l and the seizure of the cruise ship Achille Lauro later that year (Saul 2005b: 144,
footnote 25).
44
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attacks prompted the Security Council to finally - and unanimously - adopt its first
resolution (SC Res 679 of 1985) to ever use the word “terrorism” in reference to such
acts. SC Res 679, which came in December 1985 at the heels of a statement of the SC
President45 “condemning all acts of terrorism including hostage-taking and abduction”
as “manifestations of international terrorism.”46 Coincidentally, the resolution was
adopted on a day when Palestinian suicide bombers attacked US and Israeli check-in
desks at the Rome and Vienna airports, killing 20 civilians (Saul 2005b: 144).
The context by which the SC Res 679 was adopted is critical to analyzing the
development of the terrorism discourse at this point, particularly in terms of how the
concept entered the UN’s discursive arena, as well as to how its meaning shifted from
a “soft power” agenda point in the General Assembly to a “hard power” concern in the
Security Council. The Council did not simply or naturally come to a moral epiphany
about the massive security threat that terrorism posed to human rights and diplomatic
relations. Rather, I argue that recognizing terrorism as a grave security threat at that
point in history was largely - if not solely - a function of the powers that be. That is,
when the United States - the country with the most political clout in the UN at that
time, and a permanent member of the Council - recognized terrorism as a threat to its
national (and foreign interests), the trajectory of the discourse was altered. This is

The SC Presidents are determined by rotation. The statement dated 9 October 1985 was
given by the United States as Security Council President for the month of October, as
represented by Herbert S. Okun and Vernon A. Walters. The statement was made in response
to the hijacking of the Italian ship Achille Lauro.
45

SC REs 579 (1985), paras 1 and 5; see also SC Pres Stat (9 October 1985); also cited in
Saul 2005b: 144.
46
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because SC Res 679 was formulated and adopted in response to a letter from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council requesting that the Council urgently
meet to “consider the serious situation created by acts of hostage-taking and
abduction.” 47 The formal letter presented by the United States signaled to the
international community that terrorism should be considered a grave enough offense
under international law to merit attention from the Council. The unanimous
condemnation of these incidents as terrorism arguably clouded this fact: The spate of
terrorist attacks directly and indirectly affected the United States both with its citizens
and its political allies - particularly Israel - as victims. With the US holding the strongest
voice in the UN - one that could shape, direct, and reconstruct the agenda and the
ensuing political and social discourse within the international arena, I posit it was not
primarily the prevalent sense of urgency that led to the elevation of terrorism in the
broader global security discourse, but rather the capability (and legitimacy) of the US to
thrust it into that direction.
The inclusion of terrorism on the Security Council’s agenda did not mean that
the General Assembly remained silent on terrorism following the failed 1972 draft
convention. From 1972 to the time that the SC adopted its first resolution on terrorism,
the GA adopted eight separate resolutions on the issue, repeatedly focusing on
“Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human
lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms” and encouraging Member-States to

47

Dated 16 December 1985.
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examine “the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which
lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.”48 In
1976, it once again invited the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism to continue its work
(A/RES/31/102).
Unlike the tone of the resolution in the SC, the GA resolutions often and openly
acknowledged that States may be just as capable of committing terrorist acts as nonstate actors. A 1985 GA resolution, for instance, condemned State terrorism and called
for Member-States to recognize the “[i]nadmissibility of the policy of State terrorism
and any actions by States aimed at undermining the socio-political system in other
sovereign States (A/RES/39/159)49. This particular resolution once again brought the
question of terrorism as perpetrated by the State into the discourse, not only
acknowledging that State terrorism was “being practiced ever more frequently” at that
time, but also condemning its practice by “categorically rejecting all concepts,
doctrines, or ideologies to justify actions of States aimed at undermining the sociopolitical system of other States” (p.99).
In the same period, the GA also took up the definitional issues on terrorism in
the context of differentiating it from the struggle of people’s national liberation.
Through a 1987 resolution, the GA brought to the fore debates about when political

These resolutions are as follows: Resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972; 31/102 of
15 December 1976; 32/147 of 16 December 1977; 34/145 of 17 December 1979;
36/109 of 10 December 1981; 38/130 of 19 December 1983; 40/61 of 9 December 1985; and
42/159 of 7 December 1987.
48

49

23 January 1985.
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violence or the use of force can be considered legitimate or illegitimate, with the latter
falling within the definition of terrorism. The said resolution recognized that establishing
a generally agreed definition of international terrorism could enhance the “struggle
against terrorism” (para. 17). In indirectly making a distinction between political
activism in relation to seeking independence and political violence with the aim of
causing fear or harm, the GA reaffirmed the right to self-determination of peoples, as
well as the need to uphold human rights of individuals in the face of preventing
international terrorism as commonly understood. In this context, the resolution called
for the prevention not only of international terrorism by extremist groups or individuals,
but also terrorism by States, to wit:
“The General Assembly...
4. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international law to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts
in other States, or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed
towards the commission of such acts;
5. Urges all States to fulfil their obligations under international law and to
take effective and resolute measures for the speedy and final
elimination of international terrorism and, to that end:
(a) To prevent the preparation and organization in their Respective
territories, for commission within or outside their territories, of
terrorist acts and subversive acts directed against other States
and their citizens…” (A/RES/42/159, emphasis mine).
The resolution did nothing to settle the ideological, much less definitional,
debate on the nature of terrorism; rather it even highlighted the nebulous state of
affairs with regard to the concept of international terrorism, particularly in terms of who
can commit such an act. Moving forward then, the United Nations operationally
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focused on acts of terrorism in calling on states to prevent and/or prosecute these
crimes under national law following international law principles.
It can be said that the GA more actively had terrorism on its agenda compared
to the SC, with the former delivering more resolutions than the latter. In 1989, three
years after the initial recognition of terrorism as an issue within the Security Council’s
domain, another milestone resolution was passed by the SC. A UN military observer in
Lebanon was abducted that year. The SC strongly condemned this action and
demanded his release with a resolution (SC Res 638) that was unanimously adopted by
the Council members. The same resolution framed hostage-takings and abductions as
methods of terrorism and called Member-States to prosecute “all acts and abductions
as manifestations of terrorism” (Saul 2005: 144, citing SC Res 638, emphasis mine).
Saul (2005: 144-45) notes that this blanket classification of all hostage-takings and
abductions as terrorism effectively removed from the meaning of terrorism any political
motives, the intent to instill fear, or coercive aims of the perpetrators that had
previously been identified as defining elements of the phenomenon.
Another terrorist attack using plastic explosives on a civilian airliner over the
Sahara triggered an additional SC resolution that called Member-States to “prevent all
acts of terrorism”50 in relation to civil aviation. This signaled the acknowledgement that
any attack on aircraft, including those committed by the use of plastic explosives, can
and should be considered a practice of terrorism.

50

SC Res 635 (1989), preamble.
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All the incidents that had led up to the 1987 GA and 1989 SC resolutions on
terrorism clearly shifted the UN’s focus from coming to an agreement on the meaning
of the phenomenon to instead identifying the methods of terrorism (such as hostagetaking, abductions, or attacks using plastic explosives) to characterize the threat. Thus,
even if such acts were done without any direct harm to the State, the Council
effectively suggested that they should be considered serious violations of international
law as means by which terror was sown.
The following year, assassinations of State authorities were also discursively
included within the ambit of terrorism when the Council President condemned the
assassination of then newly elected Lebanese President Rene Moawad as a “cowardly,
criminal, and terrorist act.”51 While some legal scholars posit that assassinations
cannot be considered terrorism because fear is only instilled upon an individual
(Guillame 2003,5; Rubin 1977: 121-22), others have opposed such an argument for the
reason that assassinations are still likely to horrify other politicians, terrify their
supporters, and threaten the safety of the public at large (Saul 2005: 145; Snitch 1982;
). In the latter sense, political assassinations can be considered acts of terror by virtue
of the fear impressed on potential indirect victims.
The discourse on terrorism and its definition as observed in subsequent SC
resolutions into the early 1990s continued to center on condemning violent criminal
acts without referring to the potential reasons for such attacks. Saul (2005:146) notes
that the definition of terrorism at this point was not based on political motives but
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SC Pres Stat (22 November 1989) S/20988, also cited in Saul 2005:145.
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rather on “prohibited means” - suggesting that the UN recognized the immediate need
to address the manifestations of terrorism as a security threat instead of resolving the
debate on its conceptual essence. It appears that the underlying notion that we “know
terrorism when we see it” prevailed as the underlying, albeit unspoken, discursive rule
in dealing with the threat on the ground.
With acts of terrorism identified and codified in international law, the UN found a
steady means by which to practically and operationally address acts of terror in the
field. Consequently, however, it found itself having to address issues of prosecution
particularly in the context of international human rights principles. This turn marked the
transition into the third phase of terrorism’s discursive development in the UN.

Tertiary Phase of Discourse Development (1993-2001): The Pre-9/11 Period
The conceptual and operational relationship between terrorism and human
rights first entered the UN discourse towards the end of 1993, when the General
Assembly passed a resolution on human rights and terrorism. The resolution was
based on the notion that terrorist acts constitute gross violations of human rights,
particularly against the “most essential and basic human right” to life. Hence, all
Member States were called to fulfill their “obligation to promote and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms” (A/RES/48/122) pursuant to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in their counter-terrorism efforts.
This resolution - and the subsequent discourse that ensued - reflected a
broader agreement among Member-States that terrorist acts could never be justified
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based on any cause, whether it be political, social, economic, religious, racial or ethnic
(Ruperez 2005: 15). It paved the way for the third phase of the development of the
terrorism discourse that transcended its conceptualization in terms of motivations.
Considering that there was a common agreement on the atrocity of terrorist acts per se
(that had already been identified through treaties), it made more operational sense at
this point in time to not only condemn terrorist acts as human rights violations
regardless of motivation, but more significantly to allow for the prosecution of such
acts under international human rights laws. In light of this development, the resolution
urged Member-States to increase cooperation on counter-terrorism both at the
national and global levels, and provided for the inclusion of terrorism as an issue within
the human rights agenda of the General Assembly.
In December 1994, a Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism was adopted by the GA. This resolution marked a shift in tone from simply
identifying or categorizing terrorist acts, to engaging in national and global efforts that
will “eliminate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” (A/RES/49/60). While it did
not explicitly define terrorism, it subtly included a characterization of the phenomenon
by noting that “[c]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in
any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be
invoked to justify them.” The statement suggested that terrorism was necessarily a
criminal act that first, aimed to sow fear among the public, and second, was done for
political purposes. In effect, the GA agreed on the unjustifiable criminal nature of
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terrorism as a political act that violated human rights “wherever and by whomever
committed,” including when such acts “jeopardize the friendly relations among States
and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States” (A/RES/49/60).
The said resolution was also important beyond the human rights context in that
it acknowledged the possibility of State terrorism alongside terrorism committed by
extremist groups, as revealed by this paragraph:

“States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
territories of other States, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities
within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts.” (emphasis
mine; A/RES/49/60)
This provision arguably set the stage for the current definitional debate on terrorism,
wherein arguments for including State terrorism in the conceptualization of
international terrorism have created rifts between and among countries vis-a-vis their
political interests.
At the heels of Resolution 49/60, the Member-States recognized the need to
further expand international law on transnational terrorism given the growing
prevalence of terrorist incidents at that time. The GA voted to establish an Ad Hoc
Committee to support the Sixth Committee of the GA in elaborating an international
convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an
international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism that would
supplement the existing treaties against terrorism. In resolution 51/210 of 1996, the GA
called on States to work on developing a comprehensive legal framework for a
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convention that clearly defines and addresses international terrorism. It was then that
the proposed UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (UNCCIT) was
born. However, at the time Resolution 51/210 was approved, the UN had failed to
clearly develop a universal and legally binding definition of terrorism despite the ten
existing conventions on terrorist acts at that time.
Regional treaties52 on the phenomenon had generic definitions (O’Donnell 2006:
872) but these remained trapped in the discursive and practical complexities brought
about by the conceptual intersections between extremist violence, political violence,
self-determination, and international criminal law. The proposed UNCCIT sought to
resolve this conceptual ambiguity by clearly defining international terrorism, and then
criminalizing all its forms.
Despite the subsequent definitional debate and the deadlock on the UNCCIT,
the UN has annually included “Measures to eliminate international terrorism” in the
agenda of the General Assembly. The issue has been regularly taken up by the Sixth
Committee in its meetings. The absence of a comprehensive convention and universal
definition of terrorism also did not deter the adoption of three subsequent counterterrorism conventions developed under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Committee to
elaborate conventions on international terrorism: the 1997 International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the 1999 International Convention for the

Relevant definitions are those from Article 1(2) of the Convention of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism; Article 1 of the 1999 Treaty on
Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in
Combating Terrorism; Article1(3) of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism, and Article 1(e) of the 1987 Regional Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (O’Donnell 2006: 872).
52
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Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the 2005 International Convention for
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (UN Library 2008).
The 1990s clearly saw terrorism develop into being a staple agenda point for the
General Assembly, building on decades of resolutions and declarations (both from the
GA and the SC) that condemned terrorism as an unjustifiable atrocity against human
rights, and urged for its prevention and elimination at the national and international
levels. It was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11,
2001, however, that operational efforts to counter terrorism came to a head.
Discursively though, the situation seemed to only take an even more convoluted turn
within this organization of States.
The Discourse Today: Politically Conceptualizing Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era
The day after four civilian aircraft crashed into the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, the United Nations GA strongly condemned the
“heinous acts of terrorism” that caused the loss of almost 3,000 lives in the United
States.53 In that resolution, the GA urgently called for international cooperation “to bring
to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September
2001” and stressed “that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts” would be held accountable.54 The
Security Council, through a separate resolution, also condemned the attacks and called
for international cooperation against the terrorist threat.
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The year before the 9/11 attacks, in September 2000, India had sought to make
progress on a comprehensive convention on terrorism by circulating a revised draft of
the proposed UNCCIT. That draft contained a definition of the crime of terrorism, which
reads as follows:

"1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure
facility or the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph1 (b)
of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
abstain from doing any act."55
The aforementioned article in the UNCCIT draft has been at the heart of UNCCIT
negotiations. Here, it is clear that the proposed definition of international terrorism
precludes any notion that States can similarly commit terrorist acts against civilian
populations or other States for political reasons. Article 3 of the proposed convention
further suggests that the convention (as well as the existing treaties on terrorism) only
applies to acts of terrorism with an international dimension (O’Donnell 2006: 874) by
stating, “This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single

United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by GA
resolution A/RES/51/210 of 17 December 1996, Sixth session (28 January-1 February 2002),
Annex II, art. 2.1.
55
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State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State [and] the alleged
offender is found in the territory of that State.’’56
These two paragraphs led to an early deadlock of UNCCIT negotiations,
primarily because it failed to address the notions of State terrorism and selfdetermination. This led to a failure in attaining a universal definition of terrorism in the
nascent years of the debates. In subsequent years, the bone of contention would be
seen to veer from the draft definition in Article 2 towards the draft “exclusionary
clauses” in the proposed convention that determine what terrorism is not. In those
debates, arguments by States as to when and how legitimate struggles of peoples for
self- determination and against foreign occupation, must be distinguished from
terrorism became prevalent alongside arguments that the definition of terrorism must
include State terrorism.57
In the aftershock of the deadliest terrorist acts on U.S. soil, negotiations on this
revised draft treaty gained significant ground from 2001-2002, with agreement being
reached on most of the 27 draft articles of the proposed convention (Saul 2005b: 77).58
Yet, despite what would have been a watershed moment for the terrorism discourse and
definitional debate, a stalemate ensued in 2003 with States reaching their “bottom line”

United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by GA
resolution A/RES/51/210 of 17 December 1996, Sixth session (28 January-1 February 2002),
Annex II, art. 3.
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Report of the coordinator, above note 81, p. 3; see also the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
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positions on matters that included the definition of terrorism in the Preamble and Article
2 in connection with Article 18, the latter contemplating the applicability of the
convention to armed forces, as well as to armed struggles (or possible situations of selfdetermination).59
Problems of definition transcended GA discussions and became more severe
given that the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1373 (2001) that
established at the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) - a committee composed of all
the 15 members of the Security Council - tasked to monitor States’ implementation of
legal, institutional, and operational counter-terrorism measures outlined in the resolution.
The CTC was given the charge of ensuring that States took steps to a) criminalize the
financing of terrorism and freeze funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; b)
deny all forms of financial support for terrorist groups; c) suppress the provision of safe
haven, sustenance or support for terrorists; d) share information with other governments
on any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts; e) cooperate with other governments
in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in
such acts; and f) criminalize active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law
and bring violators to justice.60
The SC adopted these general measures to urge Member-States to adopt national
legislative efforts without clearly defining terrorism. This consequently underlined
concerns about the legal consequences of having each State prosecuting terrorist acts

Ad Hoc Committee Report (2003), supra n. 142, p.8; also cited in Saul 2005b: 77. Refer to the
Annex for the complete text of the current draft of the convention under negotiation.
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absent a universal definition of the phenomenon. But since the immediate threat of
terrorism necessitated an equally swift reaction, the SC has encouraged Member-States
to “unilaterally define terrorism in national law” allowing for wide and divergent operative
definitions (Saul 2005b). Terrorism - as a crime under multiple State law - is thus highly
subject to interpretation and, arguably, to national interests.
Seemingly recognizing this subjectivity, SC resolution 1373 (2001) requests
Member-States to report to the CTC all the steps taken by their national governments
to implement the said resolution. Currently, all Member-States have submitted at least
one report since the establishment of the CTC, with some States being more proactive
in their reporting than others.61 With negotiations on the UNCCIT stalled, the SC and
GA continued to take up terrorism and counter-terrorism measures on an ad hoc basis.
Three years after 9/11, the SC went on to establish the Counter-terrorism Executive
Directorate (CTED) to aid the CTC in monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373
and coordinate the reporting process among States. The CTED currently requires all
Member-States to submit reports on how each country implements the Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
It is clear that UN counter-terrorism efforts and the counter-terrorism operations
of Member-States on the ground moved forward absent a universal and legally-binding
definition of terrorism. In an effort to streamline the divergent national policies and
programs, Member-States took advantage of the 2005 World Summit - a high-level

Complete assessments of compliance to Resolution 1373 is available on the UN CounterTerrorism Committee website at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373. The most recent
assessments were published in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2015.
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plenary meeting attended by 170 Heads of State and Government - to mandate that
the General Assembly develop, without delay, a global counter-terrorism strategy.
In 2005, the Secretary General established the Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) under the Department of Political Affairs; and on
September 8, 2006, the GA finally adopted what is now referred to as the UN Global
Counter-terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS). For the first time, Member-States agreed to “a
common strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism,” and resolved to take
“practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it.”62 The aim of the
UNGCTS is not to conceptually define terrorism, but rather to bypass the definitional
debate and promote comprehensive, coordinated and standardized operational
responses to terrorism on the ground.63 Thus, the UNGCTS is conceptually and
philosophically founded on the existing treaties and resolutions on terrorist acts in its
understanding of terrorism.
Since the adoption of the UNGCTS, the SC has adopted and additional 16
resolutions related to terrorist acts, and the GA another three resolutions related to the
Global Strategy. In all these resolutions, the focus has been on condemning particular
acts of terror, specifying sanctions and concrete strategies to prevent the spread of

United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force,
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.
62

The UNGCTS, which is reviewed by the GA every two years, has four pillars: I. Addressing
the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; II. Measures to prevent and combat
terrorism; III. Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and IV. Measures to ensure
respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against
terrorism (A/RES/60/288).
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terrorist networks such as Al Qaida and ISIL (particularly in reference to the financing of
terrorism), and urging increased cooperation through information and intelligence
sharing.
The decade that followed (2007-2017) can thus be described as one that saw
the development of strategic and operational efforts to fight terrorism, rather than the
development of the terrorism discourse in terms of its definition and conceptualization.
Specialized agencies were established and are continually being proposed - the United
Nations Counter-Terrorism Center under the UN Office of Counter Terrorism in
September 2011; the AQMT [Al-Qaida]/ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant]
Monitoring Teams in 2011 and 2015; and a 2017 proposed agency by Secretary
General António Guterres to counter transnational terrorist threats. The sovereignty and
jurisdiction of Member-States were highlighted and each was given the authority to
prosecute terrorism within their own legal system.
In the midst of all these legal and operational developments, negotiations on the
definition of terrorism through the UNCCIT had stalled. In 2012, the Ad Hoc Committee
(formed by the 1996 resolution) to draft an international comprehensive convention on
international terrorism recommended that the Sixth Committee of the GA establish a
working group with a view to finalizing the process on the draft UNCCIT (A/RES/67/99).
The Working Group was established at the sixty-ninth (2014), seventieth (2015),
seventy-first (2016) and seventy-second (2017) sessions of the General Assembly (UN
Office of Legal Affairs 2017). Since 2013 then, the Ad Hoc Committee has not
convened - and is not projected to reconvene in the near future - despite original calls
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for such a group to meet annually. Work on finalizing the UNCCIT draft has instead
been left to the working committee established under the Sixth Committee of the GA.
The challenges to coming to a commonly accepted definition of terrorism under
the UNCCIT - as well as in relation to a global terrorism convention - are wellestablished within UN policy circles: While there a significant number of MemberStates proclaim that terrorism cannot and should not be resorted to or justified for any
reason, other Member-States maintain that people may still engage in political violence
under certain circumstances, particularly when needed to fight against foreign
occupation.
The consideration of the right to self-determination versus State terrorism has
thus played a key role in this definitional debate, particularly in reference to other
human rights such as the right to life, liberty and property that acts of terror infringe
upon (Ruperez 2005: 15-16). The issue has become more complex in this context as
some Member-States have argued for (or against) the inclusion of the use of violence
by armed forces against non-state actors in conflicts within the definition of
‘international terrorism.’ The important questions to ask then is: What set of rights and consequently, what set of international norms - will trump the other? Should these
rights even be pitted against each other? Should exceptions to the use of political
violence be made when States employ it, or when civilians use it against State tyranny?
In the 2004 report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats
Challenges and Change, the Panel succinctly laid out the challenges in answering
these - and other questions - surrounding the definition of terrorism while
simultaneously seeking to contribute to resolving the debate:
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“159. The norms governing the use of force by non-State actors have not kept
pace those pertaining to States. This is not so much a legal question as a
political one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12
international counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, the
Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes. Legal scholars know this, but there
is a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and littleknown provisions of other treaties, and a compelling normative framework,
understood by all, that should surround the question of terrorism. The
United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength
concerning non-State use of force as it has concerning State use of force.
Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the
normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United
Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a
clear definition, is a political imperative.
160. The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The
first is the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed
forces against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework
against State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors
and we do not find this objection to be compelling. The second objection is
that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition
of terrorism should not override this right. The right to resistance is contested by
some. But it is not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing
in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of
civilians.”64 (Emphasis mine)
In a subsequent 2005 address, Secretary-General Kofi Annan further stressed
these points referring to the High-Level Panel report, stating that:

“We do not need to argue whether States can be guilty of terrorism, because
deliberate use of armed force by States against civilians is already clearly
prohibited under international law. As for the right to resist occupation, it
must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to
deliberately kill or maim civilians. The Panel calls for a definition of terrorism
United Nations. 2004. “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” Report of the UN
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change.
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which would make it clear that any action constitutes terrorism if it is
intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and noncombatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
Government or an international organization to do or abstain from any act.
I believe this proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to
unite behind it.” (Emphasis mine)65

Understanding the history and trajectory of the terrorism discourse and the longstanding definitional debate on international terrorism from this chapter, it is not
difficult to come to the realization that defining terrorism is not simply a legal question.
It is a highly political one. A universal and commonly accepted definition of the
phenomenon remains elusive in the face of the Member-States’ inability to transcend
their political bottom lines in order to achieve a comprehensive convention to combat
the terrorist threat.
The next three chapters attempt to explain why the definition of terrorism
remains to be the elusive holy grail of the global terrorism discourse.
Drawing on the theoretical lens of Bob Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational
approach to examining states, the following analysis seeks to unpack the strategic
political processes engaged in by UN Member-States over the last two decades to
define and frame the discourse of terrorism. Through content and discourse analysis,
and the application of social network theory, I argue that the network of political
relations between and among states, varying foreign policy interests, and the need for
states to wield power in transnational social life, have determined the production and

UN Secretary General’s address at the closing plenary of the International Summit on
Democracy, Terrorism and Security (Madrid Summit). 10 March 2005, Madrid, Spain.
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propagation of multiple meanings of ‘terrorism’ that have led to the current institutional
deadlock on the matter. By viewing the state not simply as an autonomous creature,
but as a product of social and political relations within a larger global state system, the
analysis aims to shed light on how States have used a constructed body of meaning,
i.e. the terrorism discourse and the definitional debate to influence general decisionmaking processes in international security affairs.
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CHAPTER 5. The UNCCIT Deadlock: A Definitional Debate as a Function of
‘State Projects’

The State Project: A Review
The State as a political actor is far from one-dimensional. As Bob Jessop (1990)
posits through his strategic-relational approach to analyzing states (explained in Chapter
2 of this study) the state is a product of its interactions with society, and its institutions
and behavior are highly contingent on that relationship. The interactions between state
institutions and social factors external to the state brings about what Jessop calls state
effects - organizational coherence, functional coordination, and operational unity - that
enable the state to operate effectively within its jurisdiction, and within the larger system
of states.
As highlighted earlier in this study, what makes Jessop’s model distinct from
other state theories is that it views these resulting effects not as inherent to the state as
a political entity, but rather as a result of a relational process that produces certain
outcomes. The state effects he identifies only emerge through historically contingent
state projects - i.e., strategies, laws, policies - that endeavor to organize the activities of
the state around a coherent political-economic agenda that can, in turn, be projected
onto civil society (Jessop 1990: 9, 346). Given that there is a constant struggle for global
political power in the state system, states practice strategic selectivity in determining
political strategies that shape their own institutional structures and interventions in the
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global arena. Consequently, the state becomes the “site, generator, and product of
strategies” (1990: 260) that enable it to accumulate and exercise power nationally and
transnationally.
In this entire process, the role of state projects in the international state system is
crucial in that it provides countries with the state effects that they need to secure and
maintain their political clout vis-a-vis other states in the system. State projects allow for
organizational coherence, functional coordination and operational unity by making sure
that the ensemble of state activities is centralized around one goal or political agenda. By
doing so, state projects lead to standardized interventions that not only strengthen a
state’s power internally, but arguably regulate the balance of power within the globalized
state system.
In the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism, adhering to a well-constructed
state project is crucial because acts of terror committed throughout history have sought
to destabilize or overthrow governments (Perl 2001). Destabilization strategies by those
who have engaged in terrorism have included attacks on ‘hard targets’ such as military
installations, political organizations, or government officials. But terrorists also know that
widespread instability can arguably be better achieved if the economic institutions of the
state are also destroyed. Consequently, history is replete with examples of terrorist attacks
on public markets, commercial shopping centers, power stations, public utilities, airports,
or leisure facilities/activities (Dugdale-Pinton 2005). More recently, the threat of cyber
terrorism on states - that is, the use of cyberattacks to target computer systems, identity
data, or voting systems in democracies - is added to the mix, and even becomes more
alarming since there are no mechanisms in place to globally monitor or prosecute such
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acts.66 Terrorists ultimately benefit from targeting state strategies and institutions that
enhance national economic development and stability.
Jessop’s concept of state projects – and his strategic-relational approach to
examining this dynamic in a capitalist state system – thus seems apropos given the
interplay between foreign policy and political-economic interests of states vis-a-vis the
nature of terrorism as a destabilizing force in transnational life. I argue that the absence of
a commonly accepted definition of terrorism particularly in light of the deadlock of UNCCIT
negotiations is a testament to the impact that state projects have in this context as seen
in the non-negotiable policy bottom lines of particular groups of states. Balancing political
and economic interests through discussions on arguably the most pressing security
concern today is a direct and effective means for a state to influence not only the global
counter-terrorism strategy, but more so the balance of power in the state system.
Why State Projects Matter
Global counterterrorism efforts have largely depended on member-states for
operationalization. When we therefore look at the counterterrorism policies of individual
states, each has its own interpretation of the phenomenon within its legal system with
most states even having multiple definitions. As a means by which states can gain
jurisdiction and legal authority against non-citizen individuals or groups that commit
transnational acts of terror, I thus argue that the process of defining terrorism and
operationalizing the mechanisms to combat it is largely characterized by a competition of

Currently, there is a working group within the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force that is trying to address the phenomenon.
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state projects. In particular, it is a shaped by the state projects of the member-states that
have the most at stake in asserting their sovereignty and power in international relations in
the context of security issues.
Heavily engaging in the definitional debate at the UN, and standing their ground
on a particular proposed conceptualization of the definition of terrorism, can thus be
interpreted as an essential part of such states’ strategy to protect their national and
regional supremacy, as well as enhance their political clout in the global state system.
Since shaping the definition of terrorism under international law is fundamentally an
undertaking that addresses issues of transnational security vis-a-vis sovereignty, I argue
that state projects involved in defining terrorism become key in achieving the effects of
hegemony and cohesion that are necessary to maintain the existence and the power of a
state (Jessop 1990). Moreover, since each state has the liberty to define terrorism and
formulate laws or policies under current legal conditions, the processes by which a state
conceptualizes and operationalizes terrorism necessarily reflects particular political
interests rather than issues purely about the common good (such as human rights, for
instance), and ultimately becomes an instrument of state power in the national and global
arena.
Whose State Projects Matter? The Push and Pull in UNCCIT Negotiations
As expounded on in Chapter 4, the definitional debate has perennially come down
to a fundamental disagreement on what qualifies as terrorism; that is, whether terrorism
should only be understood as political violence “from below” - committed by non-state
actors against states - or whether such violence can also be engaged in “from above” -
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by states against their citizens or citizens of another state pursuant to a particular state
policy. This controversy over who commits terrorism, against whom it is committed, and
for what ends, has largely characterized the international discourse on the matter, and
has served as the major roadblock to a meaningful convention on international terrorism.
The split in consensus is evident; but what exactly is driving this deadlock in
negotiations? Which states are playing key roles in shaping the discussions? What state
projects matter in the search for a universal definition of terrorism at the United Nations,
and how do these state projects specifically affect the discourse?
The standoff appears to be driven by opposition from certain member-states on
two major fronts. Reports67 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the convention negotiations
generally observe differences of opinion concerning these two schools of thought: the
first insists that acts of terrorism should be distinguished from legitimate struggles of
peoples for self- determination, and against foreign occupation or alien domination; and
the other posits that a definition of terrorism should include state terrorism, which can
mean either a) “the adoption by a state of a policy of systematic use of violence and
intimidation, including practices such as torture, extrajudicial execution and enforced
disappearances, in order to eradicate a political or other opposition movement;” or b)
“any deliberate resort by a state to acts that a priori satisfy the legal definition of

‘‘Report of the coordinator on the results of the informal consultations on a draft
comprehensive convention on international terrorism held from 25 to 29 July 2005,’’ A/59/894,
Appendix II; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for 2005, A/59/37, Annex I, para.15.
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terrorism, such as the taking of hostages or the use of explosives in ways described by
the relevant international treaties” (O’Donnell 2005: 873-4).
The most prominent voices - and consequently, the most relevant state projects in this debate are those from the members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC)68 and the United States, with the OIC insisting on having a definition that affirms the
right to self-determination against foreign aggressors. What is crucial to note is that the
arguments of these two state blocs on what terrorism is under international law appears
to be a function of larger and long-standing state projects they hold vis-a-vis the Middle
East peace process. In particular, the deadlock can be viewed as a direct consequence
of their strategies and foreign policies in relation to first, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for
the OIC; and second, the overall military involvement of the United States in Middle East
affairs.
The OIC State Project
The OIC has long taken up and rallied for the Palestinian cause. Time and again,
through various OIC resolutions, all OIC members have reaffirmed “the centrality of the

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international organization founded in
1969, consisting of 57 member-states, with a collective population of over 1.6 billion as of 2011.
According to its website, the organization aims to be the "the collective voice of the Muslim
world" and works to "safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of
promoting international peace and harmony". The members of the OIC are: Afghanistan,
Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei-Darussalam, Burkina-Faso,
Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote D’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan,
Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The OIC has permanent delegations to the United Nations
and the European Union.
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cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif for the whole Islamic Ummah,” and believed in
the “Arab and Islamic character of Occupied East Jerusalem and the need to defend the
sanctity of Islamic and Christian holy places” against Israel.69 In principle, OIC memberstates view Israel’s expansionist plans and occupation of Palestinian territory as illegal, a
detriment to Palestinian social and economic conditions, and an endangerment to
international peace and security. They have openly condemned continued Israeli military
operations - including alleged extrajudicial assassinations of Palestinians - on the Gaza
Strip, and continually call on the international community to hold Israel accountable for
“the crimes committed in the course of its aggression” into Palestinian territory. In OIC
Resolution 1/41 PAL on the Cause of Palestine, OIC member-states hailed the “just and
heroic struggle [of the Palestinian people] to realize their legitimate national aspirations
and inalienable rights, including to self-determination and freedom (p.5) and, inter alia,
“1. [Reaffirmed] the centrality of the cause of Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif
for the whole Islamic Ummah, and [emphasized] the Arab and Islamic character of
Occupied East Jerusalem and the need to defend the sanctity of Islamic and
Christian holy places;
2. [Reiterated] its strong condemnation of Israel, the occupying Power, for its
continued and intensified aggression on Islamic and Christian holy places in
and around Al-Quds Al-Sharif, for its destruction and confiscation of
Palestinian homes in the City of Al Quds, particularly in the Silwan and Sheikh
Jarrah districts, and for all its colonial practices, settlement activities, and wall
construction and other illegal measures aimed at changing the legal status of the
City of Al Quds, its demographic composition, its Arab and Islamic character; as
well as its illegal and provocative raids into Al-Haram Al-Sharif and the
excavations underneath Al Haram Al Sharif and Al Aqsa Mosque;
3. [Condemned] Israel’s systematic violation of the human rights of the
Palestinian people, including violations resulting from use of excessive force
69

Draft Resolutions on the Cause of Palestine, the City of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict” adopted by the 41st Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers Session of Exploring Areas of
Islamic Cooperation. OIC/CFM-41/2014/PAL/RES/FINAL, 18-19 June 2014.
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and military operations, which led to the death and injury of Palestinian citizens,
including children and women, non-violent peaceful protesters, the use of
collective punishment, confiscation of Palestinian land, the wall, and the
destruction of properties and infrastructure and all illegal other acts…
5. [Expressed] grave concern over the consequent deterioration of social and
economic conditions and the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem and particularly in the Gaza Strip
due to continued Israeli aggression and blockade and other illegal measures
and collective punishment against the Palestinian people, and commits to
work with the international community to pressure Israel, the occupying Power, to
end all illegal practices and to abide by its obligations under international law;
6.[Reaffirmed] the sovereignty of the State of Palestine over all the Palestinian
territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, as well as its airspace,
territorial waters, and borders with neighboring countries;
7. [Reaffirmed] its strong support for the efforts of the State of Palestine to
mobilize international support for the realization of the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people, notably their rights to self-determination and the
independence of their State with East Jerusalem as its capital; and in this
regard reiterates its call on the Security Council to favorably consider the
application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for
admission to full membership in the United Nations…
14. [Strongly condemned] the terrorist attacks of the armed Israeli settlers
against Palestinian citizens, properties, places of worship which have
increased and is becoming more systematic and organized in recent times under
the watch and protection of Israeli occupying forces; and calls on the United
Nations, in particular, the Security Council, to assume its responsibilities in this
regard by providing the necessary protection for the Palestinian people, and
further calls on all states to hold the settlers and their leaders accountable for their
crimes; and
15. [Invited] Member States to commence an international campaign aimed at
classifying the Jewish settlement movement called “Hilltop Youth” and the “Price
Tag” groups as terrorist groups and organizations which must be included in
terrorism lists of countries and international organization (Emphasis mine).
More recently, pursuant to this overarching state project on upholding the Palestinian
cause, the OIC forcefully rejected President Trump’s declaration of Jerusalem as the

107

capital of Israel, and declared it “null and void” and a “dangerous” step in the peace
process. The unilateral declaration of the U.S. President was seen as a violation not only
of UN resolutions and international law but also an affront to historical, social and cultural
facts about the region and its occupants.70 The group vociferously declared:
“1. We reject and condemn the US Administration's unlawful statement regarding
the status of Al Quds.
2. Just like the fact that Israel’s decision to annex Al Quds and its actions and
practices therewith are never accepted, we declare that this statement is
identically null and void from the point of view of conscience, justice and history.
We invite all members of the UN, the EU and the international community to
remain
committed to the status of Al Quds and all related UN Resolutions.
3. We emphasize that it will never be possible to give up on the aspiration to a
sovereign and independent State of Palestine on the basis of the 1967
borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital; which we regard as a
prerequisite for peace and security in the region (Emphasis mine).
4. We declare that we will act in cooperation and coordination to protect the
cause of Palestine and Al Quds in the international arena, especially in the
UN.
5. We declare that we will mobilize support in the name of entire humanity to
strengthen the State of Palestine and its institutions in every field.
6. We call upon all countries which have not yet recognized the State of Palestine,
which was declared in 1988 in Algeria as the result of the will of the Palestinian
people to live freely, to take this vital step. Recognition of the State of Palestine
has now become essential in order to achieve balance for the prevalence of
common sense and conscience in the region in the wake of recent
developments.”71 (Emphasis mine)

“Istanbul Declaration on ‘Freedom for Al Quds’ Extraordinary Islamic Conference, Turkey, 13
December 2017. OIC/EX-CFM/2017/PAL/Declaration, p.3.
70
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Ibid, p.4.
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The provisions of the two statements highlighted above, together with other related OIC
resolutions on the cause of Palestine,72 clearly define the OIC member-states’ collective
state project in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is also a strong demonstration
of their resolve to defend the right of Palestine to self-determination against Israel in any
and all international or UN discussions about peace and security in the region, especially
those discussions which seek to frame Palestinian attacks as ‘terrorism.’
The OIC insists that given the extant conflict, the acts by Palestine to protect their
territorial and national identity need to be distinguished from terrorist acts. A 2012
statement by Egypt representing the OIC at the General Assembly points out that while
the OIC believes that nothing can justify terrorism, “terrorism [needs] to be distinguished
from the right to self-determination.”73 The declarations and statements presented here
undergird the OIC member-states’ foreign policies and official views on security issues in
general, and global counter-terrorism measures in particular.
The commitment to this collective state project is also evidenced by two other
major legal instruments adopted by the OIC: The Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism74 and the Terrorism Convention of the Organization of Islamic Conference on

These OIC resolutions are: Resolution No. 1/41-PAL on the Cause of Palestine; Resolution
No. 2/41-PAL on the City of Al-Quds AlSharif; Resolution No.3/41-PAL on the Occupied Syrian
Golan; Resolution No.4/41-PAL on Solidarity with Lebanon; Resolution No.5/41-PAL on the
current Situation of the Peace Process in the Middle East; Resolution No.6/41-PAL on Financial
Support Mechanisms for the Palestinian people.
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Meetings Coverage Summary 67th General Assembly, Sixth Committee 1st & 2nd Meetings
(AM & PM), GA/L/3433, 8 October 2012. Available at
https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/gal3433.doc.htm. Accessed on 12 September 2017.
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League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 22 April 1998,
adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of
Justice Cairo, April 1998.
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Combating International Terrorism.75 Both conventions explicitly define terrorism to
exclude armed struggle pursuant to liberation and the right to self-determination.
How does this all feed into the terrorism discourse and the definitional debate at
the UN? There is no doubt that the OIC states have framed Israel’s anti-Palestinian
actions in the West Bank and Gaza as terrorist acts, explicitly calling Israel’s attacks
“terrorist” acts - and consequently making the case for the existence of terrorism as
something that can be conducted by non-state actors as well as state institutions, while
simultaneously legitimizing the use by Palestinians of similar acts of political violence
(especially bombings/suicide bombings) that could be similarly constructed as terrorism
under international law. This policy double standard on the basis of a ‘human rights’
frame is central to interpreting every statement made by the OIC (or any state
representing it) in the process of its engagement in the negotiations to define terrorism at
the UN.
The OIC is of the belief that excessive military and extra-judicial attacks against
Palestinian citizens, property, and places of worship fall within the scope of existing
treaties on terrorist acts currently in force. However, while there are particular
conventions such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings for instance, that tacitly accept certain forms of state terrorism, such a
convention clearly excludes acts committed by the military forces of a state under the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1 July 1999, Annex to Resolution No: 59/26P, adopted at the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Twenty-Sixth Session of the Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, July 1999. Available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e6646.html Accessed 20 February 2018.
75

110

ambit of terrorism (O’Donnelly 2006: 875). Legal critics have also pointed out that
violations committed by the military are already covered under international law in times
of conflict or war; necessarily making terrorism a phenomenon that only contemplates
international political violence committed by non-state actors against civilians or the
state.
This particular bone of contention regarding the scope and application of the
proposed convention relative to existing international humanitarian law, particularly when
it comes to who commits terrorist acts concerns provisions of draft Article 20 of the
UNCCIT. As noted by O’Donnell (2006: 875), only two of the four paragraphs of the Article
have been agreed upon, to wit:
“1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international law, in
particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and
international humanitarian law.
4. Nothing in this article condones or makes lawful otherwise unlawful acts, nor
precludes prosecution under other laws.”76
The other two draft paragraphs proposed by the “Friends of the Chairman” exclude the
application of the proposed convention to acts already governed by international
humanitarian law, such as those committed by military forces of the state:
“2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are
understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law,
are not governed by this Convention.
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their

‘‘Report of the coordinator on the results of the informal consultations on a draft
comprehensive convention on international terrorism held from 25 to 29 July 2005.
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official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law,
are not governed by this Convention.”77
This means that if military personnel commit acts of political violence against civilians or
other state institutions, such will not be dealt with as terrorist acts under the UNCCIT, but
rather as other violations of humanitarian law in the context of war or conflict. The OIC
opposes paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 20 for the reason that there is no mention of
foreign occupation by military forces as an exception to the rule. That is, the OIC believes
that if there is an instance which would necessitate - and justify - engagement in political
violence by citizens (or an unrecognized state), it would be political violence committed
pursuant to the exercise of that people’s right to self-determination. The OIC counter
proposal for Article 20 (2) aims to exonerate this type of political violence (and arguably,
act of terror) under international humanitarian law, by proposing that:
“2. The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations
of foreign occupation, as those terms are understood under international
humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this
Convention” (emphasis mine).
In relation to paragraph 2, the OIC proposal for paragraph 3 concerns acts committed by
the military forces of a state in the absence of an armed conflict or occupation (O’Donnell
2006: 877). The initial draft by the Friends of the Chairman would exclude acts committed
by a state army during peacetime from the definition of terrorism - and consequently from the consequences of the convention “‘inasmuch as they are governed by other
rules of international law.’’ The draft proposed by the member-states of the OIC,
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however, would exclude these acts by the military ‘‘inasmuch as they are in conformity
with international law,’’ to wit:
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their
official duties, inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law, are not
governed by this Convention”78 (emphasis mine).
As O’Donnell (2006: 877) notes, the OIC is clearly against the exclusion from the
convention of what might be considered acts of terrorism committed by military forces in
peacetime, because in their view, such acts should be treated just as rigorously under
treaties on terrorist acts as they are under humanitarian or human rights treaties. In other
words, military activities that might be considered terrorist acts under the proposed
convention should not be excluded simply because they are considered criminal
violations of military personnel under other human rights instruments or the UN Charter.
The proposal of the OIC aims to effectively apply the same rules to any act of terror,
committed by any person or entity, in times of conflict or in peace.
With these fundamental philosophical differences, neither school of thought has
budged on the other’s proposal. In subsequent instances, the OIC has even become
more vocal in expressing and adhering to their state project on the Palestinian cause.
Most recently, on October 20, 2017, a statement79 given by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the
OIC group reaffirmed their commitment to reaching a consensus agreement on the draft
convention and “resolving the outstanding issues including those related to the legal
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definition of terrorism, particularly on the distinction between terrorism and the rights of
self-determination by people under foreign occupation, and colonial or alien domination,
as well as on the scope of the acts covered by the draft Convention.”80 Yet, the
organization simultaneously reiterated the “need” to make that distinction in the
definition of terrorism, in line with the long-standing collective stance of the OIC group
on the issue.
Understanding that the OIC states have no intention of reneging on their state
project of upholding the Palestinian cause against Israel - one that has been clearly
fleshed out through organizational resolutions and policy statements at UN forums - the
reasons behind the standoff on the UNCCIT negotiations become less ambiguous, and
the trajectory of the Convention fairly predictable. The OIC will not abandon their
collective state project as doing so would result to undesirable state effects for their
region: Their sovereignty as Islamic states will be threatened, national and regional
cohesion would break down, and their political and economic hegemony (especially
within the Middle East) relative to Israel and its allies, might be brought into question.
For these Islamic countries, the state effects of hegemony and cohesion have
always been necessary to maintain their political place as a unified Islamic ummah81 not
only in the region, but more importantly in world affairs. The “unity and solidarity” of the
ummah in relation to “the well-being of the Islamic people” has long been an objective of
the organization, and was expounded on significantly during the Fifth Islamic Summit
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Conference in 1987 dubbed as the "Summit of Islamic Solidarity.” An important point of
resolution at that Summit was the consensus that the Palestinian question is the core of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that the ummah must insist on the withdrawal of Israel from
Palestinian territory for the conflict to be resolved:
“... a just and comprehensive peace in the region can only be established on the
basis of complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist enemy from all
occupied Palestinian and Arab territories the restoration of the Palestinian
people's inalienable rights including its tight to return, to self-determination and to
establish an independent Palestinian State on its' national soil, with AI-Quds AlSharif as its capital, and under the leadership or the PLO, its sole legitimate
representative.”82
Shaping regional security and asserting the influence of Islamic states in that
region to the exclusion of Israel and its allies thus requires strict adherence to their
collective state project. And since ‘terrorism’ has long been used by each of the
opposing sides to characterize the attacks of the other, directing - not only shaping - the
terrorism discourse and the definition of terrorism at the global level is an essential and
non-negotiable means to carry out that state project. As one member-state of the OIC
stated in an interview for this study, the OIC puts a heavy premium on policy alignment
when it comes to decision-making at the UN. This group strategy consequently affects
the trajectory of the terrorism discourse in the context of the UNCCIT negotiations:
OIC Member-State83: At the GA level, our country is a member of the Nonaligned movement and also a member of the OIC. So, in the GA, mainly the
decision can’t be separate from those groups. When you’re an Islamic country,
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your decision, your position can’t be against what the OIC is. You have to define
[your] position first at the OIC [level].
Q: Is there a sanction that the OIC has for countries that don’t join in a particular
position?
A: No, there is no sanction but it’s a political thing. There are many issues apart
from terrorism. You have to - when you sit at the OIC - you have to discuss it.
You have to see how many countries accede to your position. If not, when the
majority wins, that’s the position that the OIC takes. You can elaborate on that
position, take a further step in a GA meeting, but it cannot be against the OIC.
So you align yourself with them. So, in the GA, things don’t go fast. It’s very
slow because of the consensus [rule]. When you need consensus, you have to
satisfy every country. It’s very difficult with an issue like terrorism because
people see differently. It’s getting political, mainly. The only thing that the GA
can be very active on is development issues. There you can clearly separate that
from the politics… But with particular things, the GA is always doing things very
slow. And terrorism is one of those.84

Thus, it can be argued that unless the OIC is willing and able to adjust or redefine their
state project through changed foreign policies or security strategies vis-a-vis the
Palestinian cause against Israel, then a universal definition of terrorism - at least within
the context of the proposed UNCCIT - appears unworkable. This argument finds
support in how the US/WEOG views the OIC as an immobile entity in the negotiations
with the latter figuratively carving out a niche for the Palestinian issue into the convention
text, as explained by a WEOG member-state representative I interviewed:
Q: Where are the negotiations (on the UNCCIT) now? How would you define the
discussions?
State Representative: There has really been no fundamental movement since
2007 on this issue. I would define the discussions on the definition as very much
deadlocked. I don’t think there have been any marked changes in their positions.
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My understanding is really, it was the OIC that had a problem with the definition
(issue). And they wanted to have this carve out for people who were resisting
foreign occupation. So, it’s the old terrorist versus freedom fighter discussion.
And the OIC has a very specific angle that it comes from, obviously, because of
the Palestinian issue. Nothing has really changed on that…there’s movement.
We can have negotiations, but we will end up having the same conversations
happen. So unless you have some real change on some of the very fixed positions
on this, it’s going to be very difficult. You have the OIC on one side, and countries
like the US and Israel on the other – because of this issue of foreign occupation.
And so, I don’t see that as moving anytime soon.
Q: You don’t think the OIC is going to budge?
SR: Unless there’s a split within the OIC on this issue, if there’s any kind of
softening of positions, I think that would change it. But otherwise, I don’t see what
would change their position.
In my interview with a former top official of the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive
Directorate (CTED), the official also noted that as long as the OIC continues to argue for
the exclusion of political violence in the name of the right to self-determination, then the
definitional problem cannot be overcome. The only real solution to the impasse
fundamentally depends the question of whether violence can be exercised in the name
of the right to self-determination, which is central to the Palestinian cause against Israel:

Q: So fundamentally, why do you think there is a deadlock in UNCCIT
negotiations?
UN Official: The problem stems from ‘occupied territory.’ The OIC believes that
any action necessary to force an occupied state to leave territory is
acceptable...And we don’t believe that killing innocent civilians is an acceptable
way. If there was some way to split the difference, where it could be said that
insurgencies or guerilla warfare, which focuses on military targets, would be an
acceptable way to remove an occupying force but not target innocent civilians,
then I think we would have a definition. But as long as mainly the Islamic
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countries of the OIC argue that anything can be done to remove occupying
forces, then there’s a real problem here. And that can’t be overcome, I think,
until such time that there’s an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians…
But I think if we were able to get a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli issue, then
there wouldn’t be an issue with ‘occupied territory.’ There are people who’ve
written ways to try to bridge this gap. We’ve come very close a few times but it’s
never been able to reach an agreement. So as a consequence, we don’t have an
agreement in the Sixth Committee and it will continue to go on that way until
such time as we do have a Middle East agreement that will then allow a
definition to move forward. But as long as there’s no urgency to define, then we
are not compelled to find new ways to try to bridge the gap.
Q: What about the issue of state terrorism as part of the definitional debate? Will
the UNCCIT deal with state terrorism?
UN Official: No, this definition will not deal with state terrorism, I can tell you
that. Categorically, the Sixth Committee has no authority and has no mandate to
deal with state terrorism. It will not, and cannot, because they’re going to be
negotiating against the ‘member-state’ and that’s not going to happen. So don’t
go down that road because you’re going to hit a stone wall… State terrorism
can’t be an issue. The United Nations is a universal body of 193 independent
states. You can’t be negotiating against one of them.
Q: So, if the issue is not entirely about the inclusion of ‘state terrorism’ in the
definition, then what is the definitional problem then? Does it just boil down to
the self-determination issue?
UN Official: The definitional problem is: If there are is an occupying power
occupying territory, the OIC insists that there be no restriction in ridding the
occupiers from that territory. Therefore, anything - including actions against
innocent civilians - is okay. As Boaz Ganor, who has written extensively on this
said, one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist. That holds true in the
case of occupied territory… So, the question boils down to if the OIC continues
to insist that all means can be used - all military and violent means can be used
against the occupiers, then Western countries, and other countries cannot
accept that. There can be no cut out like that… You don’t kill innocent people.
Period. 85
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Textual and contextual evidence indeed point to the highly political nature of the
OIC state project built around the Palestinian question. Yet, while the set of strategies
and policies outlined above might be viewed as solely political and security-driven, the
incessant pronouncements of concern by the organization over the “deterioration of
social and economic conditions”86 and the humanitarian crisis in the currently
occupied contested Palestinian territory (including East Jerusalem), as well as anxiety
about the instability from terrorism in the region, supports the argument that members
of the OIC organize the activities of their state around a coherent collective politicaleconomic agenda. In 2005, at the Third Extraordinary Summit the OIC highlighted the
need for higher levels of economic cooperation and development among its memberstates within the context of continued regional conflict. It then outlined steps to
address “development, socio-economic, and scientific issues” together with political
and security issues as part of a ten-year program of action for the organization.87 The
state project under scrutiny here was surely created to respond to the alleged terrorist
threat from the Israeli state and is arguably a political strategy that aims to maintain
the stature and reputation of the Islamic ummah in their home region. However, it is
also one that highlights the economic interests of the OIC member-states and
recognizes the repercussions of political instability on their economies within a global
capitalist context. As I have shown, these strategic choices based on political and
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economic interests have indeed influenced the construction of terrorism - or more
precisely, the impasse in the process - within the international state system.
While philosophically divergent from the state project of the OIC, the state
project of the loudest voice in the “West” - the United States - has similarly contributed
to the deadlock in UNCCIT negotiations. I now turn to an examination of the American
state project and how it has molded the trajectory of the convention discussions, and
the global terrorism discourse writ large.
The U.S. State Project
The 9/11 attacks of marked a turning point in the American government's
undertaking of an imperative state project to ensure national security and continued
political hegemony in the international arena. Through the adoption of arguably normbreaking counterterrorism policies, and the development of a (highly politicized)
discourse on the 'War on Terror,' the United States - during the Bush Administration rapidly drove terrorism to the top of the policy agenda to prove American resilience and
national might in the face of an unknown enemy. Engaged in the rhetoric of "You're
either with us, or against us" when speaking to the international community, President
George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin
Powell repeatedly emphasized that their long-term objective was to destroy terrorism
through "the death or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure
and support base, and retaliation against States that aid or harbor terrorists" (Richelson
and Evans 2001). The definition of terrorism - what acts qualify as terrorism and who
qualifies as the enemy - became a state project necessary to establish organizational
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coherence, functional coordination, and operational unity (Jessop 1990) of the American
State given a situation that challenged the perception of American superiority in the
global state system.
Such an undertaking can be viewed at first glance as a purely security-driven
strategy against non-state actors that committed violations of international law.
However, the framing of the political strategy as a “war,” redefining the acts to be
included in the phenomenon, and redrawing the lines between who the enemy should
or should not be – all without looking to other States for approval – shows that the
American state project to reframe the terrorism (and counter-terrorism efforts) became
a strategic endeavor to organize the state activities around a coherent politicaleconomic agenda. While created to respond to security threats, the U.S. national
security strategy (especially after 9/11) has been a political strategy that aims to
maintain the stature of the United States as a political and economic superpower in a
globalizing state system.
Terrorism had been part of the U.S. security agenda prior to the 9/11 attacks, albeit
to a lesser extent relative to its status on the national security agenda today. It was in the
aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympic Games when the discourse on terrorism as a
foreign policy issue first gained traction as a social problem in the U.S. public sphere
(Stampnitzky 2014). At that time, the first conceptualizations of the term by scholars and
government officials alike included a wide range of incidents from bomb threats to petty
crime during street protests, with most of them describing terrorism as something linked
to the international or transnational sphere, while excluding political intent in their
characterizations of the crime (Ibid). Amidst all this, a more focused effort to define
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terrorism came from a White House memo that referred to international terrorism as
comprised of acts not considered “traditional violence which is covered by established
codes (i.e., common crimes), internal political disputes, civil strife, decolonization, binational or international armed conflict,” but rather contemplated the “spread of violence
to countries not directly concerned…and the victimization of innocent persons” (White
House Memo88 cited in Stampnitzky 2014). President Nixon then established the Cabinet
Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT), with the initial objective of improving security
conditions for citizens at home and abroad, as well as for diplomats on U.S. soil. This
group was significant in shaping how terrorism was perceived and understood within and
outside the state, because it was responsible for bringing together experts to determine
definitions and responses to the problem. In 1976, a speech given by the head of the
CCCT reinforced the earlier White House memo, alluding to the international nature of
violent terrorist acts, and restricting the problem to the spread of violence to persons and
places far removed from the scene of struggles of self-determination (Feary 1976, cited
in Stampnitzky 2014). Such a definition of terrorism that excluded insurgent violence, the
use of violence for self-determination, or even the use of violence by States did two
things: first, it immediately confined the performance of terrorism to non-state actors; and
second, it clearly delineated the interest of the U.S. government in addressing terrorism,
which was to prevent violence from spilling over into the international community. Based
on these statements, the United States was not concerned about resolving the conflicts
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per se, but was worried that such conflicts could affect not only innocent lives, but more
so its own state institutions and power.
The United States recognized this link between state power and the effects of
terrorism early enough. After the Munich attacks, it quickly framed terrorism as a
phenomenon that erodes international stability – a factor which was and continues to be
a major foreign and economic policy objective for the United States (Perl 2001). Given
this connection, the United States has clearly understood the ramifications of leaving
terrorism unchecked. As a capitalist state that was leading the international community
not only in terms of military power, but also and more crucially in terms of economic
power during the 1970s and 1980s, it was important to establish an operational definition
of terrorism, as well as of counter-terrorism efforts, that adhered to the necessity of
preventing conflicts from “spilling over” into the international community, and ultimately
harming the general stability of the global political economy. Such initiatives comprised
the earliest state project on terrorism that provided organizational coherence, functional
coordination, and operational unity to the U.S. state agencies assigned to deal with the
threat. As a result, the state project cast an image that the U.S. state was collectively and
effectively addressing an international stability problem, thereby boosting its reputation
nationally and internationally, as a global political and economic power.
When terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, however,
terrorism as it was framed in U.S. national security policy, lost its purely “international”
nature as innocent civilians were victimized within U.S. borders. It was an instance that
completely changed the strategic course of U.S. engagement in global counterterrorism efforts. The state project was thus redefined; and Secretary of State Colin
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Powell clearly characterized the strategy as a “full-scale assault against terrorism” (Perl
2001). The result was the U.S.-led “War on Terror,” founded on the mantra, “you’re
either with us or against us.” To be successful in this war, the United States expressed
its willingness to employ all means necessary – arguably, even those against prevailing
international norms – to crush terrorism and its perpetrators. Hence, without a global
definition of terrorism, and the nebulous norms on self-defense as exercised by states,
the United States created a state project around its right to self-defense against
terrorists and those who harbor them. Effectively, the “War on Terror” was a political
and (when necessary) military strategy meant to re-secure its place as a global
superpower despite the fact that the worst terrorist attack on history could be carried
out on its shores.
In 2002, the Bush Administration promulgated a revised National Security
Strategy (NSS) as a concrete and comprehensive response to the attacks and the
terrorist threat from groups such as Al Qaeda. The 2002 NSS stated that the United
States was "fighting a war against terrorists of a global reach" but in the same vein,
claimed that the "enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology"
but terrorism itself. The NSS went on to define terrorism as "premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." Thus, the stated policy of the
United States in dealing with terrorists was that it will make no concessions to their
demands and strike no deals with them. Likewise, it made no distinction between
terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.
The 2002 NSS also enumerated various methods to be used by the United States to
combat terrorism. But of particular interest is that which provides:
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"[We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by] defending the United
States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by
identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the
United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right
of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them
from doing harm against our people and our country."89 (Emphasis mine.)
This statement is perhaps the most significant in the post-9/11 state project, as it
championed the doctrine of preemptive strike - and the use of the military - as the
primary means by which the United States seeks to quell terrorism. It was the statement
that had raised numerous questions on the relevance of present international institutions
and norms governing military action, as well as concern from other states about an
emerging, new form of American imperialism. For the first time since the national
discourse on terrorism was formed in the 1970s, the long-standing strategies of U.S.
policy against aggression - deterrence, containment, and even diplomacy - had lost
their relevance. The state project was thus defined by strategies that challenged the
"outdated" nature of international norms on aggression due to the changing nature of
the enemy. The Bush Administration even argued that the United States (or any state for
that matter) has a right to forestall hostile activities by adversaries "even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."90 It would be unwise to wait
for threats to materialize as such would be suicide. To wait for the enemy to build up
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arms, fully plan an attack and launch the attack before it strikes was deemed
unacceptable. The United States believed that it had a right to prevent such an attack
based on the conviction that America has a transcendent role in making the world "not
just safer but better" (Newhouse 2003: 11).
Coming into the UNCCIT negotiations with this policy in mind, the United States
thus seeks to exclude acts committed by military forces in the absence of a conflict or
occupation, from the ambit of the proposed convention on international terrorism. This
exclusionary clause continues to act as a roadblock to consensus since the U.S.
continues to argue that such acts by the military should not be considered acts of terror
under the proposed convention, but might otherwise be addressed through existing
international human rights law and international law prohibiting aggression and the
violation of sovereignty. One critique of this exclusion is that excluding acts committed
by state military forces merely because they are governed by international human rights
standards or basic principles of international law would create an “unacceptably broad
limitation on the scope of the future Convention” (O’Donnelly 2006: 877). As stated
earlier, the OIC argues against this stance, positing that acts of terrorism committed by
military forces in the exercise of their official duties during peacetime should be treated
similarly under existing terrorism treaties, as well as future terrorism conventions
(O’Donnelly 2005: 877-8).
The 2012 National Security Strategy of the United States focuses on terrorist
organizations - their networks and affiliates - as the “paramount terrorist threat” to the
country (NCTS, 1). As such, it clearly does not recognize state terrorism, nor does it
acknowledge that the military as a state apparatus can engage in acts of terror under
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international law (with the latter being treated under other international norms and
conventions). But what is more significant in terms of understanding the U.S. state
project in relation to the country’s engagement in UNCCIT negotiations is the explicit
statement that the entire strategy is “embedded within an overall strategy of enhanced
U.S. economic and political engagement” with other states in the Middle East, South
Asia and Southeast Asia “that fosters peace, prosperity and democracy” in these
regions (NCTS, 16). Subsequently, in the 2015 National Security Strategy, which
recognizes the “evolving threat” of terrorism owing to the bourgeoning network of alQa’ida affiliates and ISIS/ISIL, the United States explicitly declares that it has shifted
away from fighting large, costly wars pursuant to counterterrorism efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and instead will pursue
“a more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism
operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to
prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased
threats… [The United States] will work to address the underlying conditions that
can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression.
This means supporting alternatives to extremist messaging and greater
economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth. We will help build the
capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists
locally. Working with the Congress, we will train and equip local partners and
provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist groups. This will
include efforts to better fuse and share information and technology as well as to
support more inclusive and accountable governance” (2015 National Security
Strategy, p.9, emphasis mine).
These statements in the 2012 and 2015 NSS clearly illustrate that the state project
surrounding terrorism is more than merely a political or military initiative that is isolated
from the value form of the state. This state project – as well as those that have preceded
it over the past four decades – has constructed the definition of terrorism and terrorists,
established the scope and limits of state action against it, and embedded all these in
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the overarching economic relations that the United States engages in as a capitalist
state. These strategic choices have significantly influenced the construction of terrorism
at the global level based on larger (political and economic) U.S. interests.
***
Upon the transfer of power to the Trump administration in January 2017, the
state project of the United States in relation to security and terrorism has once again
evolved. The messaging and rhetoric of cooperation and collective action that
permeated the security strategies under the Obama administration has now been
constructed within the context of an overarching “America First” policy. This “America
First” policy is explicitly stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy signed by
President Donald Trump in December 2017. Charting a “new and very different course”
(2017 National Security Strategy, p. i), President Trump declares that the goal of the
new NSS is to prioritize the interests of U.S citizens and protect the sovereign rights of
the United States as a nation. By doing so, the strategy reframes the security interests
of the country from an omnipotent, exceptionalistic, and dominant standpoint, citing
that “the whole world is lifted by America’s renewal and the reemergence of American
leadership;” hence the need to “promote a balance of power that favors the United
States, our allies, and our partners” (2017 NSS, p. ii).
In the 2017 NSS, threats to security have been largely grouped into threats to
“the American Way of Life,” which includes first, threats against the U.S. border from
weapons of mass destruction, biothreats, and immigration; and second, terrorist
threats, particularly Jihadist terrorists and transnational criminal organizations –
including cyber criminals. As to the first group of threats, the new strategy states that
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“[s]trengthening control over our borders and immigration system is central to national
security, economic prosperity, and the rule of law. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and
criminal cartels exploit porous borders and threaten U.S. security and public safety”
(p.9).”91
With regard to the second set of threats, the focus on Jihadist terrorists as the
“most dangerous threat to the Nation” (2017 NSS, p. 10) necessarily delimits the
terrorist threat to persons or groups that subscribe to Islamic extremism. Taking the
new policy on immigration and border protection together with the association of
terrorism with a particular religious fundamentalist movement, it can be argued that the
state project against terrorism has indeed taken a new turn. However, careful scrutiny of
the 2017 NSS might tell us that the will of the United States to maintain power, internal
cohesion, and hegemony through security issues are similar, if not even stronger.

The renewed – and more intense - focus on immigration and border control under the Trump
administration has been seen to impact the manner by which the United States carries out its
counter-terrorism policies and operations. In effect, the state project on international terrorism is
now arguably increasingly shaped by the “crimmigration industry” within the United States.
“Crimmigration” refers to an important development in US immigration law today: the
convergence of immigration and criminal law (Stumpf 2006: 379). Immigration law has
traditionally been linked to foreign policy rather than the criminal justice system; yet the
increased link between narratives of immigrants as criminals, and the need to exclude such
individuals from membership in the US polity, has gained ground within at least the last 20 years
(Stumpf 2006: 380). In effect, one can argue that the boundaries of states vis-à-vis who can
stay within those states have significantly expanded state power. In order to preserve state
power that emanates from crimmigration, the overall state project on security and terrorism
necessarily has to provide for immigration as a security threat, with immigrants or the “other” as
threats, criminals, and even terrorists. Such framing at the intersection of immigration and
terrorism, while not largely falling within the scope of this study, is indeed a topic that requires
further sociological examination. The way in which such a social fact influences the US state
project and the terrorism discourse as a whole is another aspect of this inquiry that requires a
separate and extensive exploration.
91
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The America First policy frames the terrorist threat as an external (or international)
phenomenon perpetrated by the “other,” particularly rogue Islamic states and entities.
The “othering” of the terrorist here – a process by which a minority group is
differentiated and cast as the “other” as part of a social or political agenda, on the
argument that their culture and beliefs are fundamentally different (and deemed as a
threat) to the rest of society (Said 1978) - necessarily ties well into the recent narrative of
the Trump administration that securing borders against immigrants, who can be
criminals or terrorist threats to US territory, is easily justified.
Not part of the “other” in this narrative, are US allies and partners, who will also
benefit from the balance of power sought by the United States under this new NSS. And
it is clear that its traditional “Western” allies, including Israel, still belong. In applying the
new strategy to the various geopolitical regional contexts, the United States “seeks a
Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not
dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable
global energy market” (2017 NSS, p. 48). It blames the instability in the region to Iran,
Syria, and jihadist ideology propagated through ISIL/ISIS. It clearly states that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not to blame:
“For generations the conflict between Israel and thePalestinians has been understood as the prime irritantpreventing peace and prosperity in the region.
Today,the threats from jihadist terrorist organizations and the threat from Iran
are creating the realization that Israel is not the cause of the region’s
problems. States have increasingly found common interests with Israel in
confronting common threats. (2017 NSS, p.49, emphasis mine).
While the United States remains “committed to helping facilitate a comprehensive
peace agreement that is acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians,” the singling out
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of Israel as the state that is not at fault in the region might tell us something about the
partnership between the US and Israel on the conflict. With President Trump openly
supporting Israeli interests, and declaring Jerusalem as the capital recognized by the
United States, it is not difficult to argue that the state project of the United States – in
relation to security and terrorism, particularly in the Middle East – remains built around
this perennial conflict. The rhetoric might have changed, but the fundamental principle
relevant to the application of the larger state project in relation to the terrorism
discourse at the UN, remains unchanged.
***
The examination of the state projects of the OIC and the United States clearly
illustrates the impact of the need for states to wield power in transnational social life.
This need, as expressed through overarching state projects on global security, has
determined the production and propagation of multiple meanings of ‘terrorism,’ which in
turn has led to the current institutional deadlock on a convention that could have
universally defined and operationalized the phenomenon. In this chapter I have shown
that the state, as Jessop theorizes, is indeed far from an autonomous creature; it is a
product of social and political relations within a larger global state system, which uses
discourse as a constructed body of meaning to establish its presence among the
community of states. In this case, the state engages - and arguably manipulates - the
terrorism discourse to influence decision-making processes on security issues at the
UN, and more significantly, in broader international affairs.
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CHAPTER 6. The Role of Networks: Alliances, Foreign Policy, and the Terrorism
Discourse
The previous chapter has shown that the state projects of the OIC countries and
the United States - particularly in reference to laws, foreign policies, and strategies in
relation to regional and global security - have contributed to the deadlock in UNCCIT
negotiations. As instruments for cohesion and hegemony, these state projects are
necessarily founded on, and effectively reflect, the values and ideologies of the polity they
represent. Thus, while the quest for a universal definition of terrorism appears to be
discursively and operationally shaped by the state projects elaborated on in the previous
chapter, I argue here that political alliances - the networks of states within the United
Nations - play a crucial role in exacerbating the fissures in the terrorism discourse, which
are brought about by historical political interests and divergent ideologies. Following the
divide brought about by the two major state projects directing the debate, there are thus
two major political blocs through which ideological differences are advocated: the first is
the network of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) states, and the second is the
network of non-OIC member-states largely allied with the “West,”92 that is, the United
States, Europe, and states friendly with the plight of Israel.

I use “West” here not as a geographical reference denoting uniformity by virtue of location or
region, but as a historical/cultural/political reference to states traditionally linked to or allied with
the United States and Europe (as opposed to Islamic, Asian and African states). It is not meant
to denote any homogeneity between or among states in that group, or deny any hybridity that
92
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As argued earlier in this study, the main point of contention between these network
of states lies in the question of whether acts of groups (or national movements) fighting
for self-determination - or corollary to that, a state’s efforts to secure territory through
occupation in an armed conflict - can qualify as terrorism under the proposed convention.
The OIC strongly believes that acts pursuant to the right of self-determination should not
be covered by the proposed convention. The United States and its allies, on the other
hand, believe that all terrorist acts regardless of motivation or justification, must be
contemplated by the UNCCIT; these acts, however, can only be perpetrated by non-state
actors.
This fundamental ideological divide between these two major blocs has been clear
throughout the years of UNCCIT negotiations. Yet this behavior between and among
political allies, particularly in reference to global security affairs, is not new. This chapter
probes deeper into that dynamic by examining the role such networks have played in
perpetuating and strengthening certain political ideologies and policies, and consequently,
the trajectory of the terrorism discourse at the UN. At this point, a review of the analytical
import of social network theory is apropos.
Social Network Theory: A Review
Social Network theory posits that social relations can more effectively and
efficiently be understood through a complex system of social structures referred to as a
‘network’ (Carrington and Scott 2011). A network is theoretically a system of socially

occurs outside the category between “East” and “West.” The term is employed purely for ease
of analytical reference to the identified network of states.
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relevant elements that are somehow connected (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) by one or
more relations referred to as ‘ties’ (Marin and Wellman 2011). Thus, network analysis is
concerned with relationships defined by links among “agents” or “nodes” - individuals,
organizations, or even states - addresses the associations among these nodes rather than
their particular attributes (Hafner-Burton et. al. 2009: 562). No assumptions are made
about characteristics of nodes or homogeneity within the network. As Hafner-Burton et.
al. (2009: 562) point out, what the method of analysis is founded on can be summarized
into three principles:
a. Nodes and their behaviors are mutually dependent, not autonomous;
b. Ties between nodes can be channels for transmission of both material (e.g.
weapons, money, disease) or non-material products (e.g. information,
beliefs, norms); and
c. Persistent patterns of association among nodes create structures that can
define, enable or restrict the behavior of nodes (emphasis mine).
Consequently, social network theory and network analysis allow us to analytically
explore any kind of ties between entities and, ultimately, the behavior and interaction
between those entities because of those ties. We are then able to make inferences about
the dynamics of social life within that network given a particular set of social facts.93
Social network scholars conceptually think of networks as the primary building
blocks of the social world. Hence, network analysts are able to examine patterns of
behavior within the network to see how they affect individual behavior and the network as

Emile Durkheim (1895) posited that sociology is the empirical study of social facts. He first
defined the term to consist of "manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual,
which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control” over that
person. Durkheim further pointed out that social facts are “representations and actions” that
cannot and should not be confused with “organic” or “physical” phenomena. A social fact is
something that is constructed by a community and is used to influence actions, behaviors, and
expectations of those who belong to it.
93
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a whole. Following these principles, international relations scholars view networks as sets
of relations that form particular structures that might constrain and/or enable agents in the
international system (Hafner-Burton et. al. 2009: 560). While traditional structural analyses
of the international state system focus on actor attributes, social network theory or
network analysis instead delves into “how material and social relationships create
structures among actors through dynamic processes” in transnational life (Ibid). Such
approach paves the way for rethinking core concepts in the study of state relations, the
most notable of which is the exercise of power in the system.
On a practical note, networks are regarded in international relations as avenues for
collective action and cooperation, tools for exercising influence, or means of carrying out
international governance (Ibid). That said, political science and international relations
literature has largely focused on the effects of non-hierarchical (i.e., non-state) or
transnational activist networks (including terrorist networks) on their environment or on
intergovernmental policies, rather than on the effects of hierarchical (i.e. state) network
structures on international affairs. As observed by Hafner-Burton et. al., the early scholars
of network analysis in the 1960s that studied emerging global structures based on trade
networks, international governance organizations, and diplomatic relations stopped short
of using network theory “to test or predict network effects on international politics” (2009:
562).
It is at this point that the sociological take on social network theory - one that
explores how the ties that bind (or separate) states as actors in the global stage,
particularly within the UN - becomes most relevant and useful in our quest to explain the
long-standing definitional debate on terrorism. Given what we have learned about the
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effect of state projects and collective behavior in the previous chapter, it is important to
ask: What is the role that geopolitical alliances play in the UNCCIT debate, and in the
terrorism discourse as a whole? What alliances or state blocs matter in the negotiation
process to define terrorism, and why? How significant are state networks in constructing
a universal and legally-binding definition of terrorism? In order to answer these questions,
we necessarily have to first identify the strategic alliances involved in this particular
process, and then examine the behavior of these state blocs in relation to voting and
decision-making in the UN, before exploring how these alliances affect efforts to define
terrorism in the context of the UNCCIT.
United We Stand: The Strategic Alliances that Count
It has been established in the immediately preceding chapter that the definitional
debate in reference to the UNCCIT negotiations fundamentally boils down to two strands
of thought: first, that the convention should differentiate between terrorism vis-a-vis the
right of peoples to exercise self-determination in the context of occupied territory (even
with the use of political violence); and second, that certain apparatuses of the state particularly the military - can employ violence in non-conflict situations pursuant to state
policy without such acts being considered terrorism under the convention. It has also been
shown that the views on those issues, while not homogenous, are largely split along
evident ideological lines that run through two political/geopolitical alliances: The OIC
states on the one end, and states allied with the United States or the “West” on the other.
Examining records and reports of general voting behavior at the UN along with
policy statements of countries within these two networks of states, I argue that this
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coalescing behavior among the OIC on the one hand and the US/West on the other observed in the definitional debate on terrorism - is a long-standing phenomenon that is
not peculiar to the terrorism discourse. The dichotomy is not uniquely a function of the
contested provisions of the proposed convention; rather, these divisions run deeply along
political lines, and the well-established alliances and regional groupings at the UN serve
as vehicles through which these ideological divisions are discursively and operationally
reified. These sub-networks within the international network of states thus play heavily into
the dynamics of negotiating the definition of terrorism under the UNCCIT.
Data from the US State Department on UN Voting Behavior from 1996 to 2016
provide support for the idea that the political rift is exacerbated by alliances, showing that
political stands on issues have largely been related to - and even dependent on - what
state bloc a country belongs to. These State Department reports,94 which examined the
trends in voting behavior of all member-states individually and by political group (among
other metrics) as they coincided with US votes on resolutions or declarations at the

As per the State Department reports, interpretation of the metrics and percentages must be
done with a view to nuances that are brought about by absences and abstentions in voting: “The
tables in [these] reports provide a measurement of the voting coincidence of UN member
countries with the United States. However, readers are cautioned about interpreting voting
coincidence percentages. In Section III (General Assembly Overall Votes), Section IV (General
Assembly Important Votes and Consensus Actions), and the Annex, the percentages in the
column of the tables titled “votes only,” are calculated using only votes on which both the United
States and the other country in question voted Yes or No; not included are those instances
when either country abstained or was absent. Abstentions and absences are often difficult to
interpret, but they make a mathematical difference, sometimes significant, in the percentage
results. The inclusion of the number of abstentions and absences in the tables of this report
enables the reader to consider them in evaluating voting coincidence percentages. The
percentages in the column of the table titled “including consensus” offer another perspective on
General Assembly activity. Consensus resolutions indicate agreement with U.S. positions, so
adding these to the vote totals more accurately reflects the extent of cooperation and agreement
in the General Assembly.
94
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General Assembly, suggest that that for years the OIC and the US/West have seldom
voted similarly on issues involving categorical voting at the UN. Together with what we
have learned about the strict adherence to state projects of these two groups, it can then
be argued that the OIC and the US/West participate in UN discussions, debates, and
voting procedures based on how their allies vote (or should vote).
Figure 2 provides evidence for this argument as it shows the coincidence, on
average, of voting behavior between the OIC and the United States over time. The table
shows “votes only” percentages and “consensus” percentages, with the former calculated
using only votes on which both the United States and the OIC member-states in question
voted ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ while the latter is calculated from instances when states indicated
agreement with U.S. positions on consensus resolutions95. Adding votes on consensus
resolutions to the vote totals “more accurately reflects the extent of cooperation and
agreement in the General Assembly” (2012 Report).

95

Consensus resolutions are those reached when all member-states have agreed to adopt the text of a
draft resolution without taking a vote. Reaching consensus is not the same thing as being unanimous, as
states can still disagree on certain phrases or paragraphs on the consensus resolution despite agreeing
to it in general.
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Figure 2. Voting Practices in the United Nations - Coincidence of
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) States Voting
Behavior with United States Voting Behavior, 1996-2016.

*Data not available for given year.
Source: Data culled and calculated from Congressional Reports on UN
Voting Behavior from 1996-2016, United States State Department Bureau of
International Organizational Affairs.
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It is important to note for analytical purposes that absences and abstentions are also not
included in the “votes only” calculations made by the US State Department.96 While an
absence or abstention might arguably cause a significant mathematical difference in the
“votes only” percentages, the said indicator remains an important tool in establishing
patterns of behavior among states who choose to cast categorical votes on specific
resolutions or declarations. The “votes only” data ultimately provides insight into not only
patterns of voting over time but also sheds light into the workings of state power in
instances when consensus actions are not on the table. These instances illustrate how
state power - and network power (i.e., the influence of the alliance’s collective thinking on
its individual members) - is either magnified or minimized.
With this in mind, it can be argued that for the last two decades - from 1996 to
2016 - the pull of the OIC network and the US/West bloc on the state behavior of each of
their individual allies, at least in terms of voting in the General Assembly - has been
significant. The data shows that the overall voting behavior of OIC members at the General
Assembly has been in stark contrast to how the United States votes on resolutions,
declarations, or consensus actions. On average, OIC members (as a collective unit) vote
a “yes” with the United States only 28% of the time. The twenty-year average on

It is important to note that being absent or abstaining from a vote at the UN GA may actually
be done pursuant to a political stance or government policy that might not be directly related to
the vote or issue at hand. Unless it affects their interests or their allies’ interests directly, not all
member-states choose to take a categorical stance on a GA resolution or declaration (since
such are non-binding and non-enforceable). Abstentions or absences can thus be viewed as a
strategic vote or (non)action, without categorically casting one for strategic political reasons.
Nevertheless, an abstention may have the same effect as a ‘yes’ or as a ‘no’ depending on how
the other members voted (Felsenthal and Machover 2014). The tactical move might even
symbolize a break from a collective stance on a certain matter, without explicitly severing
ideological or political ties with one’s closest allies.
96
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consensus votes on the other hand appears higher with coincidence in voting calculated
at 78%. While the latter number seems to suggest greater agreement between the two
networks of states, this figure must be put into perspective: Coincidence on consensus
votes between the United States and the Western blocs (including the Western European
and Others Group, the European Union, Eastern Europe, and the Nordic Countries)
average significantly higher, in the 85 to 95% range.97 This might suggest that while the
OIC states are willing to come support consensus actions on issues presented at the GA
- such as, but not limited to, violence against women, trafficking against women and girls,
human rights, torture, or the organizational budget - the said group of states is not willing
to bend as much as other state blocs when it comes to agreeing with the United States;
and the United States is equally adamant in such discussions and decision-making
situations vis-a-vis the OIC.
On the other hand, data on the coincidence of UN voting practices between the
United States and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) - to which Israel has
gained permanent membership in 2004 - suggests that traditional geopolitical and/or
economic allies of the United States have voted with it similarly on issues involving
categorical votes at the GA. Figure 3 shows that on average, the states belonging to the
WEOG have voted “yes” with the United States about 65% of the time over the past twenty
years. On consensus votes, the average is higher with voting behavior coinciding almost
89% of the time.

97

Based on US State Department UN Voting Behavior Reports from 1996-2016.
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Figure 3. Voting Practices in the United Nations - Coincidence of Western
European and Others Group (WEOG)98 Voting Behavior and Israel Voting Behavior
with United States Voting Behavior, 1996-2016#

#

Averages calculated using voting data available from multiple US Congressional Reports on UN
Voting Behavior from 1996-2016.
*Data not available for the given year.
Source: United States State Department, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs.
The WEOG is one of five unofficial regional groups in the United Nations formed in 1961 that
acts as a voting bloc and negotiation forum. As of 2010, there are 28 WEOG member-states:
Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. The United States of America was granted sole observer status in the group. In May
2000 Israel became a full member of the WEOG on a temporary basis thereby enabling it to put
forward candidates for election to various UN General Assembly bodies. In 2004 Israel obtained
a permanent renewal to its membership. (UN Department for General Assembly and
Conference Management. Available at http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml)
98
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Graph 1. Weighted* Voting Behavior of OIC and WEOG states relative to US Voting
Behavior at the United Nations General Assembly, 1996-2009

Source: United States State Department, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs.
*The ties represent the average voting coincidence of one state to US votes on categorical
(yes/no) items at the UN General Assembly using “votes only” data from Congressional Reports
on UN Voting Behavior from 1996-2016.
Legend:
Blue Circle - OIC member-state
Red Diamond - Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) member-state
Red Circle in Black Square - member of both the OIC and WEOG

The network graph above (Graph 1) provides another view of the coincidence of OIC and
non-OIC (WEOG) votes with US voting behavior over the past two decades, with the ties
weighted based on the twenty-year coincidence averages for every state vis-a-vis the
United States. The nodes are arranged in the graph with states having the least voting
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coincidence with the United States at the bottom right. As one moves clockwise, the
average voting coincidence increases.
Here, we see that the state which has predominantly voted at odds with the United
States in the General Assembly over time is Syria with its votes coinciding only 13% of the
time. At the extreme end is Israel, which has voted almost identically with the United
States, at least over the past two decades, averaging a 92% coincidence in yes/no votes.
I have chosen to present a weighted network here, to examine the node strength of
the United States - as a key player in the discourse under study - with OIC states on the
one hand, and its traditional allies on the other. Node strength takes into consideration the
weights of ties and has been the preferred measure for analyzing weighted networks
(Opsahl 2010, citing Barrat et al., 2004; Opsahl et al., 2008). While node strength might be
criticized as a “blunt measure” of node centrality - that is, how “central” a node is in a
network or how influential it is based on ‘nearness’ or ‘farness’ - as it only considers the
level of involvement of a node within the network (Opsahl 2010), I argue for its usefulness
in the present analysis, as it precisely this level of involvement of states vis-a-vis one node
(the United States) in relation to voting behavior that I am examining. Ultimately, the node
strength of the United States when it comes to voting behavior in the GA might give us a
sense of the relative influence or power of the country in terms of shaping discourses using
symbolic GA voting as a tool.
By weighting state ties in this particular graph, the data suggest that there are
certain states that not only vote similarly, but that such actors do so together with other
states that possess common attributes. In this case, the average voting coincidence with
US votes shows that OIC states have significantly voted in the opposite direction, along
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alliance lines. Similarly, the WEOG states have voted in line with their bloc, and
analogously with the United States - even if the US only has observer status in that political
group. What is most striking here is that the tie between the United States and Israel - at
least in terms of voting behavior - is very strong compared to other states. While voting
along (WEOG) bloc lines, the tie between Israel and the United States is sui generis within
their own alliance, voting similarly almost 30 points above the WEOG bloc average. Since
the beginning of voting behavior reports in 1986, Israel and the UK have marked the
highest voting coincidence in the General Assembly. The trend continues to this day.
Such findings on the strength of the tie between the US and Israel (and corollary to
that the weakness of ties between Israel/the US and OIC states given their disparity in
voting behavior) might provide support for the argument made in the previous chapter:
The United States and Israel are key allies in the international arena, and the state project
of the United States in relation to security issues in general, and the terrorism discourse in
particular reflects such a tight relationship. The US is keen on supporting the Israeli cause
against Palestine as part of its state project on security issues; and the OIC will hold
ground to defend the Palestinian cause against Israel with the former being a member of
its political alliance. Given the pull of alliances on state behavior, together with the explicit
state projects of both blocs, it is no surprise then that the negotiations on the proposed
UNCCIT have seen a long-standing deadlock.
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Why Alliances?
The voting patterns in the GA between and among the United States, the WEOG,
and the OIC over the past twenty years suggest that state networks - particularly
geopolitical alliances - have significant influence on state behavior within the UN. In
particular, by commanding adherence to regional or collective policies, as well as
ideological and political interests, these alliances are able to dictate how individual states
choose to vote categorically or in consensus, and more significantly, what they advocate
for (or against) in inter-state discussions on policies and actions.
That said, achieving similar voting behavior in relation to specific policies on the UN
agenda is not simply the reason why states join and adhere to certain alliances. Kenneth
Waltz (1979: 125) provides a possible explanation, positing that states join alliances to
form “balances of power” in a system that lacks structural stability. In order to achieve
that stability, states seek allies - and pool their resources, material or otherwise - to
counter the threat of other states’ power and hegemony.
Additionally, in a system characterized by informational asymmetry - a condition
where one party (in this case, a state) can have more or better information than the other
- this art of balancing power through bargaining and decision-making is notably guided by
perceptions (Gartzke 2002:1). As such, states have the incentive to manipulate the
perceptions of other states by any means; and in the UN, it is done by manipulating things
such as voting behavior, and ultimately, the international discourse - for as Foucault (1988)
posits, discourses are expressions of power and a process that can be mobilized to shape
and define social realities. Thus, while resolutions, declarations, and consensus actions at
the General Assembly are legally and operationally non-binding, I argue that the process
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of voting on these agenda items together with allies is crucial not only because such
shapes global policy and international discourse on various issues, but more importantly
because the entire exercise signals which state (or states) possess more power over
another in a highly unstable system of competing interests. The perception of power
acquired by and through alliances in this process can ultimately influence binding
decisions at the Security Council, or otherwise impact international convention
negotiations.
Such has been clear in efforts to define terrorism within the proposed UNCCIT.
Defining terrorism has been used as means by which to assert state power; and in this
particular case, it is asserted through and on behalf of allied interests. Linking it to the
findings of this study on what state projects matter in the definitional debate, I posit that
the deadlock is a function of the inflexibility of both the OIC and the US/West. When
recalling the ways in which both state blocs adhere to their state projects - particularly on
their policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -it is clear that the problem
transcends merely defining terrorism per se; the dilemma is couched on protecting allied
interests, the adherence to which ultimately redounds to the sovereign benefit of each
state involved.
Bridging Networks: How Can the Deadlock End?
Up to this point, our findings have suggested that the strict adherence of the OIC
and the US/Western block to their state projects manifested through collective action
through their networks, are significantly linked to the inability to come to a consensus on
the meaning of terrorism and a comprehensive convention on the phenomenon.
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Understanding the reasons for this deadlock necessarily leads us to ask: is it possible for
the deadlock to end in the foreseeable future? The answer lies in whether there is a viable
path connecting these two otherwise separate networks; a path that can ideally allow
information, ideas, and beliefs to pass - and penetrate - such networks to build more viable
ties. Ultimately, the two networks need a bridge that can trigger a possible path to
compromise.
In network theory, a bridge is a direct tie between nodes that would otherwise be
in disconnected components of a graph. Graph 2 illustrates how bridges work. For
instance, if networks 1, 2, 3 make up a social networking graph, with n1 as a node in
network 1 and n2 as a node in network 2, there is a social tie α between n1 and n2. If were
to α were to be removed, 1 and 2 would become disconnected components of the graph.
This means that α is a bridge. Without α the networks 1 and 2 would have no path or
connection between them. In the same graph, we see that network 3 does not have any
bridges to networks 1 and 2, consequently providing no ties, or any means to connect to
the other two networks.

148

Graph 2. Example of a Bridge in a Social Networking Graph

Bridges are important for networks when it is necessary to transmit information
from one sub-group to another within a larger network (Ahn 2008). This is significant
because social actors, whether individuals, organizations, or nations, shape their everyday
lives through consultation, suggestion, support, nagging, and information and resource
sharing from/with others (White et al. 1976). These information and discursive network
interactions directly or indirectly influence beliefs and attitudes, as well as behavior, action,
and outcomes (Pescosolido 2006: 209).
In examining the OIC and network and the WEOG/US network of states, it becomes
clear that while there is generally coincidence of votes among these states, these votes
do not operationally tie them together as an alliance; rather the voting coincidence ties
shown in Graph 1 are better understood as manifestations of loyalty to or membership in
their particular political bloc. What is vital to look at then, is whether there are ties between
these two networks in terms of membership; that is, whether there are states who can be
ideological or political bridges that might provide an opening or path to compromise. Such
is crucial because social structure - in this case the social ties within the network structure
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through which members become aware of what the others are doing - have effects on
collective behavior and action (Macy 1991: 734, citing Granovetter). According to Macy,
an analysis of the structure of networks might suggest “that collective action may depend
not only on the strength of collective interests but also the network of social ties that
channel the necessary chain reactions” in behavior (Ibid: 735). Consequently, the higher
the network density, i.e., the more connections nodes have within a network, the fewer
mediations are required for information to pass between any randomly selected nodes:
“At maximum density, every node is tied to all others, permitting cues to travel
from any point to any other point without mediation. This condition enables
each actor to choose based on knowledge of what everyone else is doing. At
the other extreme, all ties are disconnected and the network disappears”
(Ibid: 735).
Given these principles, I argue that the possibility of achieving a compromise that can
break the definitional deadlock in the UNCCIT negotiations highly depends on the number
of state connections between the OIC and the WEOG/US blocs. It is not only important
that voting behavior coincides when issues need to be decided on. Rather, and more
significantly, it is crucial that there are operational relationships between these alliances
that act as bridges between them, which would in turn allow information or beliefs to pass
through the international state network more easily. Granovetter’s (1973) argument on the
“strength of weak ties” becomes relevant here. In his theory, Granovetter acknowledges
that individuals (or social actors) have both strong and weak ties because of the variation
in our interpersonal relationships between different groups of people. To put it simply,
strong ties are the people we know well and often interact with; weak ties are more tenuous
in that relationships with them are not as intimate. However, these weak ties are crucial,
following Granovetter’s theory, because they bind groups of strong ties together and
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bridge otherwise isolated networks into contact with each other. As Granovetter posits,
“the degree of overlap of two individuals’ friendship networks varies directly with the
strength of their tie to one another.” In essence, when it comes to sharing information, the
“weak” ties that overlap can build new ties and might encourage more interaction between
existing networks.
The next important question then is this: Is there a bridge between the OIC network
and the WEOG/US network can connect the two and allow for compromise? Are there
member-states that overlap in terms of operational membership that may possibly serve
as that crucial weak tie? The network graph (Graph 3 below) provides a possible answer.

Graph 3. OIC and WEOG Networks with One Path Between Two Networks

Generated using Netdraw from UCINET.

Between the two geopolitical blocs, there is only one country that officially belongs to
both, and consequently serves as a bridge between the two networks: Turkey. As a
country that geographically straddles the European continent (where Istanbul is located)
and Asia, Turkey has long been perceived as a country that has is culturally and socially

151

steeped in “Eastern” and “Western” traditions. As a result, it finds itself straddling these
political lines as well, being a member of geopolitical blocs that cross ideological lines from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to the Council of Europe, and the Western Europe and Others
Group in the UN. It is also the only Muslim-majority country within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
Voting coincidence numbers from 1996-2006 how that Turkey has voted the same
way as the United States about half the time (49%), generally coinciding with the OIC
voting pattern but still scoring significantly higher than the OIC voting coincidence average
with the US of 28%. This might suggest that Turkey politically behaves in a way that might
avoid the ire of the opposing political alliances to which it belongs.
In relation to terrorism, particularly counterterrorism policy, Turkey recently enacted
counterterrorism legislation in 2014 that more closely conformed with the European
Union’s freedom of expression standards with a “narrower definition of terrorist
propaganda” that “criminalizes propagation of the declarations of an illegal organization
only if the content legitimizes or encourages acts of violence, threats or force.”99 Yet, such
legislation arguably provided loopholes that enabled Turkish authorities to “use it to detain
and prosecute thousands of politicians, reporters, and activists”100 that appear to run

From the section on Turkey, in Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, Bureau of
Counterterrorism 149–50 (US Department of State June 2015), Available from
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf. Accessed 2 March 2018.
99

100

Ibid, 150.
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counter to human rights standards in countering terrorism pursuant to the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
The ability of Turkey to serve as that effective bridge between the OIC and WEOG
bloc in the UNCCIT negotiations is also not convincing when we look at how it directly
addresses the terrorist threat within its borders. Recently, foreign fighters and Islamist
extremists - including ISIS/ISIL - have crossed through Turkey and have even consolidated
on Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iraq. The country has also dealt with decades of
attempted Kurdish secession led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karekeren
Kurdistan, or PKK), which has fought to establish a separate Kurdish state since 1984.101
As such, the Turkish government officially views the separatist group as the most
dangerous “terror group” inside Turkey.102 In 2005, when the ruling Justice and
Development Party lost many seats to the Kurdish HDP (People’s Democratic Party), the
government “declared the PKK fundamentally hostile to the nation’s security, threatened
to end the immunity of HDP members of parliament, and lambasted the Kurds in general”
(Pierini 2015). Such a move resulted in its Western allies urging Turkey to reconsider its
policy towards the Kurds and preserve the peace process with regard to the secessionist
issue.103
With the “terrorist” threat from the Kurds, alongside the threat from ISIS/ISIL Turkey
stepped up border security in 2005, and finally allowed NATO aircraft to use its Incirlik

From “Turkey: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Report of the Counter Extremism Project.
Available from https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/turkey. Accessed 26 March 2018.
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102 Ibid.
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Available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60926. Accessed 26 March 2018.
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base in the south - something that Turkey has long resisted - in its fight against these
groups. Shortly after, the US State department reported104 that Turkey now served as a
“critical geographic choke point in the flow of foreign terrorist fighters” to Syria because
of its tighter border security and revised counter-terrorism policy.
While the Graph 3 clearly provides a bridge between the two political networks
under study, the preceding examination of Turkey’s national political context and security
interests in light of the Kurdish insurgency and the ISIS/ISIL threat lead to the conclusion
that this particular overlap in the network does not create an ideal or effective path for
information flow, cooperation, or compromise, at least not in the near future. It is clear that
the country is a relatively weak tie among particular alliances (i.e., among OIC members
on the one hand, and among WEOG members on the other); and following the structural
model, as well as the principles of Granovetter’s theory, Turkey’s dual position within each
of these alliances can arguably be the political bridge that can open up a path to
compromise on the definition of terrorism under the proposed UNCCIT. However, a case
can be made that given the current political and security milieu within which it finds itself
- i.e., having to address political violence in the context of a movement for selfdetermination, while simultaneously having to apply force to thwart transnational, no-state
extremism - Turkey is not in a position to proactively exploit its place as a (weak) tie
between the two networks that can potentially break the deadlock in UNCCIT negotiations.

***

104

The US reported this in its 2015 Country Reports on Terrorism.
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The findings in this chapter point to the importance of alliances in shaping interstate behavior - and ultimately discourses - within the UN, as they become conduits
through which information, stances, and beliefs, may potentially be shared. As noted
earlier in this chapter, two of the main principles of network analysis are that ties between
nodes can be channels for transmission of both material (e.g. weapons, money, disease)
or non-material products (e.g. information, beliefs, norms), and that persistent patterns of
association among nodes create structures that can define, enable or restrict the behavior
of nodes. Applying those principles to the networks between and among state blocks, I
argue that examining such alliances of states is crucial in predicting not only how states
votes on global issues, but also in trying to understand why disagreements and stalemates
occur in UN negotiations.
In relation to the terrorism definitional debate, findings here suggest that the
deadlock in UNCCIT negotiations exists because there is a constant ideological pushand-pull based on the two blocs’ state projects that are reified through their alliances. This
dynamic is that which fundamentally determines the stances of states in the negotiations.
Absent any overlapping node or viable bridge between the two alliances - in practical
terms, without any member-state willing to take on the role of mediator - then there exists
no path to compromise at this point in time. The result: Terrorism will continue to be
undefined within its own discourse.
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CHAPTER 7. Discourse and Dominance: The Power of Shaping a Definition

Discourse as Power
The respect for the sovereignty105 of states has been the canon on which
international relations operates. As a result, the affairs between states, as illustrated by
dealings at the United Nations, have been characterized by a constant power struggle
driven by national interests (Morgenthau 1978: 27, 5). As Foucault posits, the art of
government is therefore about maximizing the power of the state (Foucault 1994).
As noted earlier in this study, power involves an element of domination, coercion,
oppression, or preemption – with the latter conducted by politically socializing people into
blindly accepting assumptions, frames and viewpoints – (Airaksinen 1992; Young 1992;
Lukes 1974). It has also been defined as a position and a relationship situated in a social
setting that may have effects on social interactions (Lukes 1974; Wartenberg 1992).
Applying this understanding of power to the present examination of the definitional debate
in the terrorism discourse, the possible explanation for the deadlock appears to be
straightforward: Control over a particular discourse in international affairs – that is, the
ability to influence thought and practice on a specific global issue – could very well be a
means for a state to obtain power in the form of political status and authority. Controlling
a discourse such as that on terrorism, which directly involves issues of security and

Sovereignty refers to the power and ability of a state to govern its own territory and people to
the exclusion of other states or external institutions. The concept involves internal autonomy (a
set of norms that address the final authority of a state within its borders), an external autonomy
(a set of norms on non-intervention of other states) and an intersubjective dimension
(recognition from other states of that autonomy and authority (Hagel 2011).
105
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sovereignty, thus becomes crucial ammunition in the fight to secure a stable and influential
position in a system that is perennially in conflict.
Honing in on the terrorism discourse, I thus argue that the inability of UN memberstates to agree on what terrorism means for the purpose of having an international
convention is both a manifestation of and a weapon of states in the struggle for state
power. The data at hand suggest that the challenge of achieving a universal,
comprehensive, and legally binding definition of terrorism is shaped not only by the unique
set of security and foreign policy interests of states (i.e. their state projects) on the one
hand, and the influence of their allies on the other, but additionally by each state’s efforts
to achieve dominance through discursive manipulation. Through voting behavior, official
policy statements and collective declarations with allies, states employ frames that steer
views on what terrorism means toward their own interests and ultimately use discourse as
power.
The voting behavior at the GA - as we examined in Chapter 6 - can be viewed as a
conspicuous marker for a state’s overall political clout in international affairs. It is the most
obvious way to measure how much power a state has given a particular issue, relative to
other states. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the patterns surrounding the
coincidence of votes between the OIC and United States/West illustrate the continual tug
for power within the UN; but the more remarkable finding to be extrapolated from these
patterns is that states which have not been historical superpowers106 in the system are

Historically, these superpowers were the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. Superpowers are defined as states that possess great military and economic power
“plus great mobility of power" (Fox 1944). With the decolonization of the British Empire following
106

157

increasingly challenging the status and influence of such superpower states, at least within
a forum where there is theoretical political parity. This is not to say that efforts to
manipulate discourse as power necessarily translate to operational, military, or economic
power for other states; arguably, the United States’ status as a superpower in that regard
remains - and an examination of that debate is indeed merited in a different study.
However, given that power in the international state system comes in many forms, the
most relevant of which (for our present purposes) being the ability to influence the direction
of policy or international law that can have real effects on state interests, then using
discourse to gain political clout in the international state system (absent any military or
economic might of a state) is a very important and strategic tool.
I now turn to an analysis of the relationship of discourse and power as it plays out
in the definitional debate on terrorism, in the context of a proposed international
convention. The section that follows unpacks the various means by which the OIC states
and the US/WEOG states shape and use the terrorism discourse to further their security
state projects - particularly in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - to the detriment
of UNCCIT negotiations.

The Word as Weapon: How States Use Discourse as Power
Terrorism is a staple of the international security agenda at the United Nations. If a
state seeks international power and influence, controlling the discourse on the topic thus
becomes imperative.

World War II, and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States is currently
the only country considered to be a superpower in such a sense (Nossal 1999).
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Foucault (1980;1972) theorizes that discourses are expressions of power as a social
relation and a process that can be mobilized to shape and define social realities. As such,
discourses are abstract constructs that can assign and communicate specific, repeatable
relations to, between, and among objects, subjects, and statements; they are also
knowledge systems that define norms of behavior and thought, as well as the meanings
that are attached to people and institutions that adopt (or do not adopt) these norms
(Foucault 1969). Discourses are shaped by individuals or groups that possess a certain
social status; thus, power necessarily operates through discourses. Consequently, the
discourses that are created and manipulated by those who have the capacity to do so
consequently produce and reify power. Such is the case when states use discourse as
power.
Since discourse is important in the production and reification of (state) power, it is
vital to understand how discourse itself is produced. Hall (1997, 1992: 201-2) posits that
these systems of meaning result from “discursive practice,” where practice involves “the
construction and reflection of social realities through actions that invoke identity, ideology,
belief, and power.” It is not enough, however, that a particular discursive practice or act is
repeated over time (Young and Ortega 2009:1). Discursive practice necessarily involves
recurring face-to-face interactions within a particular context in order for meaning to be
successfully constructed. This is because discourse creation always takes place within a
network of physical, spatial, temporal, social, interactional, institutional, political, and
historical circumstances where participants “do” or perform a practice (Young and Ortega
2009:2). Moreover, meaning is constantly negotiated in interaction rather than being
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present “once-and for-all” in whatever we say (Young and Ortega 2009: 2). The process
does not occur simply in a vacuum.
Given these parameters, I now turn to identifying and understanding the discursive
practices engaged in by states, focusing on the members of the OIC and US/WEOG blocs,
by analyzing the tools of negotiation they employed as reflected in published UN reports
or records of UNCCIT negotiations, as well as in relevant national policy statements on
the proposed convention provisions made at the GA. Upon careful examination, these
documents point to two major discursive practices used by states to create and/or shape
meaning: first, holding informal consultations and bilateral meetings to discuss proposed
provisions (as opposed to high-level summits); and second, employing and championing
certain rhetorical frames - the ’human rights frame’ and the ‘legalist frame’ - in building
and pushing for their positions. Through these means, the OIC and US/WEOG blocs
sought to express their interests and power as player in the state system, and ultimately
gain significant influence on the larger global security agenda.
Behind Closed Doors: The Discursive Practice of Informal Consultations
Negotiations on the proposed UN Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism are facilitated by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (the Legal
Committee). After the Ad Hoc Committee to elaborate an international convention for the
suppression of terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism to supplement related existing international
instruments was established in 1996 - and after years of deliberating on the scope of the
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convention - the Sixth Committee working group began coordinating efforts to take up a
draft for deliberation on September 25, 2000.107
Since negotiations on convention provisions necessarily involved highly charged
political issues - not to mention detailed and potentially unwieldy deliberations on literally
single words and phrases of the proposed text, most of the deliberative work on the draft
convention was done through a series of informal consultations and bilateral meetings,
rather than formal or high-level summits involving all member-states. In 1999, Egypt
proposed a high- level conference108 to discuss the proposed convention. Since then,
Egypt has repeatedly reiterated this call at GA sessions without any success. Resistance
to holding such a conference stems from the belief of some states that a high-level
conference is impractical given the low probability of immediate consensus on defining
terrorism, more so a consensus on a convention about criminalizing that which cannot be
defined. The informal consultations then - the regular face-to-face interactions that we
learned are vital for the efficacy of discursive practices as creators of meaning and
systems of knowledge - were the necessary, and only, means by which state identity,
ideology, belief, and power could be invoked repeatedly. In effect, the terrorism discourse
was transformed at this point in time into one that no longer dealt with strategic or
operational issues; that is, the focus of international discussions had shifted from a

U.N.G.A. Sixth Comm. Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
Report, paras 1,10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/L.2 (Oct. 19, 2000). For a complete history and
chronology of events pursuant to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1996, see the
website of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations on Ad Hoc and Special Committees.
Available at http://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/.
108 A high-level conference means that the top officials and decision makers of states, i.e. highlevel government officials, ministers, senior leaders of international organizations, and depending on the issue - heads of government/state - attend and discuss the issue(s) at hand.
107
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discourse that generally condemned terrorism in all its forms, and created norms to
prosecute specific acts of terror, to one that was obsessed with - and consequently
stymied by - defining what it is.
The specific and nuanced ways by which this transformation took place are
unfortunately hidden from plain view. Given the nature of these consultations and
meetings, there was no media coverage of the deliberations or outstanding issues, nor
any detailed transcripts of such discussions. The UN reports submitted by the Chair and/or
the Coordinator of the Ad Hoc Committee or Working Group are framed as “not official”
and readers are reminded of their use as merely “reference” material rather than official
record. Thus, the unofficial summaries within these published reports do not provide
detailed information on who said what in those consultations, nor do they name specific
member-state delegations in relation to the general points of view outlined in the reports.
Generally, the Chair/Coordinator merely identifies the major points of contention and
couches the general views on them as given by “some delegations.” The only state or
group that is often named in these reports of the Chair or the Coordinator is the OIC, given
that the said political alliance is responsible for proposing the major alternative provisions
as part of its opposition to the original proposed definition of terrorism in the preamble
and Article 2, as well as the exclusionary provisions on state armed forces in Article 18
(A/57/37, para. 9-11).
The singling out of the OIC in these reports came to the attention of one of the
group’s members. Sudan: reiterates a commitment to work together towards the
conclusion of the draft convention. However, in the oral report, while there had been
several references to delegations, only the Organization of Islamic Cooperation had been
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explicitly named. As many delegations agreed with the OIC proposal, it was unfair to single
out that Organization and to suggest that its proposal ran counter to the Bureau’s
proposal. Furthermore, no package existed as proposals were still being considered and
no single one had yet been
The Coordinator repeatedly reports in these summaries that member-state
delegations have varied in support for both proposals “but there was no consensus on
what the texts should be” (A/57/37, Annex VI, para. 3). The OIC counter-proposals thus
formed - and continue to form - the crux of the debate and the consequent impasse, so
much so that all informal consultations and bilateral meetings negotiating the convention
have centered on finding a compromise between the originally proposed text and the OIC
version.
At this juncture, I argue that despite the lack of explicit attribution of roles to states
in the negotiations, these summaries and records do suggest one thing: The mere fact
that the OIC counter-proposal displayed prominence in all these consultations speaks to
the effectiveness of the group’s strategy in shaping the status of the terrorism discourse
according to their interests. At the very least, the strategy is effective in that the OIC states
are overtly and persistently challenging the power of the West, by challenging an imposed
definition of terrorism arguably founded on Western terms. It is important to note that while
the original proposed text in 1996, as well as the revised text for negotiation in 2000, was
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prepared by India, such draft was formulated in consultation with several delegations, the
most notable of which was the United States (Diaz-Paniagua 2008: 524).109
The twenty-year political impasse surrounding the UNCCIT despite the discursive
practice of informal consultations and bilateral meetings that in theory, would have made
negotiations more pointed and manageable, clearly demonstrates that the problem
transcends semantics; rather, the situation illustrates how the terrorism discourse has
become a proxy for the continual power struggle between and among states in the context
of global security issues.
*****
While we are unable to closely examine how states interact in their informal
consultations from the reports of the Chair or the Coordinator due to the exclusion of
detailed transcripts of the meetings, a number of relevant UN General Assembly Official
Records (GAOR), might still be helpful for our purposes. Some of these GAOR reflect
particular statements or stances made by states relevant to the present analysis during
plenary discussions on the proposed convention (and definition). These GAOR provide
insight into which states had a significant hand at molding the discourse, and exactly how
they did so. What these documents tell us is that another discursive practice was
significantly employed by states to control behavior and perceptions: the use and
championing of frames to shape meaning and manipulate the terrorism discourse.
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U.N.G.A. Sixth Comm. Working Group on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Chairman,
―Informal summary of the general discussion in the Working Group,ǁ ¶ 9, in: 2000 Working Group Report, supra
note 38, Annex IV [hereinafter 2000 Chairman‘s Informal Summary].
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Employing Rhetorical Frames as a Discursive Practice
The concept of framing has been used in various fields in the social sciences to
explain how people in a particular context perceive and understand situations and
behavior. The concept is largely attributed to the work of Erving Goffman (1974) in
relation to the use of frame analysis as a research method. In the study of social
movements, Snow and Benford (1998) used framing to posit that social movements are
not only transmitters of mobilizing ideas and beliefs, but also active agents in the
production of meaning for participants, antagonists and observers. As such, groups
that employ frames are “signifying agents deeply embroiled…in the politics of
signification” (198).
The concept can similarly be applied to analyze the relationships between states
in the international system as they engage in meaning-making to shape political
discourse. Fundamentally, frames can be viewed in political life as structures of belief,
perception, and appreciation which underlie policy positions (Schön and Martin Rein
1994: 23). When used to communicate information, frames are powerful rhetorical
entities in that they make some views more salient than others and "induce us to filter
our perceptions of the world in particular ways” highlighting some features of reality
while omitting others (Kuypers 2009: 181).
With this in mind, the use of rhetorical frames as a discursive practice by states
becomes a necessary tool for agenda-setting at the UN. Indeed, determining what is
discussed and, more importantly, shaping how it is discussed in the UN is key to
establishing a state’s status and power in the larger global arena. If a state invokes a
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particular frame repeatedly and does so in every social interaction between or among
other member-states (as how discursive practices should be carried out), then that
state might be able to control perceptions of the issue, direct discussions in line with
their state projects, and ultimately achieve their policy goals.

The Human Rights Frame
The first frame that has been prominently invoked by both sides is what I view
as the Human Rights frame. The link between human rights and (counter)terrorism is a
relatively recent conversation within the discourse. In the 1970s to 1980s, we know
that discussions on terrorism focused on criminalizing acts of terror and were framed
within the context of international criminal law. When counter-terrorism became a top
priority after 9/11 however, the consideration of human rights became one of the pillars
of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, and changed the way in which states
viewed the means by which terrorists (and terrorism) should be dealt with. Today, the
discourse has extended to looking at human rights from the point of view of victims of
terrorism, and not just the accused (Del Villar and Glasberg 2015). As stated by a
senior human rights officer I interviewed who worked at the Counter Terrorism
Executive Directorate at the UN, member-states have recognized the import of human
rights in the fight against terror with the concept becoming a staple in the discourse:

UN Official: “If you see the minutes of the Security Council back in the early 2000s,
when they debated the establishment of the Counter-terrorism
Committee (CTC)...you’ll see some states saying, ‘You know it’s essential
that the CTC take account of human rights.” There were several states,
and the High Commissioner (for Human Rights) herself that specifically
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recommended that there be a Human Rights Office in the CTC…. There
are two reasons for that: One is dismay of states at the failure by many
states to respect human rights in the fight against terror, but also the
clear conviction that counter-terrorism that violates human rights is
counter-productive. As time has gone on, you see more and more have
emphasized human rights. (Resolution) 1373110 doesn’t mention human
rights and now you’ve got to a point that counter-terrorism resolutions
mention human rights.”111
In principle, all UN member-states thus agree that acts of terrorism are
reprehensible and unjustifiable since these crimes fundamentally violate human rights
norms. Invoking the strength of human rights as a political concept - one which has
universal appeal and moral ascendancy - is indeed a discursive practice that states
continually perform as they engage in the terrorism discourse. The reason being that
appealing to human rights as a touchstone for their arguments attaches to it a universal
authoritativeness and legitimacy.
However, the similarity between the OIC and US/WEOG application of that
frame stops there. The adage, “one’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” has
never been a more apropos to describe the core divergence in employing this
particular frame.
Human Rights as invoked by the OIC. On the one end of the spectrum, the
OIC believes that the fundamental human right to self-determination takes precedence
in cases when victims of foreign invasion resort to violent response against their

Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted unanimously on 28 September 2001, is hailed as
the “cornerstone of the United Nations’ counter-terrorism efforts” (Rosand 2003) passed
following the 9//11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The resolution was adopted under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and is therefore binding on all UN member-states.
From the website of the UN: “
111 Interview with author, April 13, 2015, UN Headquarters, New York.
110
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perceived oppressors. This stance necessitates that political violence committed in the
defense of one’s land against alien occupants should not be considered as terrorism
under the definition of the proposed convention.
Even at the nascent stages of the negotiations, some OIC member-states112
called for the need to define terrorism by distinguishing it from the “legitimate exercise
of the right to self-determination,” with some even suggesting that the definition of
terrorism include a reference to “State terrorism,” that would effectively criminalize the
use of force by states in the occupied Palestinian territory, Kashmir, Kuwait, Libya, and
Sudan (Diaz Paniagua 2008: 516, 522 citing multiple UN GAOR).113 Subsequent
instances of negotiation saw various OIC states delivering statements to the GA on
behalf of their political bloc, reiterating this need to respect the legitimate exercise of
self-defense against foreign occupation.114 One very striking statement was delivered
by Iran in 2017, which went a step further than previous declarations by condemning
foreign occupation by a state as the “gravest form of terrorism.” Such utterance

Bahrain, Iraq, Malaysia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen in U.N. GAOR 54th
Sess. Sixth Comm. 31st mtg., paras. 36, 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.31 (Nov. 12, 1999); U.N.
GAOR 54th Sess. Sixth Comm. 32nd mtg., paras. 10, 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.32 (Nov. 15,
1999); U.N. GAOR 54th Sess. Sixth Comm. 33rd mtg., paras 23, 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.33
(Nov. 15, 1999); Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates in U.N. GAOR 51st
Sess. Sixth Comm. 10th mtg., ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.10 (Oct. 3, 1996); U.N. GAOR 51st
Sess. Sixth Comm. 11th mtg., ¶¶ 27, 38, 68, 93, , U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.11 (Oct. 4, 1996);
U.N. GAOR 51st Sess. Sixth Comm. 30th mtg., ¶¶ 61, 80, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.30 (Nov. 1,
1996).
113 Qatar, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, and Pakistan recommended the inclusion of
‘State terrorism’ in the definition - U.N. GAOR 54th Sess. Sixth Comm. 32nd mtg., para. 47,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.32 (Nov. 15, 1999); U.N. GAOR 54th Sess. Sixth Comm. 33rd mtg.,
paras. 4, 29, 44, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.33 (Nov. 15, 1999); U.N. GAOR 54th Sess. Sixth
Comm. 34th mtg., paras. 7, 16, 28, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.34 (Nov. 15, 1999).
114 Multiple statements were given by Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates
and Iran to reiterate this frame.
112
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arguably made an indirect case for state terrorism to be included in the convention.
Iran asserted:
“[T]errorism should not be equated with the legitimate struggle of peoples under
colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation. The brutalisation of peoples
remaining under foreign occupation should continue to be denounced as the gravest
form of terrorism, and the use of State power for the suppression and violence against
peoples struggling against foreign occupation in exercising their inalienable right to selfdetermination should continue to be condemned. The Movement reaffirms its principled
position under international law and in accordance with General Assembly resolution
46/51 of 9 December 1991 as well as other relevant UN resolutions on the legitimacy of
the struggles of people under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for
national liberation and self-determination” (emphasis mine).115

Examining these statements together with national and regional instruments on
terrorism shared by OIC states, I find that this rhetorical frame is fundamentally
grounded in the definition of terrorism found in the 1998 Arab Convention on the
Suppression of terrorism, to wit:

“Article 2a. All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle,
against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in
accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence”
(emphasis mine).

It likewise follows the definition of terrorism in the 1999 Convention of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism:

Article 2(a). Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation,
aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in
accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist
crime (emphasis mine).

Statement by H.E. Mr. Gholamali Khoshroo, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Sixth
Committee, 72nd Session of the GA on “Measures to eliminate international terrorism). 2
October 2017, p.2.
115
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While these definitions seem to be preeminently situated in a human rights frame, we
must be reminded that the advocacy for the right of self-determination that permeates
these instruments is fundamentally couched on the OIC state project discussed in
chapter five; that is, the regional definitions of terrorism in the OIC and the Arab League
were done ultimately with their geopolitical security interests in mind. In particular, the
definitions theoretically and operationally support the Palestinian cause. The statement
of Syria at a GA meeting in 2002 makes this aversion to Israel explicit:

“The greatest danger we face in our fight against terrorism is the Israeli
interpretation of combating terrorism and of resolutions of international
legitimacy, which is based on a pretext of self-defence. What kind of selfdefence is this which permits occupation, settlements, killing and
destruction?”116 (emphasis mine.)
Such a statement, taken together with those scrutinized closely in the analysis of
the OIC state project in chapter five, suggests that the human rights frame is an
attempt of the OIC to create a universal normative impetus for other states to
adopt the group’s proposed definition of terrorism rather than the original
(Western-influenced) text. The strategy was effective at different points from 1996
to 2016 in that other non-OIC states such as Cuba, South Africa, and Bangladesh
came out to support the OIC-formulated provisions. The belief among these nontraditional allies of the OIC was that self-determination is an inviolable human
right, and the alternative text clearly recognized this social reality (Diaz Paniagua

Syria Statement at U.N. SCOR 57th year, 4453rd meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4453, 18 January
2002.
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2008: 588). Add to this the adamancy of the OIC to bend to any new or
consolidated text from Western states, or to even consider a suggested definition
from the Secretary-General in 2005,117 then the frame - as exploited by the OIC gained prominence, if not legitimacy.
Human Rights as invoked by the US/WEOG. Now on the other end of the
spectrum, the US/WEOG bloc of states finds itself employing the same general
human rights frame in a similar effort to build some legitimacy around its idea of
terrorism, as well as their proposed limits to the scope of a comprehensive

In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report titled, “In Larger Freedom: towards
development, security and human rights for all, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005) wherein
he opined:
117

“[w]e must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never becomes a reality. This will
require a new global strategy, which begins with Member-state agreeing on a definition of
terrorism and including it in a comprehensive convention… (p.84)
[T]he moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism have
been hampered by the inability of Member-state to agree on a comprehensive convention
that includes a definition. It is time to set aside debates on so-called ―State terrorism.
The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And
the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the
right to deliberately kill or maim civilians.” (pp. 90-1)
These statements did not sit well with some member-states, with the African Group releasing a
critique of the comments that sided in principle with the OIC stance:
“Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other motives cannot be a
justifiable defense for a terrorist act. However, there is a difference between terrorism and the
legitimate struggle waged by peoples for their liberation or self-determination in accordance with
the principles of international law. (...) The legal definition of terrorism should be the subject of a
treaty concluded by the General Assembly and it is not a matter to be determined and imposed
by the other organs of the UN.” (Malawi Statement on behalf of the African Group, at the
informal thematic consultations of the G.A. on the S.G. report ‘In Larger Freedom‘,22 April 2005
(cited in Diaz Paniagua 2008).
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convention. However, its human rights frame has been instead constructed
around the basic inviolability of the right to human life, on which terrorism
unquestionably and violently infringes. Thus, the group of states argues that
terrorism, in whatever shape or form, can never be justified on any grounds,
irrespective of motivations and objectives (A/62/37, Annex A, section 1). At the
very first instance of pre-9/11 negotiations, Finland on behalf of the European
Union even explicitly stated that their group would not enter into any discussions
that would entertain “exceptions or justifications of acts of terror based on the
motives that prompted the recourse to violence”118 (Diaz Paniagua 2008: 521).
Echoing this view, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel - three states
that have consistently voted in the GA with a high level of coincidence as seen in
chapter five - supported the initial Indian draft of the convention, stressing that
there should be no other exceptions to terrorism other than those already
recognized in the previous instrument,” referring to the Bombings Conventions
adopted before the UNCCIT negotiations began (Diaz Paniagua 2008: 521-22).
That said, the United States - together with the state of the G-8119 made efforts
in 2005 to resolve the impasse pursuant to high-level instructions from their capitals.120

Finland Statement on behalf of the European Union, U.N. GAOR 54th Session Sixth
Committee, 31st mtg. paras. 16 - 18, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/SR.31, 12 November 1999).
119 The Group of 8 (currently G7 due to the suspension of Russia) was an inter-governmental
political forum from 1997 until 2014, with the participation of the major industrialized countries in
the world - the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Canada, and
Russia.
120 From personal records of the Coordinator, Diaz Paniagua (2008), regarding an Aide Memoire
used for foreign policy demarches in July 2005. Diaz Paniagua (2008) notes: “the United States
asked foreign ministers to: ‘instruct your delegation in New York to work constructively before
and during the consultations in July to find a bridge that will resolve the outstanding
impediments to concluding the convention.’ ”
118
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These states acknowledged the importance of the right to self-determination, but
without compromising the effectivity of existing norms and international law on the
exercise of that right. They suggested new language for the preamble, to wit:
Recalling that all peoples have the right of self-determination; and that the
State Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-SelfGoverning and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of selfdetermination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations, in keeping with that Covenant.”121
Nevertheless, while the OIC recognized the effort (Diaz Paniagua 2008: 564), they
maintained that it was not enough and rejected the proposal in favor of their version.
That the same appeal to human rights was made by the OIC and the West
without achieving any consensus on what the proposed convention should define as
terrorism indeed speaks to the malleability of discourse and how this malleability is
exploited for political power. Comparing how the OIC and the United States/WEOG
countries took advantage of the human rights frame, I argue that the OIC has been
able to achieve its goal of not only advocating for the Palestinian cause, but more
importantly showing the United States and the West that it is a force to be reckoned
with. Further, I posit that the unbending behavior of the OIC, their insistence on their
version, and the lack of flexibility (as illustrated by the lack of interest in revising their
proposed text) on the basis of their belief that peoples have a right to defend
themselves from foreign invaders suggests that the OIC has gained more political clout

Diaz Paniagua (2008: 653-54); From the personal records of the Coordinator, United States Proposals on additional preambular language, 25 July 2005.
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for itself in the larger security discourse. Whether that clout is recognized and
respected is the subject of a different analysis altogether.
The Legalist Frame
The subject of ‘State terrorism’ as a form of terrorism that needed to be
included in the UNCCIT has perennially been negated by the United States and its
allies. In order to defend its argument that terrorism was inapplicable to states - and
consequently, that a state’s armed forces cannot be seen as capable committing
terrorism under the proposed convention, the United States invoked the power of
existing international law. Given that state conduct is already regulated by the rules of
international law on the use of force, particularly articles 2.4 and 39 of the United
Nations Charter (Diaz 2008: 529) as well as international humanitarian law, the
American delegation had argued on multiple occasions that member-states need to
respect this social reality instead of trying to exploit the proposed convention for their
interests. Some European states122 also opined that the convention must only fill in the
gaps left by existing international treaties on terrorist acts to the effect that the forms of
terrorism not contemplated by those legal instruments would be the only ones
prosecuted under the UNCCIT (Diaz-Paguiani 2008: 527).
Subsequently, In the 2011 Coordinator’s report on the informal consultations
that took place over that particular session, the Coordinator characterized the
negotiation as essentially one that harked to respecting extant international law:

Statement by Switzerland on a Proposed Amendment to art. 2.1, A/C.6/55/WG.1/CRP.31, 4
October 2000.
122
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“[states were] involved in a process that sought to preserve the acquis of the
existing international legal framework that had been elaborated with the
utmost deliberation, while bearing in mind the continuing application of other
legal regimes. It was recalled that it had been stressed in the course of the
work of the Ad Hoc Committee that the exclusionary elements had been
framed as applicable law clauses because the present convention would
operate against the background of an already existing legal framework in
which a legion of rules already applied and would continue to apply. Indeed,
the Geneva Conventions referred to ‘all measures of terrorism’ being
“prohibited” long before the United Nations had adopted its first counterterrorism instrument.”123
In that same paper, the Coordinator stressed that the various exclusions, framed as
applicable law clauses (by United States and others who agreed with the position),

“should be understood against the general background of paragraph 1 of
draft article 3, which safeguarded the full range of principles and obligations
that the Charter of the United Nations contains, including the right of peoples
to self-determination, as defined in General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)
concerning the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations. The significance of draft article 3, lay in the fact
that it preserved the integrity and operation of such other laws, and did
not seek to alter their scope by the elaboration of the draft convention”
(emphasis mine).
Ultimately, the states that subscribe to the legalist framework in opposing the
OIC’s efforts to 1) include state terrorism, and 2) exclude political violence pursuant to
the right of self-determination, depend on the authority of the notion that the necessity
of respecting human rights must be balanced out by the necessity to respect
international humanitarian law, particularly in the fight against terrorism (A/57/37). It can
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A/66/37 Annex II, Section A para. 5.
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be argued that these states are protecting the legal regime on terrorism that they had a
heavy hand in constructing, in order to preserve their status and power in the
international security agenda.
The statements from the OIC on the other hand, suggest that the Islamic
countries might be conversely trying to seize the UNCCIT negotiations as an
opportunity to construct a comprehensive, universal, and overarching instrument that
could legally trump the current global legal system; one that they feel is partial to
Western interests and key to maintaining the power of the United States, Israel, and
their allies. Once again, it is clear in this circumstance that the choice of states to use
frames as a discursive practice has been a weapon in the struggle for power between
and among states.
Using discourse as power in the context explored in this chapter has ultimately
done one thing: Instead of solidifying terrorism as a security threat that transcends
national interests, it has ossified the discourse into a highly charged political one. In
particular, it has been transformed into a forum for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict from the backend. This was clear to one representative of a member-state of
the WEOG I interviewed:

Q: Why do you think there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism? What
is unique about it? How is it different from genocide or other crimes against
humanity?
State Representative: That’s a really hard question. I would say that terrorism
issues are not just legal issues, they are very much political issues as well. And
certainly, the discussions around terrorism at the UN have very entrenched
positions on terrorism. And I think maybe, one of the biggest roadblocks for us
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on these issues is that it very much comes down to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Q: A conflict which is not particularly distinct relative to other international
crimes?
SR: Yes.
I: So, if that doesn’t get resolved then, there won’t be any consensus around
terrorism?
SR: Yes.124

From the analysis in this chapter, I conclude that the way in which states have used
discourse as a means to gain political power - through the discursive practices of informal
consultations, and human rights and legalistic framing - has indeed contributed to the
definitional debate on terrorism and the current impasse in UNCCIT negotiations. I have
established that such discursive practices were clearly carried out with a view to solidifying
and reifying the state projects of both the OIC as a collective network on the one hand,
and the United States, Israel, and Western allies on the other.

124

Interview with author, 30 December 30 2015 via Skype.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
“Questions are being raised about the problem of the definition of a terrorist. Let us be wise and
focused about this. Terrorism is terrorism. It uses violence to kill and damage indiscriminately to
make a political or cultural point and to influence legitimate Governments or public opinion
unfairly and amorally. There is common ground among all of us on what constitutes terrorism.
What looks, smells, and kills like terrorism is terrorism....(We) must focus on what we all agree is
terrorism without subjective interpretation, and filter out prejudice and unilateralism.”
- British Ambassador to the United Nations, New York, October 1, 2001
A few weeks after the atrocities of 9/11, the British Ambassador argued against
entering into convention deliberations focused on a definition of terrorism, fully believing
that one was not needed. The near certainty by which he claimed that everyone is clear
on the fact that what “looks, smells, and kills like terrorism is terrorism” speaks to how
highly politicized the discourse had become, and - as we have learned in this study continues to be. At the very core of the stymied global quest to define terrorism is a
confluence of three ingredients that when tightly linked produce a political impasse: states,
discourse, and power.
Drawing on Bon Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to examining states, I
argued that particular states - the member-states of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, and the United States and members of the Western Europe and Others
Group at the UN - have engaged in the negotiations on the proposed convention pursuant
to state projects that are founded on their stances relative to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The OIC has pledged unwavering support for the Palestinian cause while the United States
and Israel have maintained the strongest alliance in the Middle East. Adherence to these
state projects have led to proposed definitions of terrorism that boil down to whether
Palestinians or Israeli forces can be considered terrorists when engaging in bilateral
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attacks. In effect, varying political interests manifested through state projects have
contributed to the deadlock.
Pushing for these state projects became more effective through the network
provided by alliances. As shown in the application of network theory to understand how
the OIC and US/Western blocs work, particularly through voting behavior in the General
Assembly as well as analyzing strength of ties and bridges, a stalemate in UNCCIT
negotiations exists because there is a constant ideological push-and-pull based on the
two blocs’ state projects that are reified through their dense alliances. This network
dynamic fundamentally determines the stances of states in the negotiations; and absent
any overlapping node or viable bridge between the two alliances - that is, without any
member-state willing to take on the role of mediator - then I argue that there exists no path
to compromise at this point in time.
Engaging in the UNCCIT negotiations is a means to wield power in transnational
life. Shaping and manipulating the terrorism discourse provides states the opportunity to
construct systems of meaning in relation to the issue, and consequently gain political clout
necessary to influence decision making in the larger security discourse. I have shown here
that the OIC and the US/Western bloc have each employed the discursive practices of
internal consultations and framing (using human rights and legalistic frames) to construct
their arguments in line, ultimately, with their state projects.
The confluence of these three factors lead to the important conclusion that the
definitional debate on terrorism has been carved out with a chisel soaked in the IsraeliPalestinian issue. As clearly expressed by every single official I interviewed, the resolution
to the deadlock depends on a resolution to the conflict. In these terms, it is fair to argue
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that a universal definition of terrorism might not appear in the existing legal regime on
terrorism in the near future.

Do we really need a definition?
From the beginning of the negotiations on the UN Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism (UNCCIT), the United States argued that the process was
impractical, challenging, and even unnecessary given the 19 legal instruments adopted on
terrorist acts (Diaz Paguiani 2008: 522). It even predicted that negotiations would fail given
the varying deep-seated political differences that needed to be solved through a different
forum.
Absent a universal definition of terrorism, the United Nations has pushed for a
pragmatic approach to implementing its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS). The
Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee has been monitoring state compliance
with reporting mandates based on Resolution 1373, where each state must declare the
steps it takes nationally to implement the GCTS. Member-states understand that despite
stalled talks on the UNCCIT and no consensus on what terrorism is or means, terrorism
continues to be a threat and operations against such threat must continue. The 19 treaties
on terrorist acts - though forming a “patchwork”125 of protocols in relation to terrorism in
international law, have also contributed to the legal regime governing global counterterrorism efforts and have provided enough legal backbone to pursue transnational
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Interview with author, UN Legal Affairs officer, 13 April 13 2015.
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terrorists and hold them accountable. It is then fair to ask: do we even need a universal,
legal, and binding definition of terrorism then?
The answer to that question has been mixed. On the one hand, some states have
argued that with a strong legal framework from existing treaties, a universal definition is
not operationally necessary. Terrorists have been pursued and prosecuted, arguably
effectively - by using national criminal laws based on UN treaties and counter-terrorism
guidelines for years. Some UN officials whom I interviewed even opined that though a
definition of terrorism might contribute to the symbolic legitimacy of the UN’s counterterrorism efforts, such would not have a real or significant impact on how counter-terrorism
operations are carried out on the ground.
On the other hand, some member-states and UN legal officers believe that having
a universal and legally-binding definition of terrorism within a comprehensive convention
could serve as an important “catch all”126instrument to prosecute acts that can be
considered terrorism, but which are not covered under existing treaties. Supporting this
idea, Carlos Fernando Diaz Paniagua - former Coordinator for the Ad Hoc Committee
established by GA Resolution 51/210 that is in charge of UNCCIT negotiations - wrote that
not having a definition of terrorism could potentially cause major legal and political
problems (2008: 541-542). State obligations pursuant to treaties and Security Council
resolutions (particularly the post-9/11 Resolution 1373) are “hinged precisely on the
concept of terrorism;” and absent a common understanding of what terrorism is, it may
be difficult to criminalize terrorist acts, deny refugee status to terrorists, and prevent
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activities of terrorist movements in a homogeneous manner. (Ibid: 542). The OIC, through
Qatar once stated that having a comprehensive convention is not merely emblematic; it
has practical usefulness as well:
“The definition of terrorism and the drafting of an international convention to
combat it are not academic or theoretical issues; they are factual, practical
issues. A strict, comprehensive definition of terrorism could help us in waging
the war against it. Proceeding from such a convention, we could set out clearly
those States and groups against whom the war is targeted, those who are
qualified to lead the struggle against terrorism and terrorists, and the ways and
means to be used in such a war.”127
This dissertation shows, however, that both the symbolic and operational need for
a universal definition of terrorism to strengthen the theoretical and legal regime on the said
security issue only comes second to the political interests of states. Securing a position
of power and political strength in the international state system is instead what is most
essential for these entities that belong to it.
At this point in history, unless a member-state that is politically situated within the
OIC and the US/WEOG alliances - such as Turkey - is willing to serve as the bridge or
mediator between those opposing alliances, then a possible path for these states to speak
the same language and come to a compromise remains blocked.

Statement of Qatar on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. U.N. SCOR 57th
year, 4453rd meeting, resumption 1, at 18 - 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4453. Jan. 18, 2002; also cited
in Diaz Paniagua (2008: 452).
127
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A View to the Future: A New Mandate for Scholars and Policy-makers
The definitions of terrorism that have been proposed within the global discourse
throughout recent history have focused on physically violent nature of terrorist acts from bombings and shootings, to beheadings and chemical attacks. Such stereotypes
about what terrorism “looks like” however, clearly predate the forms into which
terrorism has evolved in recent times, and consequently leave out the consideration of
acts that do not fall within the traditional ambit of current international law. One of
those new forms is cyberterrorism.
As UN member-states are stuck in a political quagmire seeking to define
terrorism as the enemy and are unable to pull themselves out of it, that enemy is
getting smarter and stronger. Individual transnational terrorists, cadres of individuals,
or states themselves - as we have seen with attempts by Russia to influence the 2018
US elections128 - are exploiting the unfettered nature of cyberspace, making
cyberattacks increasingly common as a means of spreading fear for a political cause.
Cyberterrorism and its implications to the terrorism discourse - while worthy of
more scholarly consideration - have not been discussed in this project as the topic is
beyond the study’s intended scope. It is an area of research however that I believe
needs to be properly and extensively explored not only by security analysts and
political scientists, but more importantly sociologists. By providing a sociological lens
to examining terrorism as a social fact, and a staple of transnational political life,

United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence Statement on Declassified
Intelligence Community Assessment of Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S.
Elections
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practitioners and policymakers might be able to benefit from an analytical view that
attends to the nuances of the terrorist threat and social milieu within which terrorists
operate.
As stated at the beginning of this dissertation, the objective of this study was to
provide an analysis that would unpack the sociological significance of not having a
global consensus on the definition terrorism. I have attempted to probe into why and
how such a discursive challenge exists in the first place, with the hope of finding
spaces for compromise in the policy arena.
While the newfound knowledge gained here on how the link between states,
networks, and power has shaped the definitional debate on terrorism and the larger
global terrorism discourse may not have provided a categorical solution to the
discursive crisis, I maintain hope that it has at least contributed to the sociological and
political conversation on terrorism, as well as to the important process of
understanding - and hurdling - the global challenges to quelling the terrorist threat.

###
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APPENDIX
Current Draft of the proposed UN Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism (Appendix II of GA Resolution A/59/894, presented for negotiation on 12
August 2005)
__________________________________________________________________________________________

A/59/894
Appendix II

Draft comprehensive convention against international terrorism
Consolidated text prepared by the coordinator for discussion *
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Recalling the existing international treaties relating to various aspects of
the problem of international terrorism, in particular the Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14
September 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at
Montreal on 23 September 1971, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973, the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York
on 17 December 1979, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October 1979, the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on
24 February 1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988, the
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988,
the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of
Detection, done at Montreal on 1 March 1991, the International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December
1997, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December 1999 and the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New
York on 13 April 2005,
Recalling also the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism annexed to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994,

* This consolidated text, except for paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 20, is taken from document
A/57/37, annexes I, II and III, with minor editorial changes. Paragraph 10 of the preamble was circulated
by the present coordinator on 29 July 2005. Article 20 reproduces the text proposed by the former
coordinator for article 18, contained in document A/57/37, annex IV. It is understood that all other
amendments and proposals remain on the table.
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Recalling further the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed to General Assembly
resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996,
Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations, which endanger or take innocent lives,
jeopardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the dignity of human
beings,
Reaffirming their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever
committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States
and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States,
Recognizing that acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a
grave violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may
pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly relations
among States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the undermining of
human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic bases of society,
Recognizing also that the financing, planning and inciting of terrorist acts
are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and that
it is the duty of the States Parties to bring to justice those who have participated
in such acts,
Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including
those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is an essential element
in the maintenance of international peace and security and the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of States,
Noting that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at
Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
done at New York on 31 January 1967, do not provide a basis for the protection
of perpetrators of terrorist acts, and stressing the importance of the full
compliance by the Parties to those instruments with the obligations embodied
therein, including, in particular, the principle of non-refoulement,
Reaffirming that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Declaration of Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right
to self-determination, freedom and independence, and that those peoples that
have been forcibly deprived of its exercise have the right to struggle to that end,
in conformity with the relevant principles of the Charter and of the abovementioned Declaration,*
Bearing in mind the necessity of respecting human rights and international
humanitarian law in the fight against terrorism,
Realizing the need for a comprehensive convention against international
terrorism,
Have resolved to take effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism and
to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist acts do not escape prosecution and
punishment by providing for their extradition or prosecution, and to that end
have agreed as follows:
* It is understood that further consideration of this paragraph might be necessary.
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Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention:
1.
“State or government facility” includes any permanent or temporary
facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State,
members of a Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or
employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or
officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official
duties.
2.
“Military forces of a State” means the armed forces of a State which
are organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary
purpose of national defence or security and persons acting in support of those
armed forces who are under their formal command, control and responsibility.
3.
“Infrastructure facility” means any publicly or privately owned
facility providing or distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as
water, sewerage, energy, fuel, banking, communications, telecommunications
and information networks.
4.
“Place of public use” means those parts of any building, land, street,
waterway or other location that are accessible or open to members of the public,
whether continuously, periodically or occasionally, and encompasses any
commercial, business, cultural, historical, educational, religious, governmental,
entertainment, recreational or similar place that is so accessible or open to the
public.
5.
“Public transportation system” means all facilities, conveyances and
instrumentalities, whether publicly or privately owned, that are used in or for
publicly available services for the transportation of persons or cargo.

Article 2
1.
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a)

Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an
infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in
paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in major
economic loss;
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act.
2.
Any person also commits an offence if that person makes a credible and
serious threat to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present
article.
3.
Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an
offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article.

196

4.

Any person also commits an offence if that person:

(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph
1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in
paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article; or
(c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth
in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of the present article by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the
commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article;
or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit
an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article.

Article 3
Where the present Convention and a treaty dealing with a specific category
of terrorist offence would be applicable in relation to the same act as between
States that are parties to both the present Convention and the said treaty, the
provisions of the latter shall prevail.

Article 4
The present Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed
within a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that
State, the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State and no other
State has a basis under article 7, paragraph 1 or 2, of the present Convention to
exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 9 and 13 to 17 of the
present Convention shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases.

Article 5
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:
(a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences
set forth in article 2 of the present Convention;
(b) To make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which
take into account the grave nature of these offences.

Article 6
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including,
where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the
scope of the present Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious
or other similar nature.
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Article 7
1.
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 of the present Convention
when:
(a)

The offence is committed in the territory of that State; or

(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that
State or an aircraft which is registered under the laws of that State at the time
the offence is committed; or
(c)

The offence is committed by a national of that State.

2.
A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence
when:
(a) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her
habitual residence in the territory of that State; or
(b) The offence is committed wholly or partially outside its territory, if
the effects of the conduct or its intended effects constitute or result in, within its
territory, the commission of an offence set forth in article 2; or
(c)

The offence is committed against a national of that State; or

(d) The offence is committed against a State or government facility of
that State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises
of that State; or
(e) The offence is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or
to abstain from doing any act; or
(f) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by
the Government of that State.
3.
Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present
Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the jurisdiction it has established under its domestic law in
accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article. Should any change take
place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-General.
4.
Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 2 in cases where
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that person
to any of the States Parties that have established their jurisdiction in accordance
with paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article.
5.
When more than one State Party claims jurisdiction over the offences set
forth in article 2, the relevant States Parties shall strive to coordinate their
actions appropriately, in particular concerning the conditions for prosecution
and the modalities for mutual legal assistance.
6.
Without prejudice to the norms of general international law, the present
Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction
established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Article 8
States Parties shall take appropriate measures, in conformity with the
relevant provisions of national and international law, including international
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human rights law, for the purpose of ensuring that refugee status is not granted
to any person in respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that
he or she has committed an offence set forth in article 2 of the present
Convention.

Article 9
1.
States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in
article 2 of the present Convention by taking all practicable measures, including,
if necessary and where appropriate, adapting their domestic legislation, to
prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the
commission, within or outside their territories, of those offences, including:
(a) Measures to prohibit the illegal activities of persons, groups and
organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or engage
in the commission of offences set forth in article 2;
(b) In particular, measures to prohibit the establishment and operation of
installations and training camps for the commission of offences set forth in
article 2.
2.
States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of the offences set
forth in article 2, in accordance with their domestic law, by exchanging accurate
and verified information and coordinating administrative and other measures
taken as appropriate to prevent the commission of offences set forth in article 2,
in particular by:
(a) Establishing and maintaining channels of communication between
their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange
of information concerning all aspects of offences set forth in article 2;
(b) Cooperating with one another in conducting inquiries, with respect
to the offences set forth in article 2, concerning:
(i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons in respect of
whom reasonable suspicion exists that they are involved in such offences;
(ii) The movement of funds, property, equipment or
instrumentalities relating to the commission of such offences.

other

3.
States Parties may exchange information through the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) or other international and regional
organizations.

Article 10
1.
Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall
take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or
organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the
management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an
offence set forth in article 2 of the present Convention. Such liability may be
criminal, civil or administrative.
2.
Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of
individuals having committed the offences.
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3.
Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in
accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article are subject to effective,
proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such
sanctions may include monetary sanctions.

Article 11
1.
Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who is
alleged to have committed an offence set forth in article 2 of the present
Convention may be present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the
facts contained in the information.
2.
Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in
whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the
appropriate measures under its domestic law so as to ensure that person’s
presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.
3.
Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of the
present article are being taken shall be entitled:
(a) To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate
representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is
otherwise entitled to protect that person’s rights or, if that person is a stateless
person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually resides;
(b)

To be visited by a representative of that State;

(c) To be informed of that person’s rights under subparagraphs (a) and
(b) above.
4.
The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of the present article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory
of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that
the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes
for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 of the present article are
intended.
5.
The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present article shall be without
prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in
accordance with article 7, paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (a), of the present Convention to
invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and
visit the alleged offender.
6.
When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a person into
custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, the States Parties which have established jurisdiction in
accordance with article 7, paragraph 1 or 2, and if it considers it advisable, any
other interested States Parties, of the fact that such person is in custody and of
the circumstances which warrant that person’s detention. The State which makes
the investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 of the present article shall
promptly inform the said States Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether
it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

Article 12
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1.
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present
shall, in cases to which article 7 of the present Convention applies, if it does not
extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or
not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue
delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a
grave nature under the law of that State.
2.
Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or
otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person
will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the
trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was
sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree
with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional
extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth
in paragraph 1 of the present article.

Article 13
Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other
measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to the present
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights
and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which
that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including
international human rights law and, in particular, the Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners.

Article 14
1.
States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance
in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings brought
in respect of the offences set forth in article 2 of the present Convention,
including assistance in obtaining evidence at their disposal necessary for the
proceedings.
2.
States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of the
present article in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual
legal assistance that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or
arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance
with their domestic law.
3.
Each State Party may give consideration to establishing mechanisms to
share with other States Parties information or evidence needed to establish
criminal, civil or administrative liability pursuant to article 10 of the present
Convention.

Article 15
None of the offences set forth in article 2 of the present Convention shall
be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a
political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an
offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or
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for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the
sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a
political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.

Article 16
Nothing in the present Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an
obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State
Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for
offences set forth in article 2 of the present Convention or for mutual legal
assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion,
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request
would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons.

Article 17
1.
A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of
one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes
of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining
evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offences under the present
Convention may be transferred if the following conditions are met:
(a)

The person freely gives his or her informed consent; and

(b) The competent authorities of both States Parties agree, subject to
such conditions as those States Parties may deem appropriate.
2.

For the purposes of the present article:

(a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority
and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise
requested or authorized by the State from which the person was transferred;
(b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay
implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from
which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed,
by the competent authorities of both States;
(c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the State
from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the
return of the person;
(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence
being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for the time spent
in the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.
3.
Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in
accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her
nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other
restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that
person is transferred in respect of acts or convictions anterior to his or her
departure from the territory of the State from which such person was transferred.

Article 18
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1.
The offences set forth in article 2 of the present Convention shall be
deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing
between any of the States Parties before the entry into force of the present
Convention. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.
2.
When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which
it has no extradition treaty, the requested State may, at its option, consider the
present Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set
forth in article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided
by the law of the requested State.
3.
States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as extraditable
offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of
the requested State.
4.
If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the
purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed
not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States
that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraphs 1 and
2, of the present Convention.
5.
The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between States
Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be
modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with
the present Convention.

Article 19
The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in
accordance with its domestic law or its applicable procedures, communicate the
final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
who shall transmit the information to the other States Parties.

Article 20
1.
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international law, in
particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and
international humanitarian law.
2.
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are
understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that
law, are not governed by the present Convention.
3.
The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise
of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of
international law, are not governed by the present Convention.
4.
Nothing in the present article condones or makes lawful otherwise
unlawful acts, nor precludes prosecution under other laws.

Article 21
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States Parties shall carry out their obligations under the present
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and
territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs
of other States.

Article 22
Nothing in the present Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in
the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction or performance
of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State
Party by the law in force in that State Party.

Article 23
1.
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the present Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them,
be submitted to arbitration. If, within six months of the date of the request for
arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration,
any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice, by application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2.
Each State may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or
approval of the present Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not
consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of the present article. The other States
Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of the present article with respect to
any State Party which has made such a reservation.
3.
Any State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2
of the present article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 24
1.
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States from …
to … at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
2.
The present Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval.
The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3.
The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State. The
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.

Article 25
1.
The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following
the date of the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
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2.
For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the
Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 26
1.
A State Party may denounce the present Convention by written notification
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2.
Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which such
notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 27
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send
certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto
by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention.
Done at New York this … of … two thousand and five.
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